Dear Kirsti, John, list:
Ironic how something that is supposed to be (critical) common sense and a
method to make our ideas clear, that it should lead to such lack thereof
and even to passionate disagreement, eh? But not so surprising if one
understands Socratic irony, which is to know why spiritedness over desire
as ally of reason. After all, pragmaticism “appears to have been virtually
the philosophy of Socrates.”
_______
In response to your comment and suggestion:
I think you label my posts as being nominalist with pejorative intention.
But I recognize great value in nominalism. James and Peirce were friends
and so were Thrasymachus and Socrates (more or less).
The calling to attention the question of whether CP 5.189 is or is not a
pragmatic maxim represents a nominalistic act. For* the birth of a poet is
the principal event in chronology. * And “a poet, if he is really to be a
poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories…the
poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is
accepted of all men, when he sits down on the *tripod of the muse*, is not
in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever
comes in…”
“…in the manner of a perfect sophist”, ‘only glance at the ambition of the
men around you, and you will have to wonder at the unreasonableness of what
I have told you, unless you are careful to consider how singularly they are
affected with the *love of winning a name*, “and laying up fame immortal
for all time to come.”
Admittedly, the problem with poetry, when contrasted against that of the
philosopher (aged chorus) is:
“For the poet need not know the third point, viz., whether the imitation is
good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws of melody and
rhythm.
But the *aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the best*,
and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will never be
able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue.”
The above argues that the poet and philosopher have different talents and
different roles in reasoning. This will mean that we should have different
expectations for what poets and philosophers do. (The issue with Mach
appears to be a separate one involving the statesman/scientist, which is
Second. For it is the case too often that the Second does not recognize,
or is not aware, of the value of First in chronology.)
Despite your accusation, I consider myself a good pragmatist. That is, I
expect a good naming to be followed by good definition, which will then
stimulate good mediation of the essence.
But these are old patterns; patterns that seemingly pop up anew with each
generation. (Think of the never-ending but interesting question, “what
is…the scientific method?”) Yet, if such generals are of such importance,
then a good philosopher will have gotten ahead of such problems already.
An open question is whether Peirce has done so, whether he has done so
through design of a pragmatic maxim, and whether he was successful.
_________
What I’d like to request of readers is to keep in mind what exactly the
purpose of pragmatic maxims are (for Peirce has indicated several). Not a
pragmatic maxim for specialized readers of Peirce but a maxim for that
Stranger with general awareness of the classics who comes to Peirce with no
special knowledge of Peirce; a Stranger who has interest in seeing what
Peirce has to add to the ancient tradition.
I think a good maxim ought to, on its own, be able to inform that Stranger
about what he should know about pragmatism. I think this is a common-sense
expectation. That is, a good maxim ought to inform and prescribe good
action for not only past patterns but future patterns; patterns of
political conflict such as that which happens on this list all too often.
Therefore, I would ask, if you don’t mind, to humor me by simply stating
the two formulations you mentioned, so that we can explore its goodness and
completeness together. Perhaps we can even list and rank the various
maxims as determined by their beauty/standards and not simply based on our
recent customs, which can be indubitable. Moreover, if any of them are
found beautiful enough to be eternal, then we could even label the *best*
one as *divine*.
For “*what task in life could we have performed nobler than this**, to
write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things
into the light for all to see?”*
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
>
> John Sheriff, in *Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human
> Significance*, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state
> (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard
> metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in
> that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in
> Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of determination in any
> specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then,
> decidedly *not *the "nothing of negation," but rather "the germinal
> nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed" (CP
> 6.217).
>
> Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
> parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this in
> a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
> "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
> zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer to
> the Kemetic *Nun *in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; while
> it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics and may
> well have been acquainted with this myth).
>
> Jon wrote:
>
> [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
> thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the *possible *chalk
> marks and then draws *some *of them on the blackboard, rather than the
> blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow spontaneously
> appear; instead, the blackboard represents *created *Thirdness. However,
> I will tentatively grant that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce
> himself had in mind.
>
>
> I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is "creat
> *ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished from the
> 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a word,
> my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.
>
> One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
> mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power,
> alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the
> infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or Time."
> At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum, "which
> means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of the
> Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . .
> distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its
> original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's book, *Egyptian
> Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge*, p 8, a popularization of her
> grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great scholarly work in
> Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as it ought to be in my
> opinion).
