Again well said and it vindicates respect for Peirce. The next thing to say of course is that he did not see his work as finished but as a stable structure for the future which IMO belongs to him now whether anyone knows it or not. And oddly I think Wittgenstein would agree and see himself and Nietzsche as seminal partners in the same move.
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 2:57 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > one should note that in the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist > largely following Duns Scotus to a stronger realist largely on the basis of > how he considered thirdness ontologically. So a quote from 1893 is almost > certainly in reference to his moderate realist phase. > > I should add that even with either the Scotus styled moderate realism or > the stronger realism that took thirdness as fully mind independent, that > Peirce and Dewey did route a third way between the extremes of realism and > idealism. That continued through the idealist/realist debates up to around > the post war period when positivism and analytic philosophy became dominate. > > > On Nov 29, 2016, at 11:31 AM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Thanks Clark for putting that odd Carus quote in context and for your > clarififying words that follow, particularly your description of thirdness. > In my own thinking I see this final stage as action and expression which > means essentially that Peirce moves us from what used to be called > transcendent to the here and now. > > > I was trying to get at how “here and now” versus “transcendence” as a > false dichotomy that both Peirce and Dewey managed to avoid. Effectively > both realism of the sort introduced by Descartes as well as the idealism > that effectively also branched off from Descartes introduce this false > dilemma. Even before he moves more away from Duns Scotus there’s a sense > that Peirce isn’t satisfied with either approach because both hinge upon a > kind of internalist view from which to think through the problem. > > Treating thirdness as something real in the universe independent of what > any particular person thinks about it is key. In epistemology and semantics > we call this Externalism and it pops up in various guises. I think the > problem with Duns Scotus’ moderate realism is that for all its strengths > it’s still fundamentally tied to the individual (albeit perhaps not quite > as strong as what Descartes gave philosophy) Most of the problem of > nominalism really is the problem of internalism. Lose internalism and then > realism makes far more sense without the problems of transcendence. > > In a certain way the entire trajectory of Peirce’s thought from the > beginnings of rejecting Kantian transcendence and the “in itself” is this > move of thinking through Externalism. If anything it’s surprising that it’s > not until the later part of the 1890’s that he finally takes his objective > idealism seriously. > > While to my mind there are many problems with Dewey, one of his great > strengths is that many aspects of this central Peircean insight remain in > Dewey’s thought. > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
