Dear Ben, list:
I think yours is a wonderful idea. To think Peirce could impose himself in all disciplines. If we take the disciplines to be embedded in the three Universes, then it should be matter of course that it would. Isn’t that what ancestry of pragmatism means? A river of pragmatism…a link in a venerable chain? So, what’s stopping us? Sure there are examples but they're not of the kind that I would say is terribly convincing. That is, I don't know of serious scientists that go around thinking what they do is Peircean before they call it physics or biology or embryology or computer science or AI or ... That is, I could open my mouth about the nuances of his work but what quantum physicist would take me seriously when I know zip about what they’re saying and vice versa? So much work...reputations at stake...crazy...It would appear good integration will require a miracle…or at least something divine to which we can all affix our attention. In any case, count me a believer, Jerry R PS. As for an actual step toward integrating the different ideas, here is a suggestion from On a New List of Categories. We should correct his terminology but the structure appears correct: BEING Quality (Reference to a Ground), Relation (Reference to a Correlate), Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), SUBSTANCE one two three…Substance, Being, Truth. On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 5:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Ben - you probably know that Peircean concepts are vigorously explored in > biology [biosemiotics], physics and chemistry [pansemiosis]...as well as in > AI and computers. Peirce, in my view, is exactly right for these areas; > after all, his own references to the biological and physico-chemical realm > support this. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com> > *To:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> > *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> ; Helmut Raulien > <h.raul...@gmx.de> ; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ; > Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:16 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Dear List: > > I would like to come back into this discussion, but first let me thank Jon > for his concise correction of my multitudinous errors. Second, let me thank > you all for the liveliness of this discussion. > > But back to Jon, I ended my first post on this discussion with: "I am > not sure I am expressing this well, but my point is concerned with adding > being (and beings) into the mix as necessary to understand existence and > reality." You did not seem to respond to this, so let me raise it again, > since the term being has raised its head in recent posts. > > I am fascinated by the discussion of what Peirce means relative to the > variety of terms discussed, and I appreciate that the purpose of Peirce-L > is to focus on Peirce's thought. But if often seems that we are in a > semantic bubble, focusing almost exclusively on Peirce's terms, leading me > to wonder how and whether his thought can be brought into conversation with > other thinkers, and other thought on similar subjects. > > Specifically, I am interested in how Peirce's thought relates to the > concepts of being and beings, especially as these relate to Heidegger or > postmodernists, or even Thomists. I often think of Peirce in relation to > Heidegger with the idea that Heidegger would be a lot clearer if he had > known of Peirce's thought. > > Second, I wonder whether Peirce's thought and terms would at all help in > the issues and problem of ontology in quantum physics. Here I am > specifically referring to Peter J. Lewis, *Quantum Ontology*: > https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Ontology-Guide-Metaphysics-Mechanics/dp/ > 0190469811 > or Bernard d'Espaçant, *On Quantum Physics and Philosophy* > https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691119643/ref=pd_cp_ > 0_1?ie=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=9ZY3BJJES420C4R4AKEK or the much earlier but > easier to read and follow *Quantum Reality*, by Nick Herbert > https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Reality-Beyond-New- > Physics/dp/0385235690/ref=sr_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1473543476&sr=1- > > I realize, and appreciate that PeirceL is to discuss Peirce. Bujt it would > seem that his concepts might be easier to understand (and perhaps easier to > discuss) if they were related to concepts and problems in other sciences > and disciplines. > > In simple terms, are Peirce's ideas of firstness, secondness, and > thirdness; reality and existence related to, usable in, or translatable > into problems discussed elsewhere? > > It would seem that this is particularly relevant to Peirce's theory of > thinking--or at least to our quest to discover it. > > Ben N. > > > *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > Telephone: (814) 808-5702 > > *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts > themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar > of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a > sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear > accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler > > On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 1:58 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Hello, list! >> >> >> >> What Edwina said is so sensible as to be Greek. >> >> There is a one over many in semiosis. That is, one has to cut and >> situate oneself in a horizon while discussing one two three…One. >> >> >> >> For example, there is also a fourth and a fifth that are assumed but >> don’t get talked about; a fourth and fifth that is not Fourthness or >> Fifthness, even though there is a distinct quality about them, which makes >> it deserving of a –ness moniker. >> >> >> >> See how confusing that is? Here is something to help: >> >> >> >> “*First* is the conception of being or existing independent of anything >> else.”~Peirce >> >> “All these are called *substance* because they are not predicated of a >> subject but everything else is predicated of them… >> >> >> >> Therefore, as in *syllogisms*, substance is the starting-point of >> everything.” ~Aristotle >> >> >> >> (Could he be talking about CP 5.189? But Aristotle wrote 2400 years ago >> and Peirce only a century…but Peirce read Aristotle and was immensely >> influenced by him. But where does he say “This idea, viz., CP 5.189, was >> inspired by the philosopher, viz., Aristotle!”) >> >> ____ >> >> >> >> “Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of >> reaction with, something else. >> >> Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are >> brought into relation.” ~Peirce >> >> >> >> So, instead of “quality, relation, representation”, why not try “quality, >> representation, relation”? There is not a ‘wrong’ here but a ‘better’. >> >> It is more an issue of how one attends to the matter. This mind that >> situates is *always* present and simply assumed. The mind can be called >> utterer, interpreter or commens or in fifth, *sub specie aeternitatis*. >> The perspective of the eternal is an *objective* mind. But in what way >> can a mind be objective? >> >> _______ >> >> >> >> “The *origin* of things, considered not as leading to anything, but in >> itself, contains the idea of First, the *end* of things that of Second, >> the process mediating between them that of Third.” ~Peirce >> >> >> >> “Again (3) of quanta that have a *beginning and a middle and an end,* >> those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, >> and those to which it does, wholes.” >> >> >> >> So, what is it, a thing invented