Hi Soren, EP 2: 463.
Best, Jerry On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 5:23 PM, Søren Brier <sbr....@cbs.dk> wrote: > Where can I find Peirce’s: *An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in > Security and Liberty*, from 1913?? > > > > Best > > Søren > > > > *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 14. februar 2017 21:24 > *To:* Clark Goble > *Cc:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - > > > > Eric, list: > > > > Here is how I understand the nature of your thought: > > > > You consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, > you conceive the object of claiming about the nature of other people’s > thoughts to have. Then your conception of these effects, which makes you > raise your eyebrow and get twitchy, is the whole of your conception of the > object. > > > > And so, now what? What does the Jamesian maxim and not Peircean > recommend? > > > > For a Peircean would recognize that some “perversity of thought of whole > generations may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation”. > > ~*What Pragmatism Is * > > > > “Nevertheless in the nature of the case the essential elements of > demonstration are three: the subject, the attributes, and the basic > premisses. > > > > I say ‘must believe’, because *all syllogism*, and therefore a fortiori > demonstration, *is* *addressed* *not to the spoken word, but to the > discourse within the soul*, and though we can always raise objections to > the spoken word, to the inward discourse we cannot always object. > > > > That which is capable of proof but assumed by the teacher without proof > is, if the pupil believes and accepts it, hypothesis, though only in a > limited sense hypothesis-that is, relatively to the pupil; if the pupil has > no opinion or a contrary opinion on the matter, the same assumption is an > illegitimate postulate. Therein lies the distinction between hypothesis and > illegitimate postulate: the latter is the contrary of the pupil’s opinion, > demonstrable, but assumed and used without demonstration (*Post. An*. > I-10). > > > > And therefore, “I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as > long as it is practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much > accuracy even indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any > other person, while it is far from certain that we can do so (and > accurately record what [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) > even in the case of what shoots through our own minds, it is much safer to > define all mental characters as far as possible in terms of their outward > manifestations.” > > *~An Essay toward Reasoning in Security and Uberty* > > > > That is, > > What is C? > > What is A? > > What is B? > > > > Hth, > > Jerry R > > > > On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > > On Feb 14, 2017, at 8:41 AM, Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a > separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the > nature of other people's thoughts? > > > > "People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They > do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that? > > > > "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied > altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness? > > > > Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite > comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or > act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried. > > > > Are those two statements really controversial? Honestly asking. It seems > much of our consciousness isn’t primarily linguistic. We are, admittedly, > deciding this both upon introspection as well as reports of how other > people experience it. This gets into the question of what we mean by > thinking of course. Peirce was much more open to thinking not primarily > being about what we’re conscious of. To the linguistic point I’m not sure > that’s controversial either. The idea that our consciousness of objects has > an “as” structure seems common. That is the idea that we don’t just see a > blue sky as raw sense data we then consciously interpret. Instead we see > the sky as blue with blue and sky having those linguistic aspects even if > we don’t pay much attention to it. > > > > None of this is to deny that we can have non-linguistic experiences. But > I’m just not seeing the problem. (Completely open to being wrong here of > course) > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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