Jerry. Clark, list,
Jerry wrote:
Of course, things are always more complex than they first appear.
I would argue for a completely connected world if my purpose were
metaphysical in nature.
But, language itself separates the world from its totality into
manageable parts.
And culture has found it convenient to separate academic disciplines.
Language does definitely NOT (all by itself) separate the world into
parts. A speaker or a writer, or a community of those may. Such a way of
using language has a history & relies on such.
In saying so, you show how deeply you are committed to the (still
dominant) nominalistic metapsysics.
It does not matter, whether you wish or wish not to talk about (or
study) metaphysics. Your, or anyone's, metaphysical commitments always
remain implicated in your wtitings, as is always the case.
Language is something people use to communicate their thougts and ideas.
Language ITSELF bends just as well to the purposes of communicating on &
about interconnections of everything & all in the world.
Ferdinard de Saussure made the mistake of taking A WORD as a reasonable
approximation for units of meaning. - Well, how do you feel about
NUMBERS? - Are they, for you, something like reasonably manageable
approximations?
I truly wish to hear your answer to THIS question. (Not just approximate
wandering around the question).
CSP does sometimes refer to grammar in linguistic sense. Mostly in a
very critical way.
Logical grammar presents a very different view on the issue.
I think you are after logical grammar, but get tangled in linguistic
issues.
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 20.4.2016 18:17:
List, Clark:
On Apr 19, 2016, at 2:25 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
I raise this not necessarily to disagree but to just suggest that
things are more complex than they first appear - and perhaps in a
fashion Peirce would have agreed with. (I think Putnam’s paper on
semi-empirical methods is in its way very Peircean - it in
particular makes me think of how metaphysics can be verified)
Returning to the question of units and mathematics/nature if the
unit of mathematics is the sign and we simultaneously embrace a
semiotic realism as underlying nature then I wonder if they are
different as they sometimes appear. That is, is the basic unit of
nature really some finite spatial object?
Of course, things are always more complex than they first appear.
I would argue for a completely connected world if my purpose were
metaphysical in nature.
But, language itself separates the world from its totality into
manageable parts.
And culture has found it convenient to separate academic disciplines.
I am simply saying that habits of PURE mathematicians do not allow
non-mathematical terms in mathematical reasoning, although they co-op
many, many terms from other disciplines and use them in a different
sense.
Applied mathematics, as a derogatory term to pure mathematicians,
permits sloppy usage. Perhaps, such is the case with Mochizuki case,
which remains open as to what it is.
The issue of concern to me is the interpretation given to the
meta-languages that use mathematical symbols.
Tarski’s insistence of the role of meta-languages in logical and
mathematical communication seems to be one of the roots of the
“purification” of mathematical proofs - and in logic itself. (See
13 Questions Universal Logic paper)
That is, is the basic unit of nature really some finite spatial
object?
The challenge such a question offers is that the difference that makes
a difference is the distinction between percept and precept.
From what perspective are you asking the question?
BTW, you-all may interested in the paper by Carl Hempel,
THE THEORETICIAN'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF THEORY
CONSTRUCTION
as a comparison to CSP’s perspectives.
Cheers
Jerry
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