Hi Clark, list,
There is a phenomenon of mouse corneal striping/twisting/spiraling that is unexplained. For instance: “Corneal stripes and spirals are also visualised in some human conditions (Bron 1973) and are unexplained. They may reflect failure of centripetally migrating cells to meet precisely at the centre of the tissue or could arise from small stochastic variations in movement of the epithelial sheet. The causes of centripetal movement are still unknown and possibilities include (1) population pressure from the periphery due to production of new TACs by LESCs (2) preferential desquamation of epithelial cells from the central cornea drawing peripheral cells toward the centre (3) chemotaxis involving a gradient resulting in either attraction to a central signal or repulsion from the periphery (e.g. limbal blood vessels) (4) stimulation by corneal nerves (5) response to endogenous electric currents due to ion flow in wounded and unwounded corneas…” ~Mort et al., 2012 So, we begin with the “What is?” question. That is: “That to which the question “What is?” points is the *eidos* of a thing, the shape or form or character or “idea” of a thing. It is no accident that the term *eidos* signifies primarily that which is visible to all without any particular effort or what one might call the “surface” of the things. Socrates started not from what is first in itself or first by nature but from what is first for us, from what comes to sight first, from the phenomena.“ ~ Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History So, we begin with pondering the phenomenon in all its aspects, in search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved. You ponder it, you measure it, you honor it… If you note above from the Mort et al report, the search is constrained to physiological/chemical and not mechanical or even magnetic (which I did not treat). I think this is due to the fact that chemotactic mechanisms are more familiar to cell/developmental biologists. At least, that’s how I started. Then, you construct some heuristics and compute consequences. The heuristics were constructed after measurement of the form, which revealed a phi spiral. There are distinct advantages to working with multiple models (Chamberlin). The relations to phyllotaxis are many, including the development of procedures for going from phenomenon to numerical analyses/computational; and also based on some physical analogies, such as treatment of the tissue as a generic, centric representation of a pressure vessel. Moreover, the phi ratio is used in different ways, at different scales, including one for fibril packing. Upon computation, the deduction reveals a relevance relation, a logarithmic spiral. This satisfies some. But to me, that’s not the decider. The decider is the entire sum of relations that comes to the inquisiturus. For instance, that a possibility of a maximum entropy configuration is feasible if mechanical methods are applied. There’s a lot of information searchable using Google, nowadays, and we’re supposed to be curious. So, we provisionally accept the FEM model based on uberty. So, IBE operates when selecting the best model, a best among a lot of models; not all models but the ones that have been examined; not a thousand models but two; two, which may not exhaust all possibilities but enough to satisfice when judged based on economy of time, money, effort, etc…. As for thumos and spiritedness: Logic depends on ethics, which depends on esthetics. “…only the man in whom reason properly cultivated rules the two other parts properly cultivated, *i.e. *only the wise man, can be truly just… …in the soul spiritedness occupy a higher rank than desire…” As for the sign relation, if …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* sign determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. Then, C: the object that is observed, phi spiral on mouse corneas (a sign) A: FEM model and not Netlogo (a sign) B: hierarchical/structural optimization of corneal collagen arrangements. (a sign) Further inquiry will settle this business of whether more precise atomistic models will be requested after the Urphanomen is recognized, that is, whether we will continue to seek precision or whether we’ll simply get bored. That is, truth is the consensus opinion fated to be agreed upon at the end of inquiry. "Perhaps it is our conceit that there is only one way of understanding a phenomenon..." ~Bruner, *On Knowing*... hth, Jerry R On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, Frances, List, > > This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute. > If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term), > then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the > 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment > in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only > the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. > > If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic > semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as > soon as an *actual *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in > some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in > Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to). > > I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that > a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" > *because that > formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a > Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant > shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself > stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine > triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different > formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and > others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine > triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration > of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) > suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just > not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your > "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that > > …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* > sign > determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with > something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. (emphasis > added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary) > > > and if so, how does it? > > I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign > object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris' > syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle" > into semiotics). > > Best, > > Gary > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as >> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. >> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something >> else. That's not, in my view, Peirce. >> >> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a >> Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that >> exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic >> set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a >> Sign. >> >> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with >> other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another >> molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is >> this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see >> Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the >> riddle]. This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of >> discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other >> discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to >> referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >> To: "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]> >> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, >> Inquiry >> >> >> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently >> that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is >> not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean >> stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some >> references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" >> (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents >> some other referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to any kind >> of signer. In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" >> some "sign object" for some "sign effect" to be a sign overall, but that >> the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or "endure" any meaning at all to be >> such a sign, even if it may or can or will "yield" some meaning to an able >> signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be a crude sign or not much of >> a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some degree. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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