Gary R., List:
Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the
last several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction
between logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189
falls under logical critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while
the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and
pertains to a /complete/ inquiry.
CSP: Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it
was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an
explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was
subject to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be
admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it
would account for the facts or some of them. The form of
inference, therefore, is this:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189,
EP 2.231)
But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough
for a hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete
inquiry. As Ben U. brought to our attention ...
BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
"Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the
inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not
sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any
hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But
among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is
suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
"critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of
arguments. In the rest of that quote he is discussing why
methodeutic gets involved.
In other words, the PM is /required/ before we can take that next
step. In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this /later in the very
same lecture/ in which he presented CP 5.189.
CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you
will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic
of abduction. That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim
which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the
admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to
say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions;
and, furthermore, this is /all/ that the maxim of pragmatism
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to
logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology. For
the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
effect or import differing from that of a second conception
except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions and
intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical conduct
differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234)
Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if
sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility
of hypotheses." Peirce subsequently explained why this is so.
CSP: Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the
question of Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What
is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to
be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain
the facts. But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be
good? The question of the goodness of anything is whether that
thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of an explanatory
hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of
experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the
establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not
be disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible,
in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided
it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar as
it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the
doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235)
CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
/not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive
evaluation. In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP
5.189 may nevertheless turn out to be a /bad/ abduction; whereas
/any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM
and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a /good/ abduction.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote:
