Hi Edwina, It clarifies. For instance, what would you say is the "Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction?
Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relation*s *in the plural - and > there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is > because each of the three can function in a different modal category. I > don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this > possibility. > > Furthermore, Pierce himself refers to these relations in their > particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic > objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories, where Peirce outlines that > such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in > regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined > as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, > sinsign, legisign'. > > Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relation*s*', as in 'genuine > triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The > Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and > 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is > irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still > three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the > dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its > habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'. > > As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, > where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] > and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on > the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring > the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own > relation to the object' [8.332]. > > The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in > itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object) > but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several > Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as > the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object. That > is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and > truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before > one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to > that Dynamic Object. > > Does this clarify or muddle? > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, > Inquiry > > Edwina, Frances, List, > > This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute. > If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term), > then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the > 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment > in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only > the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. > > If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic > semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as > soon as an *actual *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in > some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in > Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to). > > I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that > a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" > *because that > formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a > Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant > shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself > stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine > triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different > formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and > others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine > triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration > of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) > suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just > not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your > "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that > > …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* > sign > determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with > something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. (emphasis > added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary) > > > and if so, how does it? > > I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign > object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris' > syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle" > into semiotics). > > Best, > > Gary > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as >> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. >> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something >> else. That's not, in my view, Peirce. >> >> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a >> Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that >> exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic >> set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a >> Sign. >> >> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with >> other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another >> molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is >> this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see >> Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the >> riddle]. This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of >> discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other >> discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to >> referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca> >> To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, >> Inquiry >> >> >> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently >> that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is >> not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean >> stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some >> references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" >> (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents >> some other referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to any kind >> of signer. In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" >> some "sign object" for some "sign effect" to be a sign overall, but that >> the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or "endure" any meaning at all to be >> such a sign, even if it may or can or will "yield" some meaning to an able >> signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be a crude sign or not much of >> a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some degree. >> >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> >> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. 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