On “'Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?'
It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in this, which pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle everyone inquires, we should constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step.” ~Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* “If the experts should but cannot advise in the Athenian assembly about harbors and walls, it would seem that the instructional persuasion they have is not and cannot be persuasive before a crowd, and the rhetorician should have the knowledge of how to *adapt* the knowledge of others *into a form that wins the trust of assemblies*. Why, however, cannot the experts themselves do the necessary adaptation?” ~Benardete, *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy* On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Thread: > JAS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00094.html > JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00098.html > JFS:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-02/msg00100.html > > JA: > >> As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously. >> Some people use them to mean syntactic elements, in the S & I domains. >> Some people use them to mean objective elements, in the Object domain. >> In a sign relational setting we need to admit both types of elements >> and we need to be clear about their distinctive roles in the triadic >> sign relation at hand. >> >> It can help to use a tactic that is common in computer science, simply >> tack the epithet "expression" or "name" on the end of the formal object >> name you have in mind in order to denote the associated semiotic entity, >> e.g., function / function expression, predicate / predicate expression, >> proposition / propositional expression, and so on. In many contexts one >> can then use the terms equivocally in the usual way, adding the epithet >> only when necessary to focus on the syntax. >> > > On 2/10/2017 2:14 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > >> JA: As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies >> promiscuously. >> >> JFS: Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words. > > Well, no, they aren't. Most logicians and other perfectly > sensible folks are hardly even consistent in the way they > use those words within a single context, much less across > the whole wide literature and history of logic. And yet > there are sensible ways of resolving the resulting Babel. > That is a big part of what the sign relational framework > is for. > > By the way, it isn't what one calls the syntactic structures -- > expressions, graphs, propositions, rhemes, sentences, whatever -- > that makes one a nominalist, it is the claim that the syntactic > entities are sufficient. > > If syntactic entities are not sufficient then there must be > other sorts of objective entities that the syntactic entities > denote. In many cases of practical interest we can recover the > isomorphic structure of the object domain as equivalence classes > of the syntactic entities. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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