Hi everyone: "We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, in fact, this is the case."
Where is genuine doubt? Thanks, Jerry R On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Clark, List: > > As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that > the PM itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting > hypotheses to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced > and justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by abduction. > > CSP: For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical > effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far > as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might > conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second > conception. Now it is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be > admitted by *any *philosopher which should prohibit on any formalistic > grounds any inquiry as to how we ought in consistency to shape our > practical conduct. Therefore, a maxim which looks only to possibly > practical considerations will not need any supplement in order to exclude > any hypotheses as inadmissible. What hypotheses it admits all philosophers > would agree ought to be admitted. On the other hand, if it be true that > nothing > but such considerations has any logical effect or import whatever, it is > plain that the maxim of pragmatism cannot cut off any kind of hypothesis > which ought to be admitted. Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true, > fully *covers *the entire logic of abduction. (CP 5.196) > > > My earlier point was that identifying *how *a conception "might > conceivably modify our practical conduct" seems like (deductive) > explication to me--the hypothesis that a diamond is hard means, for one > thing, "that it will not be scratched by many other substances" (CP > 5.403). We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find > out whether, in fact, this is the case. In Peirce's words that I quoted > previously, the PM also "cut[s] down *the premisses* of deduction" by > rejecting hypotheses that have no bearing on "possibly practical > considerations," and thus do not warrant any further attention. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; >> which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if >> another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical >> critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic. >> >> Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of >> the pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning >> practical differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive >> consideration although the actual measurement would be a combination of >> deductive and inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical >> scaffolding. But any particular detection that something is hard is >> different from the meaning of say a diamond being hard. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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