Clark, Kirsti, List: > On Apr 25, 2016, at 1:37 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > As I understand it these issues of metamathematics are an ongoing fruitful > area of mathematics. I’ll confess I don’t know as much about it as I perhaps > should. I’m more familiar with certain “uses” of Gödel and meta-languages in > philosophy. While none of these are in the Peircean arena, I think they fit > in rather well. (Inquiry as a continual generation of higher metalanguage in > terms of semiosis)
Thanks, Clark, for a very provocative post. To me, your assertions set-up an opportunity for a long-simmering but ineffable question. It is a fact that the natural sciences use several notational systems to express the consequences of inquiries. These notational systems use different meanings of symbols in order to create a coherent (logical, mathematical) expression of beliefs about relations within nature. (Consider the symbolization of time in physics, chemistry and music!) Yet, there is an intrinsic unity to the experience of time itself (if it has a self!) Why do you believe that: > While none of these are in the Peircean arena, I think they fit in rather > well. (Inquiry as a continual generation of higher metalanguage in terms of > semiosis) ? Cheers Jerry
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