>
> I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
> 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in three
> major ways" such that A*tum*, as *tum* in Nun, "projects" himself as
> Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the *neteru* ('powers'
> according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods')
> will follow from that priordial 'act'.
>
> Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the ur-continuity
> represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon, in your view
> that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of all three
> Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would fly in the
> face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable proper
> name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all
> three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452). How can one deny Peirce's own
> words here?
>
> Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for
> one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A Unified
> Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human Reason"),
> Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this quote:"[T]he
> problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the world is a
> better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life came
> about."(6.322)
>
> Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim that
> *everything* is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive use
> of the categories throughout Peirce's *oevre *which does not pertain to
> semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as you
> mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic sciences,
> viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this
> classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned
> explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much, much
> else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which is not
> semeiotic).
>
> But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
> Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the
> topic, *Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the Sciences*,
> has a number of things to say about the categories in relation to the
> classification. For example, after mentioning that one of his earliest
> classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent comments: "Fearing
> that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set it aside and developed
> alternative schemes, only to find himself ineluctably led back. Even so, it
> was some time before he conceded that the resulting divisions conformed to
> his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the
> same point.
>
> Kent later remarks that regarding his final *Outline Classification of
> the Sciences* (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his subsequent
> works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory" as late as
> 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are 'trichotomic' "
> (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three categories (much as Jon
> outlined them in a recent post).
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET: When you say that *some *of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear
>> and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion.
>>
>>
>> Are you claiming here that *none* of Peirce's positions are perfectly
>> clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that *all* of his positions
>> are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for debate? Is there *anything
>> *that you would confidently assert to be Peirce's position, without
>> qualifying it as merely your interpretation or opinion?
>>
>> ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as
>> 'creator of the three universes.
>>
>>
>> My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as *Ens necessarium* is Really
>> creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote, in CP 6.452,
>> "The word 'God' ... is *the *definable proper name, signifying *Ens
>> necessarium*; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
>> Experience." What is the basis for your disagreement with me about
>> Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see between
>> my statement of it and his own?
>>
>> ET: I completely disagree with you on the above.
>>
>>
>> My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads, and
>> thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote, in CP
>> 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of
>> fact," which means that it can only be "in the universe of
>> *representations*." What is the basis for your disagreement with me
>> about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what meaningful difference do you see
>> between my statement of it and his own?
>>
>> ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a 'quality'
>> in itself.
>>
>>
>> Are you saying that *all *qualities are *also *qualisigns--i.e., tthat
>> here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe that this
>> was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific passages in his
>> writings?
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> 1) Jon - When you say that *some* of Peirce's positions are perfectly
>>> clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. I happen
>>> to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as 'creator of the
>>> three universes. You have your opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect
>>> for you to declare that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.
>>>
>>> 2) Now - when you write:
>>> "My example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon
>>> and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at
>>> least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third
>>> Universe."
>>>
>>> I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a
>>> rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and *is
>>> a sign*. And does NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no such
>>> thing as a single relation i.e.,the Representamen-Object, existing on its
>>> own. The triad of all three relations *is irreducible*. O-R; R-R; R-I.
>>> None of these exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a
>>> quality, a feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'.
>>>
>>> A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something operating
>>> outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a 'quality' in itself.
>>> The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That between
>>> the Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen in itself; that
>>> between the Representamen and the Interpretant. The Representamen acts as
>>> mediation - and *can be in a mode of Firstness. *An Interpretant is
>>> not an Object but is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen
>>> to the stimuli of the Object.
>>>
>>> And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have their
>>> Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes the genuine
>>> sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
>>> And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in them at
>>> all.
>>> See 2.227 and on.
>>>
>>> Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily require
>>> Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes 2.227..] and ..there
>>> is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed anything, functioning outside of
>>> the semiosic triad.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have
>>> the right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
>>>
>>>
>>> Those are your words, not mine; I have *never *claimed to be "one with
>>> Peirce." What I *have *claimed is that *some *of Peirce's positions
>>> are perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to
>>> agree with him or not. That he believed in the Reality of God as *Ens
>>> necessarium*, Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of
>>> those--and I *do *happen to agree with him about that. At the same
>>> time, this is not to say that his entire "view of Mind and creation" was
>>> identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not.
>>>
>>> ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my
>>> comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
>>>
>>>
>>> On this, we are in complete agreement.
>>>
>>> ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
>>> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
>>> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
>>> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
>>>
>>>
>>> Again, this conflates the *mode *of a sign with the Universe of
>>> Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all
>>> mathematical reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas. My
>>> example was a qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon and
>>> rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at least,
>>> according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
>>>
>>> ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness
>>> - has any 'active power to establish connections between different objects'
>>> and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
>>> 'Thirdness'.
