Jerry R.:
You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not. You offer it as a
candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not. You want us
to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
and CP 5.189 is your creed. I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
Thanks,
The Other Jon
On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Jon, list:
>
>
>
> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>
>
>
> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
> accusation that applies to both of us. These are claims that must be
> decided by the rights of the question.
>
>
>
> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>
>
>
> What do you offer as reasons? If you refuse to give reasons but simply
> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer. You are not agreeing to
> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset. For if you give your
> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together. I
> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
> is nothing but the logic of abduction. Can you make such claims for the
> lessers? For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
> valued by Peirce?
>
>
>
> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
> manifestations*.
>
>
>
> That is,
>
> What is C?
>
> What is A?
>
> What is B?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>
>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>> which they point.
>>
>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>> A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives,
>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>
>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>> in question come into play.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>>
>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>>> vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods
>>> at
>>> our disposal.
>>>
>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>>
>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>>
>>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>>>
>>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon, list:
>>>>>
>>>>> How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
>>>>>
>>>>> | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."
>>>>>
>>>>> | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt
>>>>> | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But
>>>>> when
>>>>> | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure
>>>>> of
>>>>> | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
>>>>> | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
>>>>> | ~ Peirce
>>>>>
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> Jerry R
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Peircers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
>>>>>> that I collected a number of years ago, along with
>>>>>> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I
>>>>>> understand them, they all say essentially the same
>>>>>> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
>>>>>> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
>>>>>> or occasion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> List:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
>>>>>>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others
>>>>>>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
>>>>>>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
>>>>>>> besides Peirce's cosmology.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
>>>>>>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
>>>>>>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
>>>>>>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
>>>>>>> tell.
>>>>>>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in
>>>>>>> another
>>>>>>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
>>>>>>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
>>>>>>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
>>>>>>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
>>>>>>> those that are not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
>>>>>>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
>>>>>>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
>>>>>>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
>>>>>>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
>>>>>>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
>>>>>>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
>>>>>>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
>>>>>>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology.
>>>>>>> | (CP 5.196; 1903)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
>>>>>>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
>>>>>>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
>>>>>>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
>>>>>>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>
>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>
>
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