Jon,
I could not agree more. Excellent, to my mind.
Best regards,
Kirsti Määttänen
Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 4.11.2016 15:51:
Jerry, List,
Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
to Compute Better Answers.
For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
which they point.
For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
A well-developed formal system will have: (1) Primitives,
the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
(2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
(3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
(4) Inference Rules.
But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
in question come into play.
Regards,
Jon
On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Jon, list:
Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that
is
based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables? For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the
methods at
our disposal.
So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Jerry, List,
I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
Regards,
Jon
On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Jon, list:
How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?
| "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or
bad."
| "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the
belief
| that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to
adopt
| such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But
when
| a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as
sure of
| their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a
metaphysical
| theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
| ~ Peirce
Best,
Jerry R
On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Peircers,
Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
that I collected a number of years ago, along with
some commentary of my own as I last left it. As I
understand them, they all say essentially the same
thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
or occasion.
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/
Regards,
Jon
On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
List:
Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
to a new thread topic. I would appreciate it if others
would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
besides Peirce's cosmology.
There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic
maxim,"
which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic
maxim,"
which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can
tell.
In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the
best*
pragmatic maxim. For one thing, as we established recently in
another
thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
falls under logical *critic*. *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
those that are not.
In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
| That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
| if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
| the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
| that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as
| hopeful suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all*
| that the maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do,
| at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
| not understood as a proposition in psychology.
| (CP 5.196; 1903)
... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
| For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have
| no logical effect or import differing from that of a second
| conception except so far as, taken in connection with other
| conceptions and intentions, it might> conceivably modify our
| practical conduct differently from that second conception.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
