Dear list:
*“The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third.* *First and Second**, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time.”* http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/guess/guess.htm _____ *"Philip said <http://biblehub.com/greek/3004.htm> to Him, <http://biblehub.com/greek/846.htm> “Lord, <http://biblehub.com/greek/2962.htm> show <http://biblehub.com/greek/1166.htm> us <http://biblehub.com/greek/1473.htm> the <http://biblehub.com/greek/3588.htm> Father, and <http://biblehub.com/greek/2532.htm> that will be enough <http://biblehub.com/greek/714.htm> for us.” <http://biblehub.com/greek/1473.htm>* *Jesus replied, “Philip, I have been with you all this time, and still you do not know Me? Anyone who has seen Me has seen the Father. * *How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’?* *So the Jews gathered around him and said to him, “How long will you keep us in suspense? If you are the Christ, tell us plainly.”* *Jesus answered them, “I told you, and you do not believe. * *Why do you not understand what I say? It is because you cannot bear to hear my word.* *The Jews picked up stones again to stone him… * *Again they sought to arrest him, but he escaped from their hands."* ~Selections from Gospel of John Hth, Jerry R On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > ET: When you say that *some *of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear > and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. > > > Are you claiming here that *none* of Peirce's positions are perfectly > clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that *all* of his positions > are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for debate? Is there *anything > *that you would confidently assert to be Peirce's position, without > qualifying it as merely your interpretation or opinion? > > ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as > 'creator of the three universes. > > > My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as *Ens necessarium* is Really > creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote, in CP 6.452, > "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable proper name, signifying *Ens > necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of > Experience." What is the basis for your disagreement with me about > Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see between > my statement of it and his own? > > ET: I completely disagree with you on the above. > > > My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, and > thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote, in CP > 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of > fact," which means that it can only be "in the universe of > *representations*." What is the basis for your disagreement with me > about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see > between my statement of it and his own? > > ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a 'quality' > in itself. > > > Are you saying that *all *qualities are *also *qualisigns--i.e., tthat > here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe that this > was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific passages in his > writings? > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> 1) Jon - When you say that *some* of Peirce's positions are perfectly >> clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. I happen >> to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as 'creator of the >> three universes. You have your opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect >> for you to declare that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'. >> >> 2) Now - when you write: >> "My example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon >> and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at >> least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third >> Universe." >> >> I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a rhematic >> iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and *is a sign*. >> And does NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no such thing as a >> single relation i.e.,the Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The >> triad of all three relations *is irreducible*. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of >> these exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a quality, a >> feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'. >> >> A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something operating >> outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a 'quality' in itself. >> The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That between >> the Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen in itself; that >> between the Representamen and the Interpretant. The Representamen acts as >> mediation - and *can be in a mode of Firstness. *An Interpretant is not >> an Object but is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to >> the stimuli of the Object. >> >> And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have their >> Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes the genuine >> sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign... >> And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in them at >> all. >> See 2.227 and on. >> >> Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily require >> Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes 2.227..] and ..there >> is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed anything, functioning outside of >> the semiosic triad. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have the >> right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'. >> >> >> Those are your words, not mine; I have *never *claimed to be "one with >> Peirce." What I *have *claimed is that *some *of Peirce's positions are >> perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to agree >> with him or not. That he believed in the Reality of God as *Ens >> necessarium*, Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of >> those--and I *do *happen to agree with him about that. At the same >> time, this is not to say that his entire "view of Mind and creation" was >> identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not. >> >> ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my >> comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him. >> >> >> On this, we are in complete agreement. >> >> ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the >> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure >> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic >> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. >> >> >> Again, this conflates the *mode *of a sign with the Universe of >> Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all >> mathematical reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas. My >> example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon and >> rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at least, >> according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe. >> >> ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - >> has any 'active power to establish connections between different objects' >> and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to >> 'Thirdness'. >> >> >> If something does not have "active power to establish connections between >> different objects," then it is not a *sign *at all--in this case, it is >> merely a *quality*, rather than a *qualisign*. The very definition of >> what it means to *be *a sign is that it is able to connect different >> objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant. >> >> ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds >> of 'genuine triads'. >> >> >> Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine cannot >> be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all three >> kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of *representations*." >> Again, this is not about the *mode *of the sign, which can be in any of >> the three categories, but about the *Universe of Experience *where it >> belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a >> genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, >> outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting >> thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, >> nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living." Here we see that >> *all* representation--i.e., all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily >> involves a genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe precisely >> *because >> *it mediates between an object and interpretant. We also see that >> "thought is general" and "thought is living," which is another way of >> saying that thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought is >> in *signs*. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong inthis, >>> then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of Peirce - and >>> thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way and I don't think >>> that you have the right to self-define yourself as someone who >>> is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - >>> your and my comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we >>> interpret him. >>> >>> For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm not >>> sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the >>> physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and >>> don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'. >>> >>> I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the >>> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure >>> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic >>> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS. >>> >>> So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three categories. >>> The quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a >>> mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of >>> Experience, as something "*whose being consists in active power to >>> establish connections between different objects"* (CP 6.455). .....I >>> consider that this *quote **refers to Thirdness*. And therefore - I >>> don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any >>> 'active power to establish connections between different objects' and >>> therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to >>> 'Thirdness'. >>> >>> With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of >>> 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in* A* quality >>> and in* A* fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of >>> Firstness; it is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a >>> *thoroughly >>> genuine triad*' which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or >>> Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane >>> - but it is not the same as a *thoroughly genuine triad* which involves >>> generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in a mode of Firstness does >>> not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the Third universe'; there is *no >>> generality*. Firstness has no capacity to 'make connections', to >>> mediate, to connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its isolate >>> vividness. >>> So- we disagree in our readings. >>> >>> As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it >>> remains your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation - >>> is quite different from yours. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than >>> myself, those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his >>> writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be >>> HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I do not subscribe to the >>> approach that all interpretations are equally valid; while there can >>> certainly be legitimate differences, there are also objectively >>> *incorrect* readings, assuming (as Gary F. once put it) that Peirce >>> said what he meant and meant what he said. Of course, I am (very) >>> fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some cases. I even >>> conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about these particular >>> assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head." The >>> overall point remains--Peirce *did not* limit the categories to >>> semeiosis, as you apparently do. If you are right to do so, then not only >>> am I wrong about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it. >>> >>> There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the word >>> "mode." I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness >>> [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a *mode* of >>> representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of >>> Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience, >>> as something "whose being consists in active power to establish connections >>> between different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, the categories do >>> correspond to modes, such as possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In >>> any case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP >>> 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if >>> genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a >>> *thoroughly* genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and >>> exists in the universe of *representations*." So I am not the only one >>> claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third Universe"--Peirce did, as >>> well. If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it. >>> >>> Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce >>> believed in the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium* and Creator of all >>> three Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I am >>> wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, you wrote: >>>> >>>> "For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function within the O-R-I >>>> triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his architectonic >>>> arrangement of the sciences!" >>>> >>>> PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of >>>> Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' *In my [Jon Alan >>>> Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function >>>> within the O-R-I triad...etc etc.* >>>> >>>> Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that >>>> what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had the >>>> direct or correct view of Peirce. >>>> >>>> Now - to your points - >>>> >>>> 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a pure or genuine triad >>>> in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode >>>> of representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of >>>> some symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it >>>> belongs primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you >>>> mean to Thirdness]?? >>>> >>>> Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be in >>>> the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or >>>> regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote >>>> at 1.515. >>>> >>>> However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of >>>> Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and >>>> Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a >>>> complex embedded function. >>>> >>>> 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the >>>> categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences >>>> etc has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read >>>> Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any >>>> way or in any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it >>>> corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284 >>>> >>>> Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as Firstness, >>>> philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; " >>>> >>>> I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of >>>> studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to >>>> 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts? >>>> >>>> But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one >>>> can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be >>>> loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of 'feeling, >>>> quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and >>>> deduction does have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose >>>> description for all three are, after all, aspects of reasoning [Thirdness]. >>>> >>>> 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator. >>>> "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have >>>> come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. >>>> Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. >>>> Thought time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense >>>> after the first, because resulting from it" 1.412. >>>> >>>> Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens >>>> necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you >>>> have provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god as >>>> an agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is >>>> accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing, >>>> evolving, open force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from >>>> matter- and therefore not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in >>>> the Reality of God - 6.489 .... >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L >>>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations >>>> between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; all >>>> in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. >>>> >>>> >>>> I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I relations >>>> specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that is >>>> what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In other words, O-R-I is not >>>> the *only kind* of triad, even though it is probably the *paradigmatic >>>> example *of a triad. >>>> >>>> In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all *genuine *triads >>>> belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality or >>>> the world of fact. These are undoubtedly what he later called the three >>>> Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute >>>> Actuality, and representation to Signs. However, this is not to say that >>>> all signs are in the *mode *of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants. Even a >>>> qualisign, which must be iconic and rhematic in its relations to its object >>>> and interpretant, and thus is classified entirely in the mode of Firstness, >>>> belongs primarily to the third Universe--its "being consists in active >>>> power to establish connections between different objects." However, >>>> specifically as a *quali*sign--a quality that is a sign--it also, in >>>> some sense, belongs to the first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs to >>>> both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as an existent. >>>> I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how the R-O >>>> and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from >>>> others on it. >>>> >>>> ET: As such the categories only function within the triad - the O-R-I >>>> triad. >>>> >>>> >>>> Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes to >>>> this subject. For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function >>>> within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his >>>> architectonic arrangement of the sciences! For sciences of discovery, >>>> mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as >>>> Thirdness; for philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness, >>>> normative sciences as Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for >>>> normative sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic >>>> (semeiotic) as Thirdness. Within mathematics, the categories manifest as >>>> monads, dyads, and triads; within phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and >>>> representation; within metaphysics, as possibility, actuality, and >>>> necessity (habituality); within logic, as speculative grammar, critic, and >>>> methodeutic. We might quibble about these particular assignments of the >>>> labels, which are just off the top of my head, but the point is that >>>> restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly contrary to Peirce's >>>> own approach. >>>> >>>> ET: I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the >>>> Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I >>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I >>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes >>>> or universes'. >>>> >>>> >>>> No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical to >>>> an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and cosmology in >>>> particular, rather than semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now] requires >>>> both Firstness and Secondness," this does not *entail *that they were >>>> also required "before" our actual universe came into being. While you >>>> "reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or >>>> universes," Peirce quite explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I >>>> honestly do not see how any *legitimate* reading of "A Neglected >>>> Argument" can deny this. >>>> >>>> CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the >>>> *definable >>>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator >>>> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452) >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the >>>>> Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of >>>>> one mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These >>>>> are only three of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or >>>>> degenerate modes is, in my view, to provide the capacity for evolution, >>>>> adaptation and change. That is, Firstness linked to Secondness and >>>>> Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign >>>>> - introduces novelty to actuality to habit. That's quite something. >>>>> >>>>> My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon >>>>> considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are >>>>> modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing >>>>> events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function >>>>> within the triad - the O-R-I triad. >>>>> >>>>> I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic >>>>> Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I >>>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I >>>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes >>>>> or universes'. That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce >>>>> also within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this same view >>>>> within the writings of Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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