Jon, list,
yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes methodeutics. So the problem of uberty/security/abduction/deduction/pragmatism/pragmatic maxim etc. is not solved by my contribution.
Best,
Helmut
30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Helmut:
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by plausibility, which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, it is plausible that these white beans are from this bag that contains only white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously not be plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that contains only black beans.
Regards,
Jon
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Jon, list,you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the case that suits to that. Like:1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme.3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.Best,HelmutHelmut, List:I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies as a genuine deduction. It is not necessarily true that "it is possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be impossible for some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans. In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things, at least somewhat.Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:Dear list members,I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.Best,Helmut
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