List, Jerry R.,: I am curious about the origin of the quotes:
> ‘almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless > gibberish’ > ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being reached.’ > Or else, claimed Peirce, > ‘the conception that is reached is absurd.’” These are very powerful claims that separate the conceptualization of reality / pragmaticism from vast domains of philosophy and theology. Historically, this brings the relationships between the conceptualization of a mathematical variable and physical claims about nature / natural catalogues of categories into question. So, what is the meaning of these assertions (if any?) in terms of modern day science? More specifically, my comment is a reflection on the use and abuse of the term “ontology” in philosophy. In particular, it should be noted that the chemical table of elements (TOE), the present day ur-source of scientific catalogues of categories (ontologies) was a foundation for many aspects of CSP logical development of signs / symbols. Although the modern day TOE has undergone further developments in form and structure, the rational for it’s ontological existence remains unchanged for over a century and is scientifically and philosophically non-problematic. The TOE is firmly established as the ontological origin of (non-prime) matter. The extension of TOE by chemical illations to compounds and biochemical “handedness” is standard textbook stuff. The logical form of this extension is not a universal or recursive application of a variable, but is, the reference subset of TOE members, a step-by-step construction of emergent identities. in other words, chemical “universals” do not exist in the sense of physical or mathematical variables because each chemical element is indivisible. The name of a legisign is an identity that associates quali-signs with indices and hence with dicisigns and the illations that generate the legisign. This tautology is constructed without invoking the concept of prime matter. In short, how are these CSP - induced conundrums resolved by physical philosophy? mathematical philosophy? In particular, is that modern physics, with its focus on Kantian a priori and mathematical variables of energy and mass, problematically lacks meta-physical ground? Is this one aspect of CSP’s adoption of the Hegelian view of “chemism”? (see, “Real Process” by John W. Burbidge, 1996) and with its intrinsic reliance on the copulative logic of " sin-sign <—> qualisign “ and “sin-sign <—> legisign”? Thus, it appears to me that this thread goes far deeper than it first appears. The phrase > ‘made up of words that define each other with no conception being reached.’ is a novel and deep critique of the tautological usage of physical units in a philosophy of physics grounded in the Kantian a priori of space and time. In my opinion, it also describes the abstract nature of mathematical set theory as it manifests itself in Husserlian phenomenology. Cheers Jerry > On Jan 7, 2017, at 8:52 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Dear list: > > > In “Peirce's Pragmatism: The Design for Thinking”, Chiasson follows up a > section on Scotus, (thisness, whatness, universals, general laws, qualitative > essences) with the following: > > “Do you understand what Peirce meant when he said that ‘almost every > proposition of ontological metaphysics is meaningless gibberish’?...When > Peirce writes that the propositions are meaningless gibberish, he follows up > this claim by saying that these propositions are ‘made up of words that > define each other with no conception being reached.’ Or else, claimed > Peirce, ‘the conception that is reached is absurd.’” > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 7:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: > Jon A., List: > > Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it quite > helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's Dictionary > appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier passage > from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in > her book, From Realism to "Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders > Peirce. > > Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose > subject and predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it is not merely > the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory, but > also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate reality. > But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of > that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere ideal boundary > of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of that which can be > only in one place at one time. It will be convenient to call the former > singular and the latter only an individual … Now a knowledge that cognition > is not wholly determined by cognition is a knowledge of something external to > the mind, that is the singulars. Singulars therefore have a reality. But > singulars in general is not singular but general. We can cognize any part of > the singulars however determinate, but however determinate the part it is > still general. And therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are > real they are so only in their generality; but singulars in their absolute > discrimination or singularity are mere ideals … In short, those things which > we call singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute > to them is self-contradictory. > > With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain > general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these > are called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because > these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point and > can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868) > > Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a general, > which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything real is singular, > so nothing real is general--effectively self-refuting. He defined an > individual as a collection of singulars joined across places and times, which > is thus general when taken as a whole. Furthermore, absolute singulars are > "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual is really a continuum as > Peirce came to understand that concept decades later. Consequently, anything > that we cognize about individuals is necessarily general, rather than > singular. This suggests to me the following argument for realism. > > P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate. > P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate. > C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars. > P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of thought are > generals. > C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals. > P4. Some objects of thought are real. > C3. Therefore, some generals are real. > > My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of terms, > so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in order to deny > the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we can ascertain that > an object of thought has or does not have every conceivable predicate; but > those are infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is impossible. > Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine knowledge of > reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of incognizable > "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the view for which Peirce > frequently criticized nominalists, because it blocks the way of inquiry. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > <mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote: > Here is one page: > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals > <http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals> > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com <http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/> > > On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net > <mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote: >> Jon, >> >> Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine of >> Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com <http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/> >> >> On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >>> List: >>> >>> I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his >>> opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently >>> preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone >>> ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, Peirce's Empiricism: Its >>> Roots and Its Originality, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be >>> that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's katholou," >>> or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most," >>> and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ... >>> but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51). >>> >>> On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular," >>> while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of >>> propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is >>> indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and >>> particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type >>> of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, >>> individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. >>> >>> Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be >>> appreciated. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the > line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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