Jon, list: Thank you for that earnest answer. Still, can there not be a strongest argument? That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at our disposal. So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out? Thank you for your comments, Jerry R On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Jerry, List, > > I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms, > so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation > of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math. > But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives > we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful > principles can be improved almost indefinitely. > > I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have > to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Jon, list: > > > > How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad? > > > > | "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad." > > > > | "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief > > > | that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt > > | such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when > > | a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of > > | their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical > > | theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego." > > | ~ Peirce > > > > Best, > > Jerry R > > > > On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > > >> Peircers, > >> > >> Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim > >> that I collected a number of years ago, along with > >> some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I > >> understand them, they all say essentially the same > >> thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view, > >> or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience > >> or occasion. > >> > >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/ > >> > >> Regards, > >> > >> Jon > >> > >> On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > >> > >>> List: > >>> > >>> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion > >>> to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others > >>> would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing > >>> conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects > >>> besides Peirce's cosmology. > >>> > >>> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim," > >>> which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple > >>> formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," > >>> which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell. > >>> In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* > >>> pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* > >>> pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in another > >>> thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus > >>> falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently > >>> serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to > >>> deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting > >>> those that are not. > >>> > >>> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which* > >>> pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ... > >>> > >>> | That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, > >>> | if sound, must render needless any further rule as to > >>> | the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, > >>> | that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as > >>> | hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all* > >>> | that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do, > >>> | at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is > >>> | not understood as a proposition in psychology. > >>> | (CP 5.196; 1903) > >>> > >>> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*. > >>> > >>> | For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have > >>> | no logical effect or import differing from that of a second > >>> | conception except so far as, taken in connection with other > >>> | conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our > >>> | practical conduct differently from that second conception. > >>> > >>> Regards, > >>> > >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >>> > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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