Dear all,
If a general law is designed into a computer program that simulates instances of regularities or events detectable of our continuum, then it exists in space and time. It induces in us that mediation of the icon (marked by the name of that quality) and the products of this index, creating symbol. It is reducible to this extent. This is a key aspect of Peirce’s realism that a nominalist would dispute. Am I a realist or a nominalist? Hth, Jerry R On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 2:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > Right--like I said, a general is a continuum with multiple different > instantiations, not a "thing" with multiple identical instantiations. A > general does not *exist *in space and time (2ns), but it is still *real *as > a range of possibilities (1ns) or a conditional necessity (3ns). In other > words, the *reality *of a quality (1ns) or a habit/law (3ns) is not > reducible to its *actual *occurrences (2ns); this is a key aspect of > Peirce's realism that a nominalist would dispute. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - no, a commonality, i.e., a general, is not a 'thing' in itself >> that is 'identically' instantiated. First, as I said about 'this force', >> that it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and >> time; even if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in >> each rabbit. >> >> So, it can't be a 'thing' since it doesn't exist as itself in space and >> time. I myself have no problem with understanding it as a force or even >> 'will', since it does focus on the future. >> >> Second, of course, the instantiations are not identical; that's the power >> of semiosis, where Firstness functions to introduce novelty, and even, >> where 'the real' is networked with other organisms/realities and thus, is >> influenced by them. >> >> Jerry - my, I didn't know that you consider all biosemioticians to be >> nominalists. What's your evidence? Do you consider Jesper Hoffmeyer to be >> such? Kalevi Kull? My reading of their works denies this. They are strong >> Peirceans and focus on that level of non-individual general continuity. >> Your attempts to confine Peirce to your discipline of chemistry, I think, >> narrow his work. >> >> Edwina >> >> Edwina. >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >> <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Sunday, January 29, 2017 2:57 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism >> >> Edwina, Eric, List: >> >> I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is >> about whether there is something *real *(hence "realism") that all >> rabbits have in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a >> *name >> *(hence "nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals simply >> because we happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. Even >> this way of putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, because it >> implies that the universal or general is a *thing *that is somehow >> *identically >> *instantiated in multiple *other *things. >> >> One of the aspects of Peirce's version of realism that I find especially >> attractive is that he instead conceived of the general as a *continuum*, >> such that its instantiations are not *identical*, even if they are only >> *infinitesimally >> *different. No matter how similar any two *actual *rabbits may seem to >> be, there is an inexhaustible range of *potential *rabbits that would be >> intermediate between them. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 9:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Eric - I have a perhaps slightly different view of the topic than a >>> philosophical approach. >>> >>> As an example - let's say there are 10 rabbits in my garden. A >>> nominalist would say - there are ten individual rabbits..a total of ten. A >>> realist asks 'Is there such a 'force' as 'rabbitness, which empowered the >>> singular existence of rabbits in the past and will empower them in the >>> future into my garden? >>> >>> The nominalist says: No such 'force'; just a collection of individual >>> rabbits - The individual things that you perceive all by yourself as an >>> individual, is what there is in the real world. >>> >>> The realist says: Yes, there is such a force; it provides >>> continuity-of-type. It's 'instantiated' in each particular rabbit, but >>> it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even >>> if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit. >>> >>> Another example would be..beauty. Is there such a 'force' as beauty, or >>> is the attribute of beauty simply the subjective opinion of one individual >>> looking at an individual person/object. >>> >>> The nominalist/conceptualist says: It's all individual. There is no >>> non-individual 'force'; it's what each person sees. >>> >>> The realist says: No - there IS a real force that operates as >>> continuity-of-type; it is 'instantiated' in an individual existential >>> object..but still, that force is real. >>> >>> I consider that Nominalism as a societal force began to develop in the >>> 13th century, the beginning of the 400 year long battle with the Church >>> over the control of knowledge. The Church rejected the rights of individual >>> man to reason, think, analyze; he was merely to accept the words of the >>> church. Such a control over knowledge greatly hampered technological >>> development, for no individual could question the dictates of the Church. >>> So, disease was 'caused' by your own sins or the witch on the hill...etc.. >>> >>> But in the 13th c, with its population increases and concomitant >>> disease, plagues, etc..technological change was vital. The era of DOUBT and >>> questions BY individuals began...bitterly fought by the Church. So - >>> there's such as Abelard with his 'dubitando'[ I doubt]; the great tale of >>> Percival by Chretien de Troyes which told of the devastation in the land >>> wrought by a young man, Percival because he did not question what was going >>> on before his eyes;....and other developments...which all began to assert >>> the right of the individual to evaluate and judge what was going on in the >>> material world before him. This led to Nominalism - and it played a huge >>> role in enabling technological and intellectual developments. >>> >>> BUT - throwing out the baby with the bathwater - Nominalism also led to >>> a mechanical view of the world where this world is made up only of material >>> atomic entities bumping into each other; and to postmodern relativism where >>> subjective views were all valid, even if contradictory. So - with Peirce >>> [and others] we have acknowledged that continuity of type suggests a real >>> force that is articulated/instantiated in 'tokens' of that force. That, in >>> my view, is the nature of realism. >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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