Jon, As I understand you, a nominalist would say that "possibilities" are not part of "real" and that "habit/law" is not part of "real".
Does that mean that if I told a nominalist that if I repeatedly shuffled a deck of cards, and then looked at the top card, there was a 1/4 *chance* of drawing a heart, they would say I was talking gibberish? What if I told them it is likely organisms will exist in 2 million years with traits that do not exist today? What if I told them that, as a general rule, things that are heavier than the surrounding air sink towards the center of the earth when released? Or that, as a matter of habit, I put my right sock on before my left? I suspect that the nominalist would not be flustered by such claims, though they might caveat them in minor ways. If I am correct about that, then it is unclear to me what *actual* happening we could observe, under the circumstances of some to-be-arranged experiment, to distinguish which approach is correct. P.S. I anticipate you might accuse me of begging the question in that last part (by use of the italicized word), but I am inquiring nonetheless, as it seems a fair question for a pragmatist to ask. ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps <echar...@american.edu> On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 3:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > Right--like I said, a general is a continuum with multiple different > instantiations, not a "thing" with multiple identical instantiations. A > general does not *exist *in space and time (2ns), but it is still *real *as > a range of possibilities (1ns) or a conditional necessity (3ns). In other > words, the *reality *of a quality (1ns) or a habit/law (3ns) is not > reducible to its *actual *occurrences (2ns); this is a key aspect of > Peirce's realism that a nominalist would dispute. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 2:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - no, a commonality, i.e., a general, is not a 'thing' in itself >> that is 'identically' instantiated. First, as I said about 'this force', >> that it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and >> time; even if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in >> each rabbit. >> >> So, it can't be a 'thing' since it doesn't exist as itself in space and >> time. I myself have no problem with understanding it as a force or even >> 'will', since it does focus on the future. >> >> Second, of course, the instantiations are not identical; that's the power >> of semiosis, where Firstness functions to introduce novelty, and even, >> where 'the real' is networked with other organisms/realities and thus, is >> influenced by them. >> >> Jerry - my, I didn't know that you consider all biosemioticians to be >> nominalists. What's your evidence? Do you consider Jesper Hoffmeyer to be >> such? Kalevi Kull? My reading of their works denies this. They are strong >> Peirceans and focus on that level of non-individual general continuity. >> Your attempts to confine Peirce to your discipline of chemistry, I think, >> narrow his work. >> >> Edwina >> >> Edwina. >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L >> <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Sunday, January 29, 2017 2:57 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism >> >> Edwina, Eric, List: >> >> I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is >> about whether there is something *real *(hence "realism") that all >> rabbits have in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits" merely being a >> *name >> *(hence "nominalism") that we apply to many different individuals simply >> because we happen to perceive them as having certain similarities. Even >> this way of putting it arguably concedes too much to nominalism, because it >> implies that the universal or general is a *thing *that is somehow >> *identically >> *instantiated in multiple *other *things. >> >> One of the aspects of Peirce's version of realism that I find especially >> attractive is that he instead conceived of the general as a *continuum*, >> such that its instantiations are not *identical*, even if they are only >> *infinitesimally >> *different. No matter how similar any two *actual *rabbits may seem to >> be, there is an inexhaustible range of *potential *rabbits that would be >> intermediate between them. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 9:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Eric - I have a perhaps slightly different view of the topic than a >>> philosophical approach. >>> >>> As an example - let's say there are 10 rabbits in my garden. A >>> nominalist would say - there are ten individual rabbits..a total of ten. A >>> realist asks 'Is there such a 'force' as 'rabbitness, which empowered the >>> singular existence of rabbits in the past and will empower them in the >>> future into my garden? >>> >>> The nominalist says: No such 'force'; just a collection of individual >>> rabbits - The individual things that you perceive all by yourself as an >>> individual, is what there is in the real world. >>> >>> The realist says: Yes, there is such a force; it provides >>> continuity-of-type. It's 'instantiated' in each particular rabbit, but >>> it's real, even if 'it' doesn't exist all by itself in space and time; even >>> if this force-of-continuity only functions as instantiated in each rabbit. >>> >>> Another example would be..beauty. Is there such a 'force' as beauty, or >>> is the attribute of beauty simply the subjective opinion of one individual >>> looking at an individual person/object. >>> >>> The nominalist/conceptualist says: It's all individual. There is no >>> non-individual 'force'; it's what each person sees. >>> >>> The realist says: No - there IS a real force that operates as >>> continuity-of-type; it is 'instantiated' in an individual existential >>> object..but still, that force is real. >>> >>> I consider that Nominalism as a societal force began to develop in the >>> 13th century, the beginning of the 400 year long battle with the Church >>> over the control of knowledge. The Church rejected the rights of individual >>> man to reason, think, analyze; he was merely to accept the words of the >>> church. Such a control over knowledge greatly hampered technological >>> development, for no individual could question the dictates of the Church. >>> So, disease was 'caused' by your own sins or the witch on the hill...etc.. >>> >>> But in the 13th c, with its population increases and concomitant >>> disease, plagues, etc..technological change was vital. The era of DOUBT and >>> questions BY individuals began...bitterly fought by the Church. So - >>> there's such as Abelard with his 'dubitando'[ I doubt]; the great tale of >>> Percival by Chretien de Troyes which told of the devastation in the land >>> wrought by a young man, Percival because he did not question what was going >>> on before his eyes;....and other developments...which all began to assert >>> the right of the individual to evaluate and judge what was going on in the >>> material world before him. This led to Nominalism - and it played a huge >>> role in enabling technological and intellectual developments. >>> >>> BUT - throwing out the baby with the bathwater - Nominalism also led to >>> a mechanical view of the world where this world is made up only of material >>> atomic entities bumping into each other; and to postmodern relativism where >>> subjective views were all valid, even if contradictory. So - with Peirce >>> [and others] we have acknowledged that continuity of type suggests a real >>> force that is articulated/instantiated in 'tokens' of that force. That, in >>> my view, is the nature of realism. >>> >>
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