On 12/13/2016 2:43 PM, Thomas903 wrote:
I wanted to comment on statements made last night about the meaning
of law-theory-hypothesis.

I wasn't attempting to state a definitive analysis of scientific
terminology.  I was making the point that logicians use the word
'theory' in a formal sense that can be defined syntactically
(in terms of a proof that consists of symbol pushing).

There are a lot of scientists, so I won't claim that all agree with
a single definition. But when I see the term "law" being used by
scientists (e.g., Kepler's Law), it is normally used to describe
a physical-empirical regularity.

I agree.

Scientists have been using the words 'hypothesis', 'theory', and
'law' to express informal distinctions that are based on empirical
data about the world and processes in it.  That involves Peirce's
logic of abduction:  cycles of observation, induction, abduction,
deduction (AKA prediction), experiment (testing), and repeat.

It's true that logicians use the term 'entailment' instead
of 'deduction' as a kind of "semantics" because it uses model-
theoretic methods.  But those models are Gedanken worlds,
whose elements and interactions are independent of observation,
experiment, or testing upon anything in the physical world.

Note that Peirce did not use the word 'semantics'.  That word
was introduced into analytic philosophy by Charles Morris's
misunderstanding of Peirce.  Carnap loved that word because it
gave his nominalism a thin veneer of meaning.  It enabled him
to define modality in terms of Gedanken worlds without having
to get his hands dirty by grubbing around in the real world.

A [scientific] theory is the culmination of observation and
measurement, hypothesis construction, empirical testing, debate
and discussion.  As such, a theory is an intellectual-capital
good developed over time.  There is no logical activity known as
"deduction" without first developing a "theoretical model" that,
when combined with relevant premises, generates syllogisms
(predictions, explanations) relating to a class of phenomena.

Yes.  That is consistent with Peirce's logic of abduction.

John
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