Clark, list:
Thank you for bringing attention back to the issue of indubitable belief with: “I confess I had to look it up even though it’s right down my alley." And thus, knowledge grows from more to more; symbols grow, meanings grow. Also, for the following that illustrates one difficulty of talking about Thought using words alone (and the discussion points that followed): “Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a first, a second, and a third.” Best, Jerry R On Mon, Sep 12, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed > out before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of > analysis we are performing. I am content to accept your correction of my > third bullet. > > - All thought takes place by means of signs. > - Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. > - Mediation is always Thirdness. > > Therefore, all thought is always Thirdness. Since Edwina presumably still > disagrees, I remain interested in learning from her which of the three > bullets she believes is NOT an accurate statement of Peirce's view. > > > While I know Edwina has some differences from some other list members on > certain foundational ways of reading Peirce, I suspect this is much more a > semantic issue. That is I suspect there’s far less disagreement here than > it appears. > > Mediation can be mediation from 1stness or 2cdness. Such as how we think > of a reaction outside of ourselves or react to a qualia. > > Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a first, a > second, and a third. The first is a positive qualitative possibility, in > itself nothing more. The second is an existent thing without any mode of > being less than existence, but determined by that first. A *third* has a > mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the > mode of being of a law, or concept. Do not confound this with the ideal > being of a quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being > completely embodied. A law never can be embodied in its character as a law > except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have > been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. > > Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all > three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another > they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as > mere possibility; that is, mere *mind* capable of thinking, or a mere > vague idea. The *second* is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or > event. That is, it is of the general nature of *experience* or > *information.* The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. > It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives > it body. It is informing thought, or *cognition.* But take away the > psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we > see the operation of a sign. > > Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be > a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a > sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by > it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of > the nature of thought or of a sign. Every thought is a sign. But in the > first degree of degeneracy the Thirdness affects the object, so that this > is not of the nature of a Thirdness — not so, at least, as far as this > operation of degenerate Thirdness is concerned. It is that the third brings > about a Secondness but does not regard that Secondness as anything more > than a fact. In short it is the operation of executing an *intention.* In > the last degree of degeneracy of Thirdness, there is thought, but no > conveyance or embodiment of thought at all. It is merely that a fact of > which there must be, I suppose, something like knowledge is *apprehended* > according > to a possible idea. There is an *instigation* without any *prompting.* For > example, you look at something and say, "It is red." Well, I ask you what > justification you have for such a judgment. You reply, "I *saw* it was > red." Not at all. You saw nothing in the least like that. You saw an image. > There was no subject or predicate in it. It was just one unseparated image, > not resembling a proposition in the smallest particular. It instigated you > to your judgment, owing to a possibility of thought; but it never told you > so. Now in all imagination and perception there is such an operation by > which thought springs up; and its only justification is that it > subsequently turns out to be useful. > *1903 - CP 1.536-8 - Lowell Lectures: Lecture III, Volume 2, 3d Draught* > > An earlier quote might be helpful. > > A quality of feeling is perfectly simple, in itself; though a > quality thought over and thus mixed with other elements, may be compared > with others and analyzed. A quality of feeling, in itself, is no object and > is attached to no object. It is a mere tone of consciousness. But qualities > of feeling may be attached to objects. A quality of feeling, in itself, has > no generality; but it is susceptible of generalization without losing > its character; and indeed all the qualities of feeling we are able to > recognize are more or less generalized. (CP 7.530; undated) > > My sense is that it is this move to generalization that we’re disagreeing > upon. However my sense is that it’s largely a disagreement over terminology > rather than phenomena. While I have some differences with Edwina if I > understand her correctly, overall I suspect we agree that an example of > firstness can be the object in an example of thirdness or mediation. Indeed > when we think about pure feeling we are treating them in just such a > mediated fashion. > > I swear there was a Peirce quote that made this explicit but for the life > of me I can’t seem to find it and don’t have time to look further. i.e. a > place where Peirce talks of a feeling before consciousness and how in > thinking of it we bring it into mediation. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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