Edwina, List: Right--like I said, a general is a continuum with multiple different instantiations, not a "thing" with multiple identical instantiations. A general does not *exist *in space and time (2ns), but it is still *real *as a range of possibilities (1ns) or a conditional necessity (3ns). In other words, the *reality *of a quality (1ns) or a habit/law (3ns) is not reducible to its *actual *occurrences (2ns); this is a key aspect of Peirce's realism that a nominalist would dispute.
Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - no, a commonality, i.e., a general, is not a 'thing' in itself that > is 'identically' instantiated. First, as I said about 'this force', that it's > real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even if > this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit. > > So, it can't be a 'thing' since it doesn't exist as itself in space and > time. I myself have no problem with understanding it as a force or even > 'will', since it does focus on the future. > > Second, of course, the instantiations are not identical; that's the power > of semiosis, where Firstness functions to introduce novelty, and even, > where 'the real' is networked with other organisms/realities and thus, is > influenced by them. > > Jerry - my, I didn't know that you consider all biosemioticians to be > nominalists. What's your evidence? Do you consider Jesper Hoffmeyer to be > such? Kalevi Kull? My reading of their works denies this. They are strong > Peirceans and focus on that level of non-individual general continuity. > Your attempts to confine Peirce to your discipline of chemistry, I think, > narrow his work. > > Edwina > > Edwina. > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L > <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Sunday, January 29, 2017 2:57 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism > > Edwina, Eric, List: > > I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is > about whether there is something *real *(hence "realism") that all > rabbits have in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a *name > *(hence "nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals simply > because we happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. Even > this way of putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, because it > implies that the universal or general is a *thing *that is somehow > *identically > *instantiated in multiple *other *things. > > One of the aspects of Peirce's version of realism that I find especially > attractive is that he instead conceived of the general as a *continuum*, > such that its instantiations are not *identical*, even if they are only > *infinitesimally > *different. No matter how similar any two *actual *rabbits may seem to > be, there is an inexhaustible range of *potential *rabbits that would be > intermediate between them. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 9:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Eric - I have a perhaps slightly different view of the topic than a >> philosophical approach. >> >> As an example - let's say there are 10 rabbits in my garden. A nominalist >> would say - there are ten individual rabbits..a total of ten. A realist >> asks 'Is there such a 'force' as 'rabbitness, which empowered the singular >> existence of rabbits in the past and will empower them in the future into >> my garden? >> >> The nominalist says: No such 'force'; just a collection of individual >> rabbits - The individual things that you perceive all by yourself as an >> individual, is what there is in the real world. >> >> The realist says: Yes, there is such a force; it provides >> continuity-of-type. It's 'instantiated' in each particular rabbit, but >> it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even >> if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit. >> >> Another example would be..beauty. Is there such a 'force' as beauty, or >> is the attribute of beauty simply the subjective opinion of one individual >> looking at an individual person/object. >> >> The nominalist/conceptualist says: It's all individual. There is no >> non-individual 'force'; it's what each person sees. >> >> The realist says: No - there IS a real force that operates as >> continuity-of-type; it is 'instantiated' in an individual existential >> object..but still, that force is real. >> >> I consider that Nominalism as a societal force began to develop in the >> 13th century, the beginning of the 400 year long battle with the Church >> over the control of knowledge. The Church rejected the rights of individual >> man to reason, think, analyze; he was merely to accept the words of the >> church. Such a control over knowledge greatly hampered technological >> development, for no individual could question the dictates of the Church. >> So, disease was 'caused' by your own sins or the witch on the hill...etc.. >> >> But in the 13th c, with its population increases and concomitant disease, >> plagues, etc..technological change was vital. The era of DOUBT and >> questions BY individuals began...bitterly fought by the Church. So - >> there's such as Abelard with his 'dubitando'[ I doubt]; the great tale of >> Percival by Chretien de Troyes which told of the devastation in the land >> wrought by a young man, Percival because he did not question what was going >> on before his eyes;....and other developments...which all began to assert >> the right of the individual to evaluate and judge what was going on in the >> material world before him. This led to Nominalism - and it played a huge >> role in enabling technological and intellectual developments. >> >> BUT - throwing out the baby with the bathwater - Nominalism also led to a >> mechanical view of the world where this world is made up only of material >> atomic entities bumping into each other; and to postmodern relativism where >> subjective views were all valid, even if contradictory. So - with Peirce >> [and others] we have acknowledged that continuity of type suggests a real >> force that is articulated/instantiated in 'tokens' of that force. That, in >> my view, is the nature of realism. >> >
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