John - you wrote;
"I've found that the best starting point is the dyadic type-token
distinction. That's widely known and accepted in linguistics and
computer science -- even by people who have never heard of Peirce.
And those people are always surprised when you tell them that
token and type are the second and third terms of a triad.
For the first term, Peirce used the words 'tone' and 'mark'."
EDWINA: The above mark-token-type, are not what I meant by 'triad'. I would
refer to these three terms [mark/token/type] as trichotomies, as terms for
the three modal categories.
What I mean by the triad, is the semiosic triad of relations: that between
the Representamen and the Object; the Representamen -in -itself; and that
between the Representamen and the Interpretant.
See Peirce 8.335 when he discusses the sign, which I term more accurately,
the Representamen,
'in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects..
8.337, "in regard to its relation to its signified interpretant..
8.334...'as it is in itself
This dynamic 'set' of O-R; R-R; R-I....is what I view as the semiosic triad,
and it can be difficult to grasp. I've found, however, that students ..once
you've set up that 'mediative triadic spoke' [ See Peirce 1.347]...they
quickly grasp that you don't move from Object-to-Interpretant in a direct
action. But, outside of the classroom - I'm sure everyone reverts to the
familiar dyad.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>
To: "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>; <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2017 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from
AI perspective
Edwina, Stephen, Jon A.S., Jon A., list
ET
I don't find that it's the terms that slow down the use of Peirce in
analysis; I find that it's the concept of a triadic semiosis with that
vital mediation, and the concept of the three modal categories. Both
seem very hard for people to grasp - and so, semiotics is reduced to the
simplistic binarism of Saussurian semiology
I agree that the concept of triadic semiosis is the critical issue.
But expressing it in words that students have never heard, seen, or
used, is a barrier to learning and adoption.
SCR
Which makes it more imperative than ever that a way be found to make
the triadic mode more understandable and to say why it is infinitely
superior to binary thinking.
I've found that the best starting point is the dyadic type-token
distinction. That's widely known and accepted in linguistics and
computer science -- even by people who have never heard of Peirce.
And those people are always surprised when you tell them that
token and type are the second and third terms of a triad.
For the first term, Peirce used the words 'tone' and 'mark'.
Of those two, tone is hard for people to generalize. A pure tone
is rare, even in music. But mark is the obvious choice for images,
and students can quickly generalize it to any sensation.
You can start with Peirce's example of tokens of the type 'the'.
CSP mentioned the many tokens on a printed page. The next step is
to point out that vocal tokens of 'the' are also marks that can be
interpreted as tokens of that same type.
JAS
I have no problem with mark/token/type, but "predicate" and
"proposition" usually designate symbols.
That point leads to the question why the "triple trichotomy" has
three rows. The first row (mark token type) is the *material*
triad: A mark is an uninterpreted sign of some observable
material. A token is an interpretation of that material. And
a type is a habit or law that determines the interpretation.
The second row (icon index symbol) is the *relational* triad:
An icon is a token of some observable pattern among its parts.
An index is a sign of a causal relation among the parts. And a
symbol is a sign of some habit or law that determines the cause.
The third row (predicate, proposition, argument) is the *formal*
triad. A predicate is a symbol of some relation. A proposition
is a symbol that asserts the relation. And an argument is a
symbol (one or more propositions) that justifies the assertion.
JA
As far as "predicate" and "proposition" go, usage varies promiscuously.
Logicians are consistent in the way they use those words. And their
usage corresponds to the way that Peirce used the terms 'rhema' and
'dicent sign'. Nominalists like Quine may prefer the word 'sentence'
to 'proposition', but a sentence is definitely a dicent sign.
A predicate or rhema has one or more slots or pegs (in CSP's diagrams)
or variables (in the linear notations by CSP and his successors).
Since the referents of the slots or variables are not specified,
the predicate cannot make an assertion. It has no truth value.
A proposition or dicent sign has all the slots or variables replaced
by signs that designate referents. In a context in which a proposition
is asserted, it has a truth value. In a 3-valued logic, 'unknown' is
a possible truth value. Peirce also discussed issues of vagueness,
which raise further questions. But they don't affect the distinction
between predicates and propositions.
John
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