Ben wrote: "5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim."
Exactly. As Jon made clear, 5.189 has its value in critical logic and ought not be conflated with the PM. I have found Jerry's near obsession with 5.189 off putting so that putting it in its proper place, viz., critical logic, has been helpful Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > I left one point murky; what I had failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s > remarks, was that 5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry > R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben > > > On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Jon S., Gary R., list, > > Jon, you wrote, > > CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are > *not* "capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not* > admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation. > In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may > nevertheless turn out to be a *bad* abduction; whereas *any* abduction > whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the > other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction. > [End quote] > > Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly, > despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including CP > 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add one > further point about your last clause, > > whereas *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the > PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction. > [End quote] > > An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the > economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if > it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful > (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without > scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a > previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time > and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of inquiry as opposed to the > view concerned mainly with justifying already-accepted conclusions. (I said > something like this at peirce-l in May but, in passing, accepted what I > took to be my interlocutor's sense of "successful" abduction as meaning an > abductive conclusion's being true.) > > Best, Ben > > On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon, List, > > You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also > very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and > methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and > pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism > itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete* inquiry. > > Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. > While logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of > the three types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these > three patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete > inquiry. > > Thus, as you concluded: *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis > passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry > is a *good* abduction. > > And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as > semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it > is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are > *persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is, > that it is a "good" abduction. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 > <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > Gary R., List: > > Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the last > several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between > logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls > under logical critic and pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like > pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a > *complete* inquiry. > > CSP: Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was > recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory > hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain > conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a > hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or > some of them. The form of inference, therefore, is this: > > The surprising fact, C, is observed; > But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, > Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231) > > But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a > hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry. As > Ben U. brought to our attention ... > > BU: Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, > "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which > starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis > should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is > justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select > that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb > "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. > In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. > > In other words, the PM is *required* before we can take that next step. > In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same > lecture* in which he presented CP 5.189. > > CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see > that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That > is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render > needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as > hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful > suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all* that the maxim of pragmatism > really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is > not understood as a proposition in psychology. For the maxim of pragmatism > is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from > that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with > other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical > conduct differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234) > > Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound, > must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of > hypotheses." Peirce subsequently explained why this is so. > > CSP: Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of > Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What is good abduction? > What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a > hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other > conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of > anything is whether that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of > an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of > experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the > establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be > disappointed. Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence > of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of > experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such > verification. This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, > EP 2.235) > > CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are > *not* "capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not* > admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation. > In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may > nevertheless turn out to be a *bad* abduction; whereas *any* abduction > whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the > other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com > > wrote: > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 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