Dear list:
If pragmaticism appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates, then it should be helpful to see Peirce and Plato in the same place. Here, I’d like to use them together to determine the Sign of pragmatic maxim. That is, give reasons for why the name/definition/essence should go from surprise to suspect. A primary theme of Platonic philosophy is the assertion that there is a “threefold knowledge of things…I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name,- these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about anything… Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name.” ~*Laws* In *Cratylus*, Plato discusses a fitness of names in context of a theory of the truth of names. The dialogue supplies considerations for what a good name consists in; it ought to provide good information, it should indicate the nature of the thing to be a representation of the thing, it should assimilate the name to the object as much as it can... For example: "I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things. That is precisely what I mean. But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the *best sort of information*? or is there any other? What do you say? I believe that to be both* the only and the best* sort of information about them; there can be no other. Therefore, to know the name of *the* pragmatic maxim is to know what the nature and essence of pragmaticism is and outcompete others such that there is no other. So how can we tie down this opinion of what the *best* pragmatic maxim is? _____________ “*Who taught thee me to name?*”, breathed the maxim. Plato traces some constraints for how names are composed. “…we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name. And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?... Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? “ To simplify this difficult task, he proposes a means of focus: “…there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of *immutable essences*; — there ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.” >From here, it becomes eerie because the following selections suggest to me that Plato anticipated our situation; that he is talking about Peirce and us, that his reputation as the “broadest generalizer” is much warranted: “…the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say… But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things… Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?... Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his *conception* of the things which they signified — did he not?... And if his *conception* was erroneous, and he gave names according to his *conception*, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?... For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this… And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles:— are they or are they not rightly laid down? But if this is a* battle of names, *some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that THEY are, *how or by what criterion are we to decide between them*? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things. Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?" _____________ *Here is our battle of names:* CP 5.402 is the best pragmatic maxim. CP 5.189 is the best pragmatic maxim. To settle this issue is to decide which has a better likeness to pragmaticism. To determine the better argument is to know by what criteria we judge. The argument that CP 5.189 is the normative form of abduction does not appear to be self-evident to everyone. It is opinion but the claim is that it is true opinion. This claim does not appear to determine that it is the best one, because the reasons for its normativity, which captures the logic of abduction, is inadequate or simply missed. Ordinality is only valued by some and not all Peirceans. The identity/likeness between Peirce and ancient philosophy, the river of pragmaticism, is ignored away. An explicit requirement for the three categories is not deemed a necessary expectation for what *the* pragmatic maxim ought to include. Its capacity to order the great and the small, unlimited/limited, surface of things/heart of things, substance/being is not recognized. Bringing attention to the importance of the social dimension through transformation of surprise to suspect, which captures necessity of duration, is not valued. Weighing of *pros* and *cons* lead to inaction, to no movement. Never mind that “Education consists in turning the attention of the mind and enlarging the scope of its contemplation to a synoptic vision” (Richard McKeon). “Perhaps it is our conceit that there is only one way of understanding a phenomenon” (Jerome Bruner). Though ‘hard, is the knowledge of the good’, I cannot help believing that agreeing to *one and only one pragmatic maxim- *the *best* one with the character of an immutable essence- is necessary to move efficiently toward the summum bonum. That is, it would be foolish to work toward concrete reasonableness without it if it is deemed *complete* as the logic of abduction; and *complete,* because harmony in one two three… C A B… name definition essence… Consider, for instance, interchangeability of the following: pragmaticism, pragmatic maxim, CP 5.189 CP 5.189, pragmatic maxim, pragmaticism pragmatic maxim, CP 5.189, pragmaticism pragmatic maxim, CP 5.189, growth of concrete reasonableness *What other argumentation outcompetes it? **If not this, which? * _______ So, what decides the strongest argument? What is the motivator, given that it still remains *up to us* to do so? If we are to know the art that leads to knowledge in the unqualified sense, where is this art of demonstration? ( *para*., Muhsin Mahdi) In absence of that demonstration, I will throw more words, sensible perhaps, but still, they’re just words. For example, what about our valuation for primary things that are to be trusted over secondary things? For “the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.” For example, CP 5.402 states: *“*Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our *conception* to have. Then, our *conception* of these effects is the whole of our *conception* of the object.” And