On Jan 7, 2017, at 8:52 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com
<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com> > wrote:
Dear list:
In “ Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking”, Chiasson
follows up a section on Scotus, (thisness, whatness, universals,
general laws, qualitative essences) with the following:
“Do you understand what Peirce meant when he said that ‘almost
every proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless
gibberish’?...When Peirce writes that the propositions are
meaningless gibberish, he follows up this claim by saying that
these propositions are ‘made up of words that define each other
with no conception being reached.’ Or else, claimed Peirce, ‘the
conception that is reached is absurd.’”
Best,
Jerry R
On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:
Jon A., List:
Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and
found it quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is
when Baldwin's /Dictionary / appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga
pointed to a considerably earlier passage from a draft of
"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in her
book, /From Realism to "Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles
Sanders Peirce/ .
Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment
both whose subject and predicate are general terms. And,
therefore, it is not merely the case, as we saw before, that
universals have reality on this theory, but also that there
are nothing but universals which have an immediate reality.
But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual
in the sense of that which has no generality and which here
appears as a mere ideal boundary of cognition, and an
individual in the far wider sense of that which can be only
in one place at one time. It will be convenient to call the
former singular and the latter only an individual … Now a
knowledge that cognition is not wholly determined by
cognition is a knowledge of something external to the mind,
that is the singulars. Singulars therefore have a reality.
But singulars in general is not singular but general. We can
cognize any part of the singulars however determinate, but
however determinate the part it is still general. And
therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are real
they are so only in their generality; but singulars in their
absolute discrimination or singularity are mere ideals … In
short, those things which we call singulars exist, but the
character of singularity which we attribute to them is
self-contradictory.
With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there
are certain general terms whose objects can only be in one
place at one time, and these are called individuals. They
are generals that is, not singulars, because these latter
occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point
and can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868)
Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a
general, which seems to render nominalism--the view that
everything real is singular, so nothing real is
general--effectively self-refuting. He defined an individual as
a collection of singulars joined across places and times, which
is thus general when taken as a whole. Furthermore, /absolute /
singulars are "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual
is really a /continuum / as Peirce came to understand that
concept decades later. Consequently, anything that we cognize
/about / individuals is /necessarily / general, rather than
singular. This suggests to me the following argument for realism.
P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate.
P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate.
C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars.
P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects
of thought are generals.
C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals.
P4. Some objects of thought are real.
C3. Therefore, some generals are real.
My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions
of terms, so the nominalist must deny one of the other two
premisses in order to deny the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts
to claiming that we can ascertain that an object of thought has
or does not have every conceivable predicate; but those are
infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is impossible.
Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine
knowledge of reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of
incognizable "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the
view for which Peirce frequently criticized nominalists, because
it blocks the way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net
<mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:
Here is one page:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals
<http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals>
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com <http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/>
On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net
<mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:
Jon,
Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site
for “Doctrine of Individuals” I think there is a collection
of excerpts and comments.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com <http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/>
On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
List:
I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic
realism and his opposition to various forms of nominalism.
He seems to have consistently preferred the term "general"
to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone ever tried to
figure out why? In a new book, /Peirce's Empiricism: Its
Roots and Its Originality/ , Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests
that "it might be that he thinks 'general' is a better
translation of Aristotle's /katholou/ ," or because "laws
are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most,"
and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal
propositions ... but are general propositions which can
admit of exceptions" (p. 51).
On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with
"particular," while "general" is opposed to "singular."
All of these identify types of propositions--singular when
the subject is determinate, general when it is
indeterminate; and the latter further divided into
universal (all) and particular (some). Finally, Peirce
described continuity as a higher type of generality, and
contrasted it with individuality; specifically, individuals
are actualized from a continuum of potentiality.
Any further insights on these terminological distinctions
would be appreciated.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmid <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
