List: I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's *katholou*," or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most," and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ... but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51).
On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular," while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be appreciated. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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