recall that CP 5.189 is an argument, and an argument is a proposition, and “A *concept* is already implicitly a proposition; a proposition implicitly an argument.” (Olshewsky) For “The conception of *being* arises upon the formation of a proposition. A proposition always has, besides a term to express the substance, another to express the quality of that substance; and the function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the substance. “ ~Peirce Then CP 5.402 is said to be derivative of CP 5.189 because the latter structures the conception, gives it *form*, provides the sequence and duration, which 5.402 needs to have for it to recommend anything at all. So, why bother with a best? Because “we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.” __________ I wish to leave you with the last words of *Cratylus, *which should be of particular interest to those who care to know about pragmatic convergence theories of truth: “Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names… Reflect well...and do not easily accept such a doctrine; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have found the truth, come and tell me. Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these things yourself.” Thank you for your consideration and best wishes, Jerry Rhee On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 1:49 AM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear list: > > In *Pragmatism and the Normativity of Assertion,* Helmut Pape begins his > essay with a quote by Peirce: > > > > “*No general description of the mode of advance of human knowledge can be > just which leaves out of account the social aspect of knowledge…* > > *What a thing society is!...”* > > > > Then he observes: > > > > “Pragmatism is many things to many people… > > > > According to Richard Rorty we are pragmatists, if we admit that we know > the criteria for truth whenever we know what we want… > > Nevertheless, *knowing* what we want with any precision and to determine > by that knowledge coherent criteria for truth may be a harder task than > Rorty imagines.” > > _______ > > > > To illustrate just how hard this task is of 1) knowing and stating what we > want with any precision and 2) determining coherent criteria for truth from > that knowledge; *here is what I want*. Here is my normative assertion > stated explicitly. > > > > *I want to condense, simplify and spread the complete meaning of > pragmaticism in a single maxim, one and only one*. > > > > That is, I want to maintain the relevant complexity but present it in > simplicity. > > The one stated in CP 5.402 (“Consider what effects…”, the “*received > view”*) is unsatisfactory, fragmentary and *incomplete*. > > > > Alternatively, I present *this* pragmatic maxim, the one and only one > that faithfully and *completely* condenses pragmaticism, for “if you > carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it > is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction”: > > > > The surprising fact, C, is observed. > > But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. > > Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189) > > > > To say then, that CP 5.189 is that complete pragmatic maxim is to say that > it serves as the foundation for what it means to be a pragmaticist. > > It is to say that exercising the will to adopt and use this maxim to solve > complex problems is to expect convergence of diverse minds to a single > truth in spite of *dark* conditions. > > It is to say that this is the “right rule of logical analysis”. > > Adoption of this preamble “makes things *a priori”*. > > It is to accept this maxim as a “formal, and necessary presupposition of > all meaningful claims about reality”. > > This “logical principles state conditions that make the objective > representation of states of affairs possible”. > > > > CP 5.189 is an argument because *On a New List of Categories*. > > If “to determine an interpretant is the function of arguments”, then > adopting this argument is to determine an interpretant. It is to make > meanings clear. > > > > If you examine this argument closely, you will find that *this* argument > (unlike CP 5.402) gives you a sequence; it “claims that the process of > sign-transformation involves *some* real sequential cognitive process: > > *…all my own writings upon formal logic have been based on the belief that > the concept of Sequence, alike in reasonings and in judgments…could in no > wise be replaced by any composition of ideas. For in reasoning, at least, > we affirm, or, affirmatively judge, the conjugate of the premises, the > judgment of the conclusion has not yet been performed. There then follows > a real movement in thought.* > > > > That is, CP 5.189 better than CP 5.402 because sequence. > > > When you examine it, this “*logical principle* considered as a > proposition will be found to be quite empty”. That is, the argument must > be transformed into an argumentation for it to be not empty. > > > As you fill out terms C and A explicitly, *utter them out loud in public*, > you will realize “that no term has a connotation incapable of logical > analysis- there are no truly “simple” terms.” > > > > In summary, it is precise to this extent. Filling out terms explicitly > with a correct habit of mind (dialectic and not eristic) will lead to > making ideas clear because that is the function of arguments, to determine > interpretants. > > This immerses you in the social aspect of knowledge construction and will > help you discover on your own what the criteria are for truth-making. > > _______________ > > > > Now the difficulty: > > > > Who gets to speak for all who investigate, especially about complex > situations? > > Where is this proof for such a thing? > > > > That is, if “knowledge, like the verb ‘to know’, means two things, of > which one is potential and one actual”, then where is this “teridentity > of its object that is developed in a sequence of interpretations, which is > complete and perfect because it contains the ultimate interpretant of every > sign”? > > > > That is, > > *if* “The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except > through the medium of