Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
John Sheriff, in /Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for
Human Significance/, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero"
state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later
blackboard metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being
there was in that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, "
'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This
"potential being" is, then, decidedly /not /the "nothing of negation,"
but rather "the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is
involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217).
Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this
in a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
"parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer
to the Kemetic /Nun /in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth;
while it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics
and may well have been acquainted with this myth).
Jon wrote:
[M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the /possible /chalk
marks and then draws /some /of them on the blackboard, rather than
the blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks somehow
spontaneously appear; instead, the blackboard
represents /created /Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant
that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.
I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
"creat/ed/" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat/ive/" 3ns as distinguished
from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So,
in a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created'
3nses.
One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible Power,
alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic sea, the
infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of Space or
Time." At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the name, Atum,
"which means both All and Nothing [involving] the potential totality of
the Universe which is as yet unformed and intangible. . . Atum must. . .
distinguish himself from the Nun and thus annihilate the Nun in its
original inert state." (all quotations are from Lucie Lamy's
book, /Egyptian Mysteries: New light on ancient knowledge/, p 8, a
popularization of her grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great
scholarly work in Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as
it ought to be in my opinion).
I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at this
'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is expressed in
three major ways" such that A/tum/, as /tum/ in Nun, "projects" himself
as Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All the /neteru/ ('powers'
according to S. de Lubicz, but usually translated incorrectly as 'gods')
will follow from that priordial 'act'.
Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the
ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever, Jon,
in your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really creator of
all three Universes of Experience" since opposition to this view would
fly in the face of Peirce own words: "The word 'God' ...
is /the /definable proper name, signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my
belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452).
How can one deny Peirce's own words here?
Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which, for
one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay, "A
Unified Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of Human
Reason"), Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens with this
quote:"[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relations first arose in the
world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of
how life came about."(6.322)
Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim
that /everything/ is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the pervasive
use of the categories throughout Peirce's /oevre /which does not pertain
to semiotics as such, including his classification of the sciences (as
you mentioned), nor the placement of the first of the cenoscopic
sciences, viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic as semeiotic in this
classification, nor the content of phenomenology itself, concerned
explicitly with categorial relations in themselves (and there is much,
much else which Peirce emphatically associated with the categories which
is not semeiotic).
But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on the
topic, /Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the
Sciences/, has a number of things to say about the categories in
relation to the classification. For example, after mentioning that one
of his earliest classification schemes was based on the categories, Kent
comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be misleading him, he set
it aside and developed alternative schemes, only to find himself
ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time before he conceded that
the resulting divisions conformed to his categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis
Chiasson, as I recall, makes much the same point.
Kent later remarks that regarding his final /Outline Classification of
the Sciences/ (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his
subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently satisfactory"
as late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the divisions are
'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving the three
categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post).
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond*
*
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Edwina, List:
ET: When you say that /some /of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is
your opinion.
Are you claiming here that /none/ of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that /all/ of
his positions are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for
debate? Is there /anything /that you would confidently assert to be
Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely your
interpretation or opinion?
ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on
'god- as 'creator of the three universes.
My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as /Ens necessarium/ is
Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote,
in CP 6.452, "The word 'God' ... is /the /definable proper name,
signifying /Ens necessarium/; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience." What is the basis for your
disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
ET: I completely disagree with you on the above.
My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads,
and thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote,
in CP 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality
nor in that of fact," which means that it can only be "in the
universe of /representations/." What is the basis for your
disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his own?
ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a
'quality' in itself.
Are you saying that /all /qualities are /also /qualisigns--i.e.,
tthat here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe
that this was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific
passages in his writings?
Thanks,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
__
1) Jon - When you say that /some/ of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is
your opinion. I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's
view on 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. You have your
opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare
that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.
2) Now - when you write:
"My example was a qualisign, which as a /quality/ (as well as an
icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a
/sign/--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only
belong to the third Universe."
I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a
rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness
and _is a sign_. And does NOT belong to the third Universe.
There is no such thing as a single relation i.e.,the
Representamen-Object, existing on its own. The triad of all
three relations _is irreducible_. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these
exist on their own but within the triad. A Qualisign is a
quality, a feeling - and is not in the 'third Universe'.
A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something
operating outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a
'quality' in itself.
The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That
between the Representamen and the Object; that of the
Representamen in itself; that between the Representamen and the
Interpretant. The Representamen acts as mediation - and _can be
in a mode of Firstness. _An Interpretant is not an Object but
is an 'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the
stimuli of the Object.
And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT
have their Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That
includes the genuine sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and
the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in
them at all.
See 2.227 and on.
Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily
require Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes
2.227..] and ..there is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed
anything, functioning outside of the semiosic triad.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
*Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think
that you have the right to self-define yourself as
someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
Those are your words, not mine; I have /never /claimed to be
"one with Peirce." What I /have /claimed is that /some /of
Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and not reasonably
disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not. That
he believed in the Reality of God as /Ens necessarium/,
Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of
those--and I /do /happen to agree with him about that. At
the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of
Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite
certain that it was not.
ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and
- your and my comments - and make up their minds as to
how 'accurately' we interpret him.
On this, we are in complete agreement.
ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see
that eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical
mode of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would
be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
Again, this conflates the /mode /of a sign with the Universe
of Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even
sure that all mathematical reasoning should be assigned to
the Universe of Ideas. My example was a qualisign, which as
a /quality/ (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely in
the mode of Firstness, but as a /sign/--at least, according
to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a
mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish
connections between different objects' and therefore, I
simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
'Thirdness'.
If something does not have "active power to establish
connections between different objects," then it is not a
/sign /at all--in this case, it is merely a /quality/,
rather than a /qualisign/. The very definition of what it
means to /be /a sign is that it is able to connect different
objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers
to THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'.
Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if
genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of
fact," which means that all three kinds of genuine triads
can only be "in the universe of /representations/." Again,
this is not about the /mode /of the sign, which can be in
any of the three categories, but about the /Universe of
Experience /where it belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed,
representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it
involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting
thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought
is living." Here we see that /all/ representation--i.e.,
all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves a
genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe
precisely /because /it mediates between an object and
interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and
"thought is living," which is another way of saying that
thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought
is in /signs/.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
__
Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon]
am wrong inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all
of us, readers of Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We
each read him a different way and I don't think that you
have the right to self-define yourself as someone who
is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to
read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up
their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic -
whereas, I'm not sure what meaning you assign to the
word. For me - all actions within the physico-chemical,
biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and
don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is
effete mind'.
I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that
eg the mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode
of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which would be, in
the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic legisign
argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
So, i don't equate the three universes to match the
three categories. The quotation you provide "I said that
a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e.,
a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
Experience, as something "/whose being consists in
active power to establish connections between different
objects"/ (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this /quote
/_refers to Thirdness_. And therefore - I don't see that
a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has
any 'active power to establish connections between
different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how
you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'.
With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to
THREE kinds of 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad
as operational in*A* quality and in*A* fact. So- 1-1-1,
a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it
is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a
/thoroughly genuine triad/' which involves generality or
Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a
total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is
not the same as a /thoroughly genuine triad/ which
involves generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in
a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce,
belong in 'the Third universe'; there is _no
generality_. Firstness has no capacity to 'make
connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature
of Firstness - its isolate vividness.
So- we disagree in our readings.
As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I
maintain that it remains your interpretation and that
Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is quite different
from yours.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
*Cc:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
I try to be careful about only attributing to
Peirce, rather than myself, those things that strike
me as incontrovertibly clear in his writings--things
that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize
to be HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I
do not subscribe to the approach that all
interpretations are equally valid; while there can
certainly be legitimate differences, there are also
objectively /incorrect/ readings, assuming (as Gary
F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and
meant what he said. Of course, I am (very)
fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in
some cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We
might quibble about these particular assignments of
the labels, which are just off the top of my head."
The overall point remains--Peirce /did not/ limit
the categories to semeiosis, as you apparently do.
If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong
about this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
There seems to be a particular terminological
difficulty with the word "mode." I did not say
"that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
[O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
/mode/ of representation," I said that a thoroughly
genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a
qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
Experience, as something "whose being consists in
active power to establish connections between
different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts,
the categories do correspond to modes, such as
possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any
case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what
Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I
indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if
genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in
that of fact ... But a /thoroughly/ genuine triad is
separated entirely from those worlds and exists in
the universe of /representations/." So I am not the
only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the
third Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong
about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to
whether Peirce believed in the Reality of God as
/Ens necessarium/ and Creator of all three Universes
of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I
am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong
about it.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
__
Jon, you wrote:
"For Peirce, the categories do not /only
/function within the O-R-I triad--for one thing,
they are /everywhere /in his architectonic
arrangement of the sciences!"
PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the
sole interpreter of Peirce. Therefore, please
write something like: ' _In my [Jon Alan
Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of
Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I
triad...etc etc._
Do you see the difference? I am always careful
to make it clear that what I write is MY
interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I
had the direct or correct view of Peirce.
Now - to your points -
1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a
pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
[O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a
mode of representation - and representation
suggests Thirdness or the use of some symbolic
mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim
that "it belongs primarily to the Third
Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean
to Thirdness]??
Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if
genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in
that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET -
I cannot find this quote at 1.515.
However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is
an essential part of Thirdness...and Firstness
is an essential element of both Secondness and
Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that
the three categories are a complex embedded
function.
