In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relations in the plural - and there
are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is because
each of the three can function in a different modal category. I don't see how
defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this possibility.
Furthermore, Pierce himself refers to these relations in their particularity.
For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335,
Welby Signs and Categories, where Peirce outlines that such a relation is
defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in regard to its relation
to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined as 'rheme, dicent,
argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, sinsign, legisign'.
Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relations', as in 'genuine triadic
relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The Categories in
Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and 'triadic relations'
1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is irreducible. It can't be
built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still three 'tails', three 'lines
of identity', three interactions: that with the dynamic object; that of the
representamen in itself, which means, with its habits; and that with the
'signified interpretant'.
As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, where "a
sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] and "A sign
therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and
to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant
into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object'
[8.332].
The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in
itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object) but
the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several Interpretants
- including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as the
Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object. That is, the
continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and
truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before one
has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to that
Dynamic Object.
Does this clarify or muddle?
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
Edwina, Frances, List,
This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute. If
one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term), then,
one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the 10-fold
sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment in some
actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only the case in a
strictly analytical or formal sense.
If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic semiosis
(another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as an
actual interpretant is involved, there is 'meaning' in some sense (at least in
some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example which
Edwina occasionally refers to).
I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that a
sign be defined as the three relations, "input/mediation/output" because that
formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a
Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant shall
stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself stands.
This again brings up the question of what constitutes a genuine triadic
relation in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different formulation, is it
one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and others on this list,
including me, have argued that it is one genuine triadic relation, and that
seeing semiosis--especially in consideration of its continuity--as three
relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) suggests a kind of linear and,
indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just not seeing this clearly enough, so
I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your "three relations" model square with
Peirce's seeming insistence that
…a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. (emphasis added.
NEM 4:20-1 in the Commens dictionary)
and if so, how does it?
I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign
object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris'
syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle" into
semiotics).
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as
semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else.
That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something
else. That's not, in my view, Peirce.
My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a
Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that exists as
a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic set of
Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a Sign.
Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with other
matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another molecule, one cell
with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is this continuity of Form
which enables this continuity of Connections [see Peirce's outline of the
development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the riddle]. This is the process of
semiosis - that continuous formulation of discrete units formed within a habit,
which are in interaction with other discrete units. As formed and networked,
[which is not at all similar to referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'.
Edwina
----- Original Message ----- From: <frances.ke...@sympatico.ca>
To: "'Peirce List'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy,
Inquiry
Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that
a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign,
but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but
perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My grasp
of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even just noise)
is an ordinary object that at least represents some other referred object and
to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer. In other words, the
"sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign object" for some "sign
effect" to be a sign overall, but that the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or
"endure" any meaning at all to be such a sign, even if it may or can or will
"yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be
a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some
degree.
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