Jerry R, list, Jerry asked: "In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete inquiry*? That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something that ought to have a technical definition?"
I'm away from my desk for the remainder of the weekend and I haven't any books, etc. at my disposal, so I'll keep this very brief. I have been using the expression "complete inquiry" to refer to Peirce's understanding of such an inquiry as he explicates it in the N.A. There he writes: "My present abstract will divide itself into three unequal parts. The first shall give the headings of the different steps of every well-conducted and complete inquiry, without noticing possible divergencies from the norm." He will outline the stages of a complete inquiry as, firstly, the formation of a hypothesis (abduction or there, perhaps, retroduction), then the deduction of the implications of the hypothesis which would necessarily follow if it were true, and finally, employing such deductive implications as may be useful in devising an inductive test of the hypothesis to see to what extent it conforms to reality and, of course, the actual testing of the hypothesis. So, abduction (1ns) then deduction (3ns) then induction (2ns). That's pretty rough, but I hope it helps for now. Best, Gary R xx [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 6:13 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Gary, Jon and list, > > In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete inquiry*? > That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something > that ought to have a technical definition? > > Thanks, > Jerry R > > On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> Jon, list, >> >> Jon wrote: "I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I >> already know that you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program." >> >> Although, surely *de gustibus non est disputandum*, for me, as regards >> music of the classical period, Mozart has no peer, and this particular >> work, the Great Mass in C-minor, represents for me the highest achievement >> in large scale composition for orchestra, chorus, and soloists in any era. >> I just mention this because you singled out Mozart in your comment above; >> so, FYI, here's an excellent Youtube video of a live performance of the >> Massl. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTI_z714dOo >> >> I will later in this message make a remark about Mozart's approach to >> composition which will, hopefully, connect him to some of the issues >> brought up in this thread. But returning specifically to the topics of our >> recent discussion, you quoted me and commented: >> >> GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to >> this order [he comments on deduction 1st, then abduction, then induction]. >> >> JS: I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches >> any particular significance to the order of the premisses within each >> inferential process? >> >> But to reiterate what I earlier wrote, it seems to me that the reason >> that Peirce attaches no particular significance to his analysis of the >> inference patterns as analyzed in the passage from 'TLoM' is that he not >> explicitly concerned there with methodeutic, specifically, the stages of a >> complete inquiry. Rather, his subject is a piece--albeit a rather >> fundamental one, imo--of critical logic. >> >> You also wrote: JS: what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least >> muddled, if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of >> process)? >> >> Jon , I just can't see it your way; believe me, I have tried to, but >> to no avail. After decades of reflecting on Peirce's thinking about these >> matter, and after (re)reading your various post on the topic, while for me >> the *vector of process*, while perfectly expressing the ordering of a >> complete inquiry (again, in methodeutic) does not categorially analyze >> abductive inference. In short, and I suppose for the umpteeth time, I agree >> with Peirce's analyses in those two different passages just mentioned (also >> others), that which the CP editors connected in a footnote for a reason. >> >> In such places he offers abduction as the mirror of deduction, both >> inference patterns *commencing at the rule*, deduction following what he >> calls the *order of involution* n 'TMoL', abduction moving in the >> opposite direction because it merely represents a 'guess', what the >> theorist imagines may* possibly* be the rule,* the rule* nonetheless. >> So, as you recently diagrammed it. >> >> JS: It appears to me that he then presents the second inferential process >> as Rule/Result/Case (vector of representation) ... >> >> *Abduction* >> >> ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case >> (1ns); >> |> * first, the living law (3ns); >> *** finally, the subsumption of that case and the condition of the law >> (2ns). >> >> >> What perhaps interests me most especially in this and the 'bean' >> formulations of all three inference, and something which I think Peirce has >> good reason to rather emphasize, is the *quintessential* importance of >> the *rule* in all three patterns. In such diagrams as I've been >> concentrating on, each inference either * commences* at the rule >> (deduction & abduction) *or* *arrives* at the rule (induction). In your >> result/rule/case formulation one merely *passes through* the rule, and I >> must admit that that makes no logical sense to me, although I did entertain >> it as a possibility for a few weeks after you introduced it as the path >> abduction takes. >> >> Finally, >> I promis >> >> ed to bring Mozart back into the discussion, and so I will >> in just a moment. In order to prepare for that, y >> ou will recall >> that >> in >> my thought-experiment concerning deduction that >> once >> my two hands >> were thrust >> >> into the bag of beans >> (representing t >> he rul >> >> e), they didn't even need to be removed from the bag for me to >> >> know that whatever bean sample (case, 2ns) >> I >> had grabbed would *necessarily* be white >> (result/character, 1ns). >> >> >> I then suggested that mirroring this example was the abductive >> situation >> whereas for whatever *good* reasons, that >> I, >> the theorist >> , >> hypothesized that >> >> the beans in the bag >> (again, the rule) >> might all be white. As in the deductive example, >> my >> two hands >> were plunged into the bag. But now, unlike the situation of deduction >> whereas I didn't even need to remove my hands from the bag and yet could be >> certain that they were white, here, for abduction, the experiment *must *be >> made. And so I remove my sample of beans to see if they are that which I've >> guessed (or, possibly, retroduced) them to be, *possibly *white. Even >> then there is no certainty the the entire bag is all which even if this >> sample is. More sampling (experimentation) may be needed. >> >> OK, now, finally, the Mozart example. As I suggested in a recent post, >> artists make abductions too and, indeed, there would appear to be an entire >> literature growing around that proposition. Now Mozart was rather famous >> for conceiving an entire work 'in a flash' and then fleshing it out, or >> rather, "getting it down on manuscript paper" after that compositional >> flash. There is even one famous story--the details of which I'll probably >> get wrong--where Mozart was out at a pubt with some of his Masonic musician >> buddies drinking beer and playing cards or darts (or something). A men's >> chorus was needed for performance at an installation the next day, so >> Mozart conceived that composition on the spot, then, as he continued to >> drink and play, he at the same time wrote out all tthe parts (now that's >> what I call multi-tasking!) My point is that his is a case of artistic >> abduction, yet the rule (the composition) is quite complete, although the >> (result/characters--the notes) will have to be set down; when they are >> there will exist a completed of music (the case) conceived, however, >> all-at-once-together. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that >>> you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-) >>> >>> GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance >>> to this order. >>> >>> I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches >>> any particular significance to the order of the premisses within each >>> inferential process? Can we take CP 2.623 (1878) to be as authoritative in >>> this regard as the much later NA (1908) with respect to the order of a >>> complete inquiry? Again, what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least >>> muddled, if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of >>> process)? >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, List, >>>> >>>> I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber >>>> symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie >>>> Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now >>>> and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance). >>>> You wrote: >>>> >>>> JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce >>>> consistently associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate >>>> for the latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of >>>> Secondness, an experience that occurs over time. >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes >>>> it clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but >>>> only suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is >>>> given as an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of >>>> pain (my toothache quite different in character from my backach, for >>>> example). But I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it, >>>> perhaps with some Peircean examples. >>>> >>>> I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post >>>> that you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I >>>> believe, quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of >>>> the three inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of >>>> the principal points I was trying to make. >>>> >>>> As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from >>>> 'The Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any >>>> particular significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the >>>> N.A.) follows, as you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), >>>> followed by the deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, >>>> and, finally, the develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the >>>> actual inductive testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) >>>> he gives a rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much >>>> more than analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's >>>> necessary in critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a >>>> complete inquiry certainly matters. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to >>>> proof read this). >>>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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