Jon, List, I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance). You wrote:
JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an experience that occurs over time. Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes it clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but only suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is given as an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of pain (my toothache quite different in character from my backach, for example). But I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it, perhaps with some Peircean examples. I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post that you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I believe, quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of the three inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of the principal points I was trying to make. As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from 'The Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any particular significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the N.A.) follows, as you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), followed by the deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, and, finally, the develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the actual inductive testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) he gives a rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much more than analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's necessary in critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a complete inquiry certainly matters. Best, Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to proof read this). [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently > associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the > latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an > experience that occurs over time. > > Regarding CP 1.485, I agree that Peirce presents the first inferential > process as Rule/Case/Result (vector of analysis). > > *Deduction* > *** finally, the predication of the idea of the law in that case (1ns). > |> * first, living thought or ruling law (3ns); > ** then, existential case under the condition of the law (2ns); > > > It appears to me that he then presents the second inferential process as > Rule/Result/Case (vector of representation) ... > > *Abduction* > > ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case > (1ns); > |> * first, the living law (3ns); > *** finally, the subsumption of that case and the condition of the law > (2ns). > > > ... and the third inferential process as Case/Result/Rule (vector of > determination). > > *Induction* > > ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in that case (1ns); > |> *** finally, the living law itself (3ns). > * first, the subsumption of an existential case under the condition of a > living law (2ns); > > > Is this right? What (if any) significance should we attach to the > sequence of the three inferential processes here--first deduction, second > abduction, third induction? What (if anything) is incorrect, or at least > muddled, if we recast abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process) in > accordance with CP 5.189 as compared to CP 2.718? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon S, List, >> >> Jon quoted a snippet of my post and commented. >> >> GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct >> bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling >> of satisfaction"). >> >> [JS] Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of >> Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about >> NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special >> science. >> >> >> But Peirce explicitly notes that one can loosen the strict rule banishing >> psychology from logic in logic's third branch, namely, methodeutic (or >> theoretical rhetoric). After all, inquiry is done by individual inquirers >> within a community of inquiry, that is by people with psyches. It is they >> who have 'feelings' of surprise, doubt, satisfaction, etc. >> >> In any event, since Gary F's post has got me looking at 'The Logic of >> Mathematics' again, I found this passage, which I'd more or less forgotten >> about, although at one point it was crucial in my thinking about the three >> inference patterns. I've added two trikonic diagrams to illustrate two of >> the points Peirce makes, especially as regards deduction as you just >> brought it up again, Jon. >> >> Peirce writes (CP 1.485): >> >> The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in >> truth; the idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought which >> originally put them together and recognizes they are together; from whence >> many things result, especially a threefold inferential process. . . >> >> >> *Three elements in truth*: >> >> "The idea or predicate" >> |> "The thought which originally put them together" >> "The fact or subject" >> >> . . . from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential >> process. >> >> [This inferential process] either first follows the order of involution >> from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the condition >> of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case; >> >> >> *Deduction* ('order of involution'): >> >> *** finally, to the predication of the idea of the law in that case. >> |> * 1st, From the living thought or ruling law, >> ** then, through the existential case under the condition of the law; >> >> or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of >> that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the >> condition of the law; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an >> existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of >> the idea of that law in that case to the living law itself * (CP 1.485) >> >> >> The asterisk at the end of that quote is to the editorial note: "Cf. >> 2.620 ff" which is, of course, exactly where the three inference patterns >> relating to the bean example are given. >> >> So, for now, and most certainly for deduction, I'm going to stick with >> Peirce's analysis in 'The Logic of Mathematics' paper and CP 2.620 ff. I've >> had enough of revisionism in that matter at least! >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >
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