by Peirce with a beginning a middle and >> end with features of syllogism, which can be used as a tool to unite the >> parts as One? >> >> >> >> one, two, three…C, A, B…beginning, end, middle…CP 5.189…One… >> >> >> >> “‘A whole’ means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of >> which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains >> the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in *two >> senses*-either >> as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between >> them.” >> >> >> >> _________ >> >> >> >> Peirce touches on the theme of Edwina’s comment in the following: >> >> >> >> “A philosophy which emphasizes the idea of the One is generally a >> dualistic philosophy in which the conception of Second receives exaggerated >> attention; for this One (though of course involving the idea of First) is >> always the other of a manifold which is not one. The idea of the Many, >> because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any >> Secondness, has for its principal component the conception of First.” >> >> >> >> Finally, Peirce closes a section on Hegel (a triadic philosophy in that >> Hegel states the syllogism, God/Son/Spirit, although it ought to be >> Father/Son/Spirit…God) with: >> >> >> >> “In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General >> conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting >> is First, heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters >> become fixed is Third. Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take >> habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. [from >> CP 6.31-4]” >> >> https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ >> us/peirce3.htm >> >> >> >> Here, you can see that one, two, three is simply a heuristic (he even >> admits in one of the Ransdell manuscripts that it is an exercise of which >> he wished to divest himself but couldn’t because it *proved* to him to >> be correct after years of testing). >> >> >> There is no right or wrong here but always a better. What we argue over >> is whether it is a *best* because there might even be a *best*. But >> where is the proof for a community? >> >> >> >> “That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very >> important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous >> conceptions of proof.” >> >> >> >> Hth, >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Helmut, list >>> Your comments point to exactly the problem with mechanical reductionism, >>> i.e., where one tries to reduce a dynamic process [the semiosic process] >>> which is always triadic, into 'bit parts' that somehow mechanically >>> interact. That's the opposite of the Peircean semiosis. >>> >>> That's why I don't consider that thought, as a semiosic process, is >>> confined to Thirdness. After all, Peirce analyzed THREE modes of thinking, >>> of reasoning - and such could not be the case if all three were similar; >>> i.e., just operating in Thirdness. Instead, their vitality and >>> strength derives from their use of Firstness and Secondness as well as >>> Thirdness. Thirdness is the vital process of developing generalities, >>> habits-of-formation. But, I read Peirce as considering that Thought as a >>> generative force requires all three categorical modes. >>> >>> I use the term of *S*ign [capital S] to refer to the triad, the >>> classes. After all, nothing exists except within a triadic interaction! >>> That includes a molecule, a cell, an insect, a word. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>> *To:* jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 9:51 AM >>> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >>> >>> Jon, Gary, Edwina,..., list, >>> I find it interesting, that Peirce later replaced "Quality, relation, >>> representation" with "Quality, reaction, mediation". Might it be better to >>> say "mediation is always thirdness" instead of "mediation is only >>> thirdness"? "Only" I find confusing, because I think "only" only fits >>> firstness, as thirdness is based on, and contains, first- and secondness >>> too (and secondness firstness). What also is confusing again and again is, >>> that on one hand a sign is always thirdness, because it is a mediation, but >>> on the other hand eg. a qualisign somehow is not thirdness. I think we have >>> to distinguish between the sign, and the sign class (or think of better >>> terms for this distinction). The sign as looked at as some entity in itself >>> is thirdness, mediation. But the sign as looked as what kind of meaning it >>> conveys or generates, in which way it mediates (of which class it is) is >>> only complete thirdness, if it is an argument. Or maybe it would be better >>> to say that the distinction is between the function of the sign and its >>> class: the function of the sign is to mediate, to bring a perception to >>> mind, to generate thought. That is thirdness. But if there is no thought >>> generated except eg. that the perception is conveyed to the mind, then this >>> generation is not as complete as it is in other signs, it is degenerate. So >>> the function "mediation" is thirdness, but there is not much action of the >>> mind, thought, thirdness, achieved by this mediation, when the sign is not >>> of the proper class for that. Can you say what I mean more simply? >>> Best, >>> Helmut >>> >>> 10. September 2016 um 04:36 Uhr >>> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Jerry, List: >>> >>> I was asking Edwina, because I am trying to get a better handle on where >>> it is that our interpretations of Peirce diverge. But since you posed a >>> direct, coherent question ... I had passages like this one in mind. >>> >>> >>> CSP: Why should there be three principles of reasoning, and what have >>> they to do with one another? This question, which was connected with other >>> parts of my schedule of philosophical inquiry that need not be detailed, >>> now came to the front. Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of >>> triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some >>> fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions >>> were. This search resulted in what I call my categories. I then named >>> them Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that >>> undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two; >>> for this reason Reaction is a better term. Moreover, I did not then know >>> enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word >>> representation serve for an idea so much more general than any it >>> habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation would be better. >>> Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, >>> Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, are to be preferred as being entirely >>> new words without any false associations whatever. (CP 4.3; 1898) >>> >>> >>> I suppose that we could reformulate the three bullets in accordance with >>> Peirce's comments here. >>> >>> - All thought takes place by means of signs. >>> - Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. >>> - Mediation is (only) Thirdness. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:12 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jon, list: >>>> >>>> This is the bizarre one: >>>> >>>> - Representation is (only) Thirdness. >>>> >>>> Where, exactly, does Peirce state this? >>>> Give me the name, date and serial number! >>>> >>>> :) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Jerry R >>>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >>> should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >>> not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. 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