Eric, list:
You said: “I have great love for Peirce and his work. But there are parts that I love less, particularly where Peirce ... seems to me to.... forget the parameters of his own argument.” If there should be inconsistencies in Peirce, my reaction is typically to treat myself as defective, not Peirce. That is, I treat Peirce as a perfect writer; that if he should blunder, he blunders intentionally for our benefit (cf., logographic necessity and Strauss’ method of interpreting perfect writers). You said: “Peirce tells us what clear thinking is, while fully and responsibly acknowledging that most people do not think clearly most of the time. On that basis, if anyone thinks of anyone else's thoughts as entailing at all times the third degree of clarity, something is seriously amiss.” It would be foolish to think Peirce went around thinking that we always think at all times with the third degree of clarity. For instance: *“I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call ‘intellectual concepts’, that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may hinge.”* ~Pragmatism His theory is for a community of inquirers and not specifically for the individual, for that would be too complicated. The method of ascertaining the meaning of ‘intellectual concepts’, he examines in many places but also demonstrates in the Neglected Argument. Moreover, he divested himself of the idea that the original maxim sufficiently treats the third grade of clearness. He does this in many places (cf., *What Pragmatism Is*) but for some reason, you (and many others, including academicians) routinely ignore this. For instance: “Moreover, my paper of 1878 was imperfect in tacitly leaving it to appear that the maxim of pragmatism led to the last stage of clearness. I wish now to show that this is not the case and to find a series of categories of clearness.” http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-09.htm You said: Further, when Peirce elsewhere starts making broad pronouncements about "thought" it oftentimes seems that he is referring solely to those rare instances of clear thinking, but other times is referring to the typical thinking, or all thinking? I can’t speak to whether he, throughout greater than 40 years of writing, maintained a single unitary definition for Thought. Yet, he does treat Thought in a technical sense as a theory, with the understanding that he is constructing a philosophical definition, one that will satisfy all who investigate. A complete logical form of thought is so given in its three elements; the three categories, set in argument form. It is the predicate term, *C*, that limits Thought. You said: The later is particularly suspicious. Assertions regarding the nature of *all* thinking would presumably be subject to extreme empirical scrutiny. As we have rejected traditional metaphysics, and denied any special powers of introspection, one would expect "thought" to be examined in the same way I don’t find your criticism here to be well thought out. What makes you think that “we” have rejected “traditional metaphysics”? Who do you even consider as belonging to “traditional metaphysics”? Have you ever read Aristotle? For he says things like: ‘The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill’, or, ‘The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child’. Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable.” ~Aristotle, *Rhetoric* Compare, for instance, against Peirce: The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. As per what Peirce said on signs, in particular a Complete Sign, I will leave for you to investigate. For instance, if you decide to take metaphysics (“the science of unclear thinking”) seriously, I think you will find fruit in comparing against *Posterior Analytics* I-23. Moreover, you shouldn’t reject traditional metaphysics until you even have an inkling of what is meant by a syllogism addressing the discourse in the soul. Hth, Jerry Rhee On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com> wrote: > Words are not merely psychological counters or tokens as it were. They are > philosophical in nature because word and language occupy a crucial point in > reality. > > The fundamental action of words is to massively limit the immense reality > of the vagueness from which the word springs, somewhat as ovulation > involves the selection of an egg or a few eggs from an unfathomable pool. > > The existence of language and word is theologically relevant because it > gets at the matter of reality itself and its fundamental nature. If as I > infer reality is all, and it moves, then it contains within its action and > rules the elements that account for all aspects of existence. > > Reality then can be seen to contain or be infused by the I Am that Moses > encountered. Its name is what is. > > However, we know that we function by language and I believe we also can > see the theological relevance of there being an Abba (the word) to whom > Jesus prayed who is both part of the I Am and part of what can communicate > with us. > > This may have to do with Tillich’s interesting notion of a God beyond God. > > My point here is that any seeing of language or words as psychological > cannot be what Peirce, as a realist and pragmaticist, would have accepted. > Words are tied in with ontology. > > That they impact us means that they become psychological as well but not > exclusively so. > > amazon.com/author/stephenrose > > On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Eric, none of the statements that you quoted in your 2/14/2017 message >> originate with Peirce. >> >> Peirce held that logic generally involves icons (including diagrams and >> not only graphic-looking ones), indices, and symbols, and he saw all three >> kinds of signs as needed. Remember also that Peirce so defined 'symbol' >> that plenty of symbols are not words and some words are not symbols. >> >> You wrote in your subsequent message: >> >> One can also find people with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) >> have lost their ability to coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot *do* >> language), and yet those people otherwise seem to think perfectly well. >> >> I remember a course on Merleau-Ponty decades ago in which the professor >> discussed patients who could no longer think about absent things. He said >> that they had lost their "symbolic function" - taking "symbol" in an old >> traditional sense as sign of something not perceived, especially something >> not perceivable, picturable, etc. I can't say off-hand whether those >> patients had completely lost their ability to think in symbols in Peirce's >> sense. >> >> I don't know whether Peirce held that actual people usually think in >> words or in any particular kind of signs, and what basis he would have >> offered for the claim; anyway it wouldn't be a philosophical statement, but >> a psychological statement, and Peirce was as adverse to basing cenoscopic >> philosophy (including philosophical logic) on psychology as he was to to >> basing pure mathematics on psychology