2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning
various sciences with the categories. I don't
think that his differentiation of the various
sciences etc has any real relationship to the
categories. The categories, as I read Peirce,
refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of
all that is in any way or in any sense present
to the mind quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284
Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery,
mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as
Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified
the various fields of studies - but not within
the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to
actual facts?
But he certainly classified fields of study into
'threes'. - and one can see that some of the
descriptions of the modal categories can be
loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed
have an element of 'feeling, quality, freedom';
and induction does have an element of actual
fact; and deduction does have an element of
necessity. But I think this is a loose
description for all three are, after all,
aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].
3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a
pre-existent creator.
"Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say
that there would have come something, by the
principle of Firstness, which we may call a
flash. Then by the principle of habit there
would have been a second flash. Thought time
would not yet have been, this second flash was
in some sense after the first, because resulting
from it" 1.412.
Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need
a prior 'ens necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of
your view of genesis and god, since you have
provided your supportive quotations from the
Bible - which sees god as an agential creator -
but - I don't see that this Agential Force is
accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the
agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open
force - and a part of matter - i.e., not
separate from matter- and therefore not prior to
time or matter. [see his discussion in the
Reality of God - 6.489 ....
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
*From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky
<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>
*Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure'
triads where the Relations between the
Object-Representamen-Interpretant are
all of one mode; all in the mode of
Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
I do not believe that Jeff's post was
referring to the O-R-I relations
specifically, but rather to triadic
relations in general, since that is what
Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In
other words, O-R-I is not the /only kind/ of
triad, even though it is probably the
/paradigmatic example /of a triad.
In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly
that all /genuine /triads belong to the
world of representation, and not to the
world of quality or the world of fact.
These are undoubtedly what he later called
the three Universes of Experience--quality
corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute
Actuality, and representation to Signs.
However, this is not to say that all signs
are in the /mode /of Thirdness; i.e.,
Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must
be iconic and rhematic in its relations to
its object and interpretant, and thus is
classified entirely in the mode of
Firstness, belongs primarily to the third
Universe--its "being consists in active
power to establish connections between
different objects." However, specifically
as a /quali/sign--a quality that is a
sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the
first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs
to both the third Universe as a sign and the
second Universe as an existent. I am still
thinking through how all of this works,
including how the R-O and R-I relations fit
into the picture, so I would welcome input
from others on it.
ET: As such the categories only
function within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
Perhaps this is our fundamental
disagreement, at least when it comes to this
subject. For Peirce, the categories do not
/only /function within the O-R-I triad--for
one thing, they are /everywhere /in his
architectonic arrangement of the sciences!
For sciences of discovery, mathematics as
Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and
special sciences as Thirdness; for
philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as
Firstness, normative sciences as Secondness,
and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative
sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as
Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness.
Within mathematics, the categories manifest
as monads, dyads, and triads; within
phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
representation; within metaphysics, as
possibility, actuality, and necessity
(habituality); within logic, as speculative
grammar, critic, and methodeutic. We might
quibble about these particular assignments
of the labels, which are just off the top of
my head, but the point is that restricting
the categories to semeiosis is decidedly
contrary to Peirce's own approach.
ET: I don't see either that the 'pure
or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens
necessarium' because I consider that our
universe requires both Firstness and
Secondness and I therefore reject such a
pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all
three modes or universes'.
No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine
Thirdness" is identical to an Argument; this
thread concerns metaphysics in general, and
cosmology in particular, rather than
semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now]
requires both Firstness and Secondness,"
this does not /entail /that they were also
required "before" our actual universe came
into being. While you "reject such a
pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three
modes or universes," Peirce quite explicitly
believed in just such a Creator, and I
honestly do not see how any /legitimate/
reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this.
CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized"
(as we Americans say), is /the
/definable proper name, signifying /Ens
necessarium/; in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of
Experience. (CP 6.452)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina
Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca
<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
__
Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the
three 'pure' triads where the Relations
between the
Object-Representamen-Interpretant are
all of one mode; all in the mode of
Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
These are only three of the ten - and
the function of the non-genuine or
degenerate modes is, in my view, to
provide the capacity for evolution,
adaptation and change. That is,
Firstness linked to Secondness and
Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad
of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign -
introduces novelty to actuality to
habit. That's quite something.
My point is that the modal categories
have no 'per se' reality [Jon considers
that both Firstness and Thirdness have
such a reality] but are modes of
organization and experience of
matter/concepts within ongoing events,
i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such
the categories only function within the
triad - the O-R-I triad.
I don't see either that the 'pure or
genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens
necessarium' because I consider that our
universe requires both Firstness and
Secondness and I therefore reject such a
pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all
three modes or universes'. That is -
I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of
Peirce also within his belief in Genesis
and God - but I can't see this same view
within the writings of Peirce.
Edwina
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to
l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line
"UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
<http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> .
