Dear list: drat! I lost my opportunity to say, "I hope your suggestions may bring a whole crop of fruit".
oh well, "the jerk store called... Best, Jerry R On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 3:56 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Dear John, Thomas, list: > > > > To those who propose putting forth philosophical definitions for old > terms, Peirce gives a kind of snarky response in “Mr. Peterson’s Proposed > Discussion”. > > > > And yet, despite his awareness that > > *Symbols grow**… Omne symbolum de symbolo.* (7) > <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm#7> > A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in > experience, its meaning grows. Such words as *force, law, wealth, > marriage,* bear for us very different meanings from those they bore to > our barbarous ancestors. The symbol may, with Emerson’s sphynx, (8) > <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce1.htm#8> > say to man, > > Of thine eye I am eyebeam. > > > > he says that Locke’s definition for “experience” ought to be left > untouched. > > > > In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”, he gives several definitions > for *hypothesis* in the footnotes. > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Tue, Dec 13, 2016 at 1:43 PM, Thomas903 <ozzie...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> John Sowa, others ~ >> >> I wanted to comment on statements made last night about the meaning of >> law-theory-hypothesis. For convenience (i.e., mine), I will address your >> statements in a different order: 1-3-2. See below. >> >> Regards, >> Tom Wyrick >> >> "Scientists make a three-way distinction of hypotheses, theories, and >> laws: >> 1. A law is a theory that has been thoroughly tested on some observable >> phenomena and shown to be reliable in making predictions about the >> future development of those phenomena." >> >> There are a lot of scientists, so I won't claim that all agree with a >> single definition. But when I see the term "law" being used by scientists >> (e.g., Kepler's Law), it is normally used to describe a physical-empirical >> regularity. It is assumed that something causes/generates the regularity, >> and that cause can (eventually) be formalized in a theory -- but the law >> itself is a phenomenological description of reality. An empirical habit. >> >> Laws: Orbits are ellipses (Kepler's Law). If the price of good X >> decreases, people buy more of good X (law of demand). If something can go >> wrong, it will (Murphy's Law). These laws-regularities are not accompanied >> by theories or tentative explanations (hypotheses). >> >> >> "3. A hypothesis is any theory in the logicians' sense. No tests of >> relevance or reliability have yet been made." >> >> This is broadly accurate, but lacks precision. An hypothesis is not "any >> theory," but a proposed explanation (story) for the observed regularity-law >> and/or "surprising facts" that depart from the law. Tests of >> the hypothesis may or may not have been made; being tested does not >> eliminate something from being an hypothesis. >> >> >> "2. A theory is a hypothesis that ... has not yet been sufficiently >> tested for it to be accepted as a law." >> >> This reads as though a moderate amount of hypothesis testing produces a >> theory, then more testing produces a law. No cause and effect is hinted >> at. The alternative view: A theory provides a widely-accepted causal >> explanation for a physical regularity (law). A generally accepted theory >> is the best causal explanation that society (scientists and practitioners) >> can presently offer for the physical law and/or exceptions to it. >> >> ..... >> >> 4. A theory is the culmination of observation and measurement, hypothesis >> construction, empirical testing, debate and discussion. As such, a theory >> is an intellectual-capital good developed over time. There is no logical >> activity known as "deduction" without first developing a "theoretical >> model" that, when combined with relevant premises, generates syllogisms >> (predictions, explanations) relating to a class of phenomena. >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 9:11 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: >> >>> On 12/12/2016 1:24 PM, Clark Goble wrote: >>> >>>> I don’t like the term “legitimate” precisely because it’s ambiguous. >>>> However I think good theories are theories that allow us to inquire >>>> about their truthfulness by making somewhat testable predictions. >>>> >>> >>> I agree with both points. >>> >>> I think that some of the objections arise from different uses >>> of the word 'theory'. Logicians typically use the word 'theory' >>> for the deductive closure of a set of propositions called axioms. >>> They impose no constraints the relevance or applicability of >>> the axioms to any kind of phenomena. >>> >>> But scientists make a three-way distinction of hypotheses, >>> theories, and laws: >>> >>> 1. A law is a theory that has been thoroughly tested on some >>> observable phenomena and shown to be reliable in making >>> predictions about the future development of those phenomena. >>> >>> 2. A theory is a hypothesis that has some relevance to some >>> observable phenomena about which it makes some testable >>> predictions. But its reliability has not yet been >>> sufficiently tested for it to be accepted as a law. >>> >>> 3. A hypothesis is any theory in the logicians' sense. >>> No tests of relevance or reliability have yet been made. >>> >>> This distinction allows anyone to suggest a hypothesis at >>> any time -- there is no penalty for proposing something >>> irrelevant or untestable. Then a community of inquirers may >>> choose to collaborate in exploring some interesting hypotheses >>> to determine which might be sufficiently promising for further >>> development. >>> >>> John >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