>>>
>>>
>>> If something does not have "active power to establish connections
>>> between different objects," then it is not a *sign *at all--in this
>>> case, it is merely a *quality*, rather than a *qualisign*. The very
>>> definition of what it means to *be *a sign is that it is able to
>>> connect different objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
>>>
>>> ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds
>>> of 'genuine triads'.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine cannot
>>> be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all three
>>> kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of
>>> *representations*." Again, this is not about the *mode *of the sign,
>>> which can be in any of the three categories, but about the *Universe of
>>> Experience *where it belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed,
>>> representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
>>> sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between
>>> an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of
>>> fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is
>>> living." Here we see that *all* representation--i.e., all sign-action,
>>> all semeiosis--necessarily involves a genuine triad, which can only be in
>>> the third Universe precisely *because *it mediates between an object
>>> and interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and "thought is
>>> living," which is another way of saying that thought is Thirdness--which
>>> makes sense, since all thought is in *signs*.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong
>>>> inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of
>>>> Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way and I
>>>> don't think that you have the right to self-define yourself as someone who
>>>> is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to read Peirce - and -
>>>> your and my comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we
>>>> interpret him.
>>>>
>>>> For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm not
>>>> sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the
>>>> physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and
>>>> don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'.
>>>>
>>>> I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
>>>> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
>>>> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
>>>> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
>>>>
>>>> So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three categories.
>>>> The quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a
>>>> mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
>>>> Experience, as something "*whose being consists in active power to
>>>> establish connections between different objects"* (CP 6.455). .....I
>>>> consider that this *quote **refers to Thirdness*. And therefore - I
>>>> don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any
>>>> 'active power to establish connections between different objects' and
>>>> therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
>>>> 'Thirdness'.
>>>>
>>>> With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of
>>>> 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in* A* quality
>>>> and in* A* fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of
>>>> Firstness; it is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a
>>>> *thoroughly
>>>> genuine triad*' which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or
>>>> Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane
>>>> - but it is not the same as a *thoroughly genuine triad* which
>>>> involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in a mode of
>>>> Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the Third
>>>> universe'; there is *no generality*. Firstness has no capacity to
>>>> 'make connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature of Firstness
>>>> - its isolate vividness.
>>>> So- we disagree in our readings.
>>>>
>>>> As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it
>>>> remains your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation -
>>>> is quite different from yours.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than
>>>> myself, those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his
>>>> writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be
>>>> HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I do not subscribe to the
>>>> approach that all interpretations are equally valid; while there can
>>>> certainly be legitimate differences, there are also objectively
>>>> *incorrect* readings, assuming (as Gary F. once put it) that Peirce
>>>> said what he meant and meant what he said. Of course, I am (very)
>>>> fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some cases. I even
>>>> conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about these particular
>>>> assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head." The
>>>> overall point remains--Peirce *did not* limit the categories to
>>>> semeiosis, as you apparently do. If you are right to do so, then not only
>>>> am I wrong about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>>
>>>> There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the word
>>>> "mode." I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
>>>> [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a *mode* of
>>>> representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of
>>>> Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience,
>>>> as something "whose being consists in active power to establish connections
>>>> between different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, the categories do
>>>> correspond to modes, such as possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In
>>>> any case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP
>>>> 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if
>>>> genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a
>>>> *thoroughly* genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and
>>>> exists in the universe of *representations*." So I am not the only
>>>> one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third Universe"--Peirce did,
>>>> as well. If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>>
>>>> Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce
>>>> believed in the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium* and Creator of all
>>>> three Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I am
>>>> wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon, you wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> "For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function within the O-R-I
>>>>> triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his architectonic
>>>>> arrangement of the sciences!"
>>>>>
>>>>> PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of
>>>>> Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' *In my [Jon Alan
>>>>> Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function
>>>>> within the O-R-I triad...etc etc.*
>>>>>
>>>>> Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that
>>>>> what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had
>>>>> the
>>>>> direct or correct view of Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now - to your points -
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a pure or genuine triad
>>>>> in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
>>>>> mode
>>>>> of representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of
>>>>> some symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it
>>>>> belongs primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you
>>>>> mean to Thirdness]??
>>>>>
>>>>> Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be in
>>>>> the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
>>>>> regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote
>>>>> at 1.515.