examples”, > > *then* “What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with > the political occupation?” > > > Where is this thing to "take these in the case of one instance, and so > understand them in the case of all"? > > > > “: — O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? > > > > Are we to find this “truth of the pragmatic maxim by relying on findings > in biology and psychology”? > > For “every man seems to know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and then > again to wake up and to know nothing.” > > > > *Now* “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical > bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your > conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. > ” > > > > I realize I am liable to the penalties of the social law for producing > this act of assertion. But I believe in the act of assent as an act of the > mind by which one endeavors to impress the meanings of the proposition, so > that it shall govern conduct, including thought under conduct. > > > > But when you “understand an assertion made by someone other than > ourselves, we see ourselves confronted with a demand which other person > makes on us: she asks us to think in a certain way, namely to accept as our > belief what the assertion says. So our public assertion commits us to > defend a proposition if called upon, and to abandon it if we cannot, while > private assent obligates us to be prepared to act on it as a habit.” > > > > Let us acknowledge, then, that we have this preamble. > > Let us acknowledge that > > > > *CP 5.189 is the one and only one single best pragmatic maxim. * > > > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > > > In addition to Pape’s essay, I embedded quotes from various Plato > dialogues, which is justified because “It appears to have been virtually > the philosophy of Socrates.” Moreover, I transmogrified statements from > Paul Forster’s *The Logic of Pragmatism: A Neglected Argument for > Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim*. > > On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 4:05 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Dear list: >> >> >> >> Wonderful! Thank you for stating your position clearly. >> >> >> >> So now, all we need decide is whether CP 5.189 is or is not a pragmatic >> maxim. >> >> But before that, we need to decide whether it is or is not a maxim. >> >> For a pragmatic maxim belongs to the set of maxims. >> >> >> >> Here are some standards for “maxim”: >> >> >> >> ‘*Every man who has seen the world knows that nothing is so useless as a >> general maxim’*, wrote Lord Macaulay in 1827. >> >> >> >> In Macaulay’s view, outlined here, maxims are essentially for the purpose >> of regulating conduct by preventing foolish action, but do not often work. >> >> >> >> General maxims’ are for the improvement and education of the masses and >> might occasionally prevent folly.. >> >> >> >> But in pre-theoretical thought, maxims are a way of preserving truth, a >> way of ‘thinking memorable thoughts’, the very stuff of knowledge, replete >> with communal values. >> >> >> >> They are used by, and of, the socially-elevated as much as the common >> people; by and of women; in a casual, ordinary ‘*ofost is selost’* >> (haste is best) way, as well as for narrative, rhetorical and emphatic >> purpose. “ >> >> *~* Paul Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry >> >> >> >> >> >> “A *form*, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula of >> the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the >> >> maxims must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of >> nature.” >> >> ~Kant >> >> >> >> As to reasons for why pragmatic maxim, I would refer to Jon and John’s >> arguments. >> >> >> >> But what I would also like to point out are their reasons for why CP >> 5.189 is *NOT* a maxim, much less a pragmatic one, for there must also >> be reasons to suspect A is *not* true. >> >> >> >> I would challenge you to defend that position. >> >> That is, the *reasons* for why CP 5.189 as a pragmatic maxim is >> surprising and/or suspicious to you. >> >> >> >> Thank you for the conversation. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 1:43 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> >> wrote: >> >>> I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the >>> issue I tried to address in my previous post was to find some common >>> unifying factor, not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim. >>> Nonetheless, I believe there are better and worse versions, and that these >>> are far outweighed by partial versions (not to mention outright >>> misunderstandings). >>> >>> >>> >>> The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes >>> Jerry’s request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around >>> about way to explain. >>> >>> >>> >>> John Collier >>> >>> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate >>> >>> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal >>> >>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] >>> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM >>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology) >>> >>> >>> >>> List: >>> >>> >>> >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread >>> topic. I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending >>> any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other >>> subjects besides Peirce's cosmology. >>> >>> >>> >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell. In >>> particular, CP 5.189 is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* >>> pragmatic >>> maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in another thread, it is >>> the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus falls under >>> logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a tool >>> for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and >>> inductive evaluation, and rejecting those that are not. >>> >>> >>> >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic >>> maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ... >>> >>> >>> >>> That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must >>> render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to >>> rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as >>> hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of >>> pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to >>> logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; >>> 1903) >>> >>> >>> >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*. >>> >>> >>> >>> For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical >>> effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far >>> as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might >>> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second >>> conception. >>> >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list: >>> >>> >>> >>> John Collier: >>> >>> But that is my point. Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly >>> since it is carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it >>> shouldn't be handled loosely. To say that such things are in the pragmatic >>> maxim (the pragmatic maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it >>> is in ONE pragmatic maxim, the best one. So, which one? I think this is >>> the matter that does not get criticized enough. >>> >>> ______ >>> >>> >>> >>> John Sowa, Edwina: >>> >>> >>> >>> "*logos* means something rather like calculation than religion..." >>> ~Strauss >>> >>> >>> >>> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number >>> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of >>> them? >>> >>> >>> >>> Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly >>> witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator >>> and geometrician?” >>> ~Plato >>> >>> >>> >>> “By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower >>> meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy >>> is.”~Strauss >>> >>> >>> >>> “When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which >>> experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent >>> arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* >>> produces a certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for >>> its quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to >>> the truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant >>> impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.” >>> ~Peirce >>> >>> >>> >>> The way begets one; >>> One begets two; >>> Two begets three; >>> Three begets the myriad creatures. >>> >>> ~Lau 42 >>> >>> ____________ >>> >>> >>> >>> Kirsti, >>> >>> >>> >>> You said: >>> >>> I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in >>> detail the exact wording CSP worked with for decades. Especially those >>> wordings he stick up with in his latest years. >>> >>> >>> >>> Peirce is greatly enhanced through a direct examination of nature. >>> >>> “That is why I prefer the study of nature,” said Goethe, “which does not >>> allow such sickness to arise. For there we have to do with infinite and >>> eternal truth that immediately rejects anyone who does not proceed neatly >>> and honestly in observing and handling his subject. I am also certain that >>> many a person who is dialectically sick could find a beneficial cure in the >>> study of nature." >>> >>> And Plato because “It (pragmaticism) appears to have been virtually the >>> philosophy of Socrates.” >>> >>> >>> >>> And Aristotle because, “The principles therefore are, in a way, not more >>> in number than the contraries, but as it were two, nor yet precisely two, >>> since there is a difference of essential nature, but three…” >>> >>> >>> >>> So, if Aristotle, Plato and Nature to understand Peirce, then how many >>> years for each and how would you resolve any differences, should any >>> conflicts arise? Which should take precedence? >>> >>> >>> >>> I would recommend starting with Nature, then all three; more or less… >>> >>> If true, then there should be no conflict and the problem would lie with >>> me. >>> >>> >>> >>> "Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about >>> the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of >>> his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present >>> moment is merely this — that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that >>> what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince >>> my hearers is a secondary matter with me." ~Plato on the attitude in >>> dialectic >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:01 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Jerry, there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic >>> maxim, and it is also implicit in other work by Peirce. >>> >>> >>> >>> One way of putting the maxim is that any difference in meaning implies a >>> difference in the possibilities of (external) experience on which they are >>> grounded. You can experience this as a feeling (what might be true) as an >>> inferred difference, or as an explanation of the difference. Of course, >>> separating the three except in the abstract, is impossible. That is what I >>> meant when I said I thought Edwina was right about inseperability. She may >>> have meant more or less that I didn’t notice. >>> >>> >>> >>> This sort of thinking is found throughout Peirce’s writing. I don’t >>> think there are any grounds for controversy about that. The interesting >>> thing to me, in this case, is that it can be applied reflectively. >>> >>> >>> >>> John Collier >>> >>> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate >>> >>> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal >>> >>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] >>> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 October 2016 6:31 PM >>> *To:* John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> >>> >>> John Collier, list: >>> >>> >>> >>> You said: I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in >>> the pragmatic maxim. >>> >>> >>> >>> Do you mind stating where, in the pragmatic maxim, it says this? >>> >>> >>> >>> I'm not questioning whether it is or not. I'm just not sure to what you >>> are referring. >>> >>> >>> >>> Thank you, >>> >>> Jerry R >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >
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