Jon A and list,

Yes, it's true that you told me off-list that
A = antecedent and C = consequent.
Yet, I persist in asserting that B = commens.  So, why do I bother?

Well, because I happen to think of all the consequences that result from
believing that B represents the mind of the community in *action*.  These
consequences are what makes me to view the hypothesis with favor.  That is,
"“All there is to thinking is seeing something noticeable which makes you
see something you weren't noticing which makes you see something that isn't
even visible.” ~Norman Maclean

For instance, suppose A and C are what you say.  Where do you go from
there?  What else do you notice?  Now, suppose that B = commens.  That is,
take the attitude discussed in the Neglected Argument.  Do not simply pick
and choose the sections of the NA you find to be useful to you.  Rather,
consider the whole message of the idea in unity...what is thought, what is
an idea, what is an explanation, what is an argument, what is an
argumentation, what is a syllogism, what is Musement, what is surprising,
what is the habit of expectation of the inquisiturus...:

"The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely
incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such, supposes its
object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis...

Its implications concerning the Universes will be maintained in the
hypothesis, while its implications concerning God will be partly disavowed,
and yet held to be less false than their denial would be.

*Thus the hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of each Universe
as purposed; and this will stand or fall with the hypothesis*. Yet a
purpose essentially involves growth, and so cannot be attributed to God.
Still it will, according to the hypothesis, be less false to speak so than
to represent God as purposeless.

Assured as I am from my own personal experience that every man capable of
so controlling his attention as to perform a little exact thinking will, if
he examines Zeno's argument about Achilles and the tortoise, come to think,
as I do, that it is nothing but a contemptible catch, I do not think that I
either am or ought to be less assured, from what I know of the effects of
Musement on myself and others, that any normal man who considers the three
Universes in the light of the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that
line of reflection in scientific singleness of heart, will come to be
stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its
august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his
strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above all things to
shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of action into
conformity with that hypothesis.

*Now to be deliberately and thoroughly prepared to shape one's conduct into
conformity with a proposition is neither more nor less than the state of
mind called Believing that proposition*, however long the conscious
classification of it under that head be postponed." ~NA

Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that
> you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-)
>
> GR:  I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to
> this order.
>
> I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches any
> particular significance to the order of the premisses within each
> inferential process?  Can we take CP 2.623 (1878) to be as authoritative in
> this regard as the much later NA (1908) with respect to the order of a
> complete inquiry?  Again, what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least
> muddled, if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of
> process)?
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber
>> symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie
>> Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now
>> and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance).
>> You wrote:
>>
>> JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion?  Peirce consistently
>> associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the
>> latter?  An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness,
>> an experience that occurs over time.
>>
>>
>> Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes
>> it clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but
>> only suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is
>> given as an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of
>> pain (my toothache quite different in character from my backach, for
>> example). But I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it,
>> perhaps with some Peircean examples.
>>
>> I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post that
>> you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I believe,
>> quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of the three
>> inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of the
>> principal points I was trying to make.
>>
>> As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from 'The
>> Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any particular
>> significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the N.A.) follows,
>> as you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), followed by the
>> deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, and, finally,
>> the develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the actual inductive
>> testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) he gives a
>> rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much more than
>> analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's necessary
>> in critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a complete
>> inquiry certainly matters.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to proof
>> read this).
>>
>
>
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