>>>>>
>>>>> However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of
>>>>> Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
>>>>> Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a
>>>>> complex embedded function.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the
>>>>> categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences
>>>>> etc has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read
>>>>> Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any
>>>>> way or in any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it
>>>>> corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as Firstness,
>>>>> philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of
>>>>> studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
>>>>> 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?
>>>>>
>>>>> But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one
>>>>> can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be
>>>>> loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of
>>>>> 'feeling,
>>>>> quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and
>>>>> deduction does have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose
>>>>> description for all three are, after all, aspects of reasoning
>>>>> [Thirdness].
>>>>>
>>>>> 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator.
>>>>> "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have
>>>>> come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash.
>>>>> Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash.
>>>>> Thought time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense
>>>>> after the first, because resulting from it" 1.412.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens
>>>>> necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you
>>>>> have provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god
>>>>> as
>>>>> an agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is
>>>>> accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing,
>>>>> evolving, open force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from
>>>>> matter- and therefore not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in
>>>>> the Reality of God - 6.489 ....
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>>>>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L
>>>>> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>>>>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations
>>>>> between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode;
>>>>> all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I relations
>>>>> specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that is
>>>>> what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In other words, O-R-I is not
>>>>> the *only kind* of triad, even though it is probably the *paradigmatic
>>>>> example *of a triad.
>>>>>
>>>>> In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all *genuine *triads
>>>>> belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality or
>>>>> the world of fact. These are undoubtedly what he later called the three
>>>>> Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute
>>>>> Actuality, and representation to Signs. However, this is not to say that
>>>>> all signs are in the *mode *of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants. Even a
>>>>> qualisign, which must be iconic and rhematic in its relations to its
>>>>> object
>>>>> and interpretant, and thus is classified entirely in the mode of
>>>>> Firstness,
>>>>> belongs primarily to the third Universe--its "being consists in active
>>>>> power to establish connections between different objects." However,
>>>>> specifically as a *quali*sign--a quality that is a sign--it also, in
>>>>> some sense, belongs to the first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs to
>>>>> both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as an existent.
>>>>> I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how the R-O
>>>>> and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from
>>>>> others on it.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: As such the categories only function within the triad - the O-R-I
>>>>> triad.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes
>>>>> to this subject. For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function
>>>>> within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his
>>>>> architectonic arrangement of the sciences! For sciences of discovery,
>>>>> mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences
>>>>> as
>>>>> Thirdness; for philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness,
>>>>> normative sciences as Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for
>>>>> normative sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic
>>>>> (semeiotic) as Thirdness. Within mathematics, the categories manifest as
>>>>> monads, dyads, and triads; within phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
>>>>> representation; within metaphysics, as possibility, actuality, and
>>>>> necessity (habituality); within logic, as speculative grammar, critic, and
>>>>> methodeutic. We might quibble about these particular assignments of the
>>>>> labels, which are just off the top of my head, but the point is that
>>>>> restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly contrary to Peirce's
>>>>> own approach.
>>>>>
>>>>> ET: I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
>>>>> Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
>>>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
>>>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes
>>>>> or universes'.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical to
>>>>> an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and cosmology in
>>>>> particular, rather than semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now] requires
>>>>> both Firstness and Secondness," this does not *entail *that they were
>>>>> also required "before" our actual universe came into being. While you
>>>>> "reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or
>>>>> universes," Peirce quite explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I
>>>>> honestly do not see how any *legitimate* reading of "A Neglected
>>>>> Argument" can deny this.
>>>>>
>>>>> CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the
>>>>> *definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief
>>>>> Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the
>>>>>> Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of
>>>>>> one mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These
>>>>>> are only three of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or
>>>>>> degenerate modes is, in my view, to provide the capacity for evolution,
>>>>>> adaptation and change. That is, Firstness linked to Secondness and
>>>>>> Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of the Rhematic Indexical
>>>>>> Legisign
>>>>>> - introduces novelty to actuality to habit. That's quite something.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon
>>>>>> considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are
>>>>>> modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing
>>>>>> events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only
>>>>>> function
>>>>>> within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
>>>>>> Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium'
>>>>>> because I consider that our universe requires both Firstness and
>>>>>> Secondness
>>>>>> and I therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three
>>>>>> modes or universes'. That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of
>>>>>> Peirce also within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this
>>>>>> same view within the writings of Peirce.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>
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