Sorry, I forgot to adjust the email message subject line. Repaired here.
- Best, Ben
Jon S., Gary R., Jon A., list,
As promised in my previous message, here is the first off-list response
that I made to Jon S.'s messages in this thread to peirce-l:
Jon S.,
You've out-researched me! I'm not sure what to say on-list at this
point. I found some backup for some of your claims. I found that, as you
said, indeed Peirce says that particular and universal propositions are
general propositions, it's in CP 2.271 (from "Nomenclature and Divisions
of Triadic Relations" 1903),
§10. Kinds of Propositions
271. A Dicent Symbol, or general proposition, is either /Particular/ or
/Universal/.
I've found elsewhere that Peirce tended to regard 'general' and
'universal' as being mostly alternate terms for the same thing.,
It may take me a while to muster a response.,
Best, Ben,
On 1/7/2017 8:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jon A., List:
Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found
it quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's
/Dictionary/ appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga pointed to a
considerably earlier passage from a draft of "Questions Concerning
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in her book, /From Realism to
"Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders Peirce/.
Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both
whose subject and predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it
is not merely the case, as we saw before, that universals have
reality on this theory, but also that there are nothing but
universals which have an immediate reality. But here it is
necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of
that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere
ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider
sense of that which can be only in one place at one time. It will
be convenient to call the former singular and the latter only an
individual … Now a knowledge that cognition is not wholly
determined by cognition is a knowledge of something external to
the mind, that is the singulars. Singulars therefore have a
reality. But singulars in general is not singular but general. We
can cognize any part of the singulars however determinate, but
however determinate the part it is still general. And therefore
what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so only
in their generality; but singulars in their absolute
discrimination or singularity are mere ideals … In short, those
things which we call singulars exist, but the character of
singularity which we attribute to them is self-contradictory.
With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are
certain general terms whose objects can only be in one place at
one time, and these are called individuals. They are generals that
is, not singulars, because these latter occupy neither time nor
space, but can only be at one point and can only be at one date.
(W2:180-181; 1868)
Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a
general, which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything
real is singular, so nothing real is general--effectively
self-refuting. He defined an individual as a collection of singulars
joined across places and times, which is thus general when taken as a
whole. Furthermore, /absolute/ singulars are "mere ideals," such that
(ironically) an individual is really a /continuum/ as Peirce came to
understand that concept decades later. Consequently, anything that we
cognize /about/ individuals is /necessarily/ general, rather than
singular. This suggests to me the following argument for realism.
P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate.
P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate.
C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars.
P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of
thought are generals.
C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals.
P4. Some objects of thought are real.
C3. Therefore, some generals are real.
My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of
terms, so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in
order to deny the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we
can ascertain that an object of thought has or does not have every
conceivable predicate; but those are infinite, and our minds are
finite, so this is impossible. Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that
we have no genuine knowledge of reality--i.e., that it consists
entirely of incognizable "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely
the view for which Peirce frequently criticized nominalists, because
it blocks the way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net
<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:
Here is one page:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals
<http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals>
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net
<mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:
Jon,
Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for
“Doctrine of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts
and comments.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
List:
I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism
and his opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to
have consistently preferred the term "general" to "universal"
(e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone ever tried to figure out why? In a
new book, /Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality/,
Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be that he thinks
'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's /katholou/," or
because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the
most," and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal
propositions ... but are general propositions which can admit of
exceptions" (p. 51).
On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with
"particular," while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of
these identify types of propositions--singular when the subject is
determinate, general when it is indeterminate; and the latter
further divided into universal (all) and particular (some).
Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type of
generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically,
individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality.
Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be
appreciated.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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