> On Sep 6, 2016, at 3:18 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: >> If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this >> compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is >> in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of >> thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent >> actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a >> living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and >> eternal belong to God; for this is God. > > is all this anything else than the ontologic argument for the existence of > God by Anselm of Canterbury?
The ontological argument typically is taken in two forms. One is a logical argument that rests on certain assumptions about ontological necessity and existence as tied to properties. The second is more complex and comes from people like Jean-Luc Marion in recent decades and is an argument for the summun bonum. While I’ve not seen anyone argue it I suspect the second form is more conducive to a Peircean reading. The main difference in the arguments is whether one has a concept of god first in order to proceed with the argument. If one takes it more in terms of negative theology (which arguably is closer to what Anselm often preaches) then there is no positive conception of god. That changes the argument more to what Marion presents and avoids the problems that people like Kant have pointed out. Effectively the second form is really an argument for something transcending our understanding. While the normal form of the ontological argument is extremely weak (even the modal logic forms) the second form is actually fairly compelling (although I don’t think it’s as solid as some think). To me Peirce’s argument really rests upon the logic of abduction and the idea that what persists through investigation we must treat as true (whether it is or not). This first means it’s not an argument in terms of what must necessarily be the case. Rather it’s an argument about what investigation leads us to believe. The main problem with Peirce’s argument is that while he gets that conclusion about god during musing abductively not everyone else does. So it’s an open question if inquiry is social whether it’s persisted enough to really be a strong indication about god. The abductive argument is really quasi-empirical in that it postulates something about our wonder that is the cause of our belief. Really it’s an example of how Peirce avoids a verificationalist principle sufficient to verify metaphysical claims. (Contra say the logical positivists with a very restrictive verification principle). Now there are some similarities to Marion’s form of the ontological argument but also some important differences. More importantly I think Peirce’s argument can with slight adjustments be applied to most metaphysical claims (either to accept them or more commonly refute them).
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