Gary R., List: Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the last several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete * inquiry.
CSP: Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this: The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231) But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry. As Ben U. brought to our attention ... BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step. In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same lecture *in which he presented CP 5.189. CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology. For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234) Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses." Peirce subsequently explained why this is so. CSP: Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of anything is whether that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235) CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are *not *"capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not *admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation. In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn out to be a *bad *abduction; whereas *any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good *abduction. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, Helmut, List, > > Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home. > > This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter > which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has > troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser had > conflated the PM and 'pragmatism' in his introduction to the piece, and > that much of my confusion arose from that (and that's yet another lesson > learned here, namely, that even a *great* Peirce scholar--which I and > many consider Nathan Houser to be--can err in any given interpretation). > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >
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