Gary R., List: GR: As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed in critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen entertained in the literature.
My default suspicion of novelty is flaring up again, so I am inclined to withdraw my off-the-cuff suggestion as having no merit. I was just thinking that the validity of each individual reasoning type (abduction, deduction, induction) falls under logical critic, while complete inquiry that includes them all falls under methodeutic; and I see the PM as pertaining primarily to the Second Stage only, deduction--identifying practical consequences of a hypothesis so that it can be tested. However, I went back and found this earlier quote and comment from Ben U. CSP: Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification. (L75.280) BU: Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as valid are topics of critical logic. I was evidently conflating the *justification *of deduction, which falls under logical critic, with the *application *of deduction within a complete inquiry--employing the PM--which falls under methodeutic. But I also see Ben here explicitly associating the PM with "the logic of abductive inference," which confuses me again. In my mind, "definition ... rendering ideas clear ... [and] consideration of conceivable experimental consequences" all pertain to the *explication* of hypotheses (deduction), not their *formulation *(abduction). Ben also provided this quote ... CSP: Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235) ... but that is discussing the *admissibility *of a hypothesis *after *it has been formulated. Does that assessment more properly fall under the justification of *abduction *(logical critic) or, as I just proposed, the application of *deduction *within a complete inquiry (methodeutic)? Ben later seemed to favor the latter, as well ... BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. ... and I now find this analysis quite persuasive. When Peirce calls pragmatism "the logic of abduction," he is not referring to the *validity *of abduction by itself, but how abduction fits into a *complete *inquiry--i.e., methodeutic rather than logical critic. Bringing us back to the original thread topic--after all that, perhaps we can simply identify this as Peirce's "theory of thinking" in the context of "A Neglected Argument." Regards, Jon On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in the > main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism in > its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some > extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replacing the > "pragmatic maxim" with "pragmatism." > > If we avoid this conflation then we can legitimately, I think, identify > the security offered by the pragmatic maxim and the uberty which > pragmaticism offers in the context of a complete inquiry. > > As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed in > critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about > that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may > think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen > entertained in the literature. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> GR: But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule >> of pragmatism" in this essay. >> >> >> Yes, but my point is that he does *not *call the PM the "rule of >> abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's >> pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic of abduction" and the PM as >> the "rule of pragmatism." Pragmaticism as a whole--i.e., all three >> Stages of Inquiry, taken together--*includes *the PM, but the PM is not *all >> *there is to it. The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), >> not abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. >> I wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to >> logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic. >> >> Frankly, Houser misquoted Peirce when he wrote, "Peirce had come to see >> that *pragmatism *has the limitations that come with choosing security >> over uberty: '[it] does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral >> virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity >> above Animality'" (EP 2.xxxii, emphasis added). What Peirce actually >> wrote is, "Yet *the maxim of Pragmatism* does not bestow a single smile >> upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things >> that alone raise Humanity above Animality" (EP 2.465, emphasis added). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that >>> "Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the >>> latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole." >>> >>> On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I >>> keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction" >>> if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic >>> maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule >>> of abduction," as you did." >>> >>> But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of >>> pragmatism" in this essay. He writes: >>> >>> "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in >>> 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465). >>> >>> So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect, >>> at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to >>> imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought >>> *not >>> *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism >>> far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule >>> of pragmatism). >>> >>> As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a >>> footnote to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' >>> somewhat different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic >>> (Houser's "rich suggestiveness"). >>> >>> In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce >>> wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the >>> amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of >>> reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable *uberty*, >>> or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384). >>> [EP2:553, fn 7] >>> >>> >>> As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our >>> argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen >>> as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in >>> itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to >>> some considerable degree. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R., List: >>>> >>>> GR: But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the >>>> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our >>>> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to >>>> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care" >>>> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that >>>> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what >>>> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my >>>> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all >>>> three stages of a complete inquiry). >>>> >>>> GR: So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM >>>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 >>>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to >>>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. >>>> >>>> >>>> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that >>>> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the >>>> "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of >>>> pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did. >>>> The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said, >>>> "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three >>>> stages of a complete inquiry)." Abduction, when employed with "solicitous >>>> care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the >>>> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475, >>>> EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security. The >>>> hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441). The PM, on the other >>>> hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. >>>> But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465). >>>> >>>> GR: The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one >>>> takes up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most >>>> security and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But >>>> how should we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and >>>> uberty? >>>> >>>> >>>> To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by >>>> generating new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating >>>> those hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by >>>> evaluating those hypotheses against experience. As you hinted, Houser's >>>> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only >>>> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List, >>>>> >>>>> Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: "Peirce >>>>> made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential >>>>> fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them not >>>>> just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to different >>>>> levels >>>>> of logic - very apples versus oranges " >>>>> >>>>> I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, >>>>> all nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one >>>>> question which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this. >>>>> >>>>> Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article >>>>> (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty" >>>>> (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this >>>>> text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that >>>>> "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that >>>>> "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which >>>>> abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it >>>>> seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security." >>>>> >>>>> But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic >>>>> maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our >>>>> approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not >>>>> contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for >>>>> solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" >>>>> to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but >>>>> the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical >>>>> analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry >>>>> (including all three stages of a complete inquiry). >>>>> >>>>> So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM >>>>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 >>>>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to >>>>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft. >>>>> >>>>> The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up >>>>> each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security >>>>> and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how >>>>> should >>>>> we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty? >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>> >>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>> *C 745* >>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>>> >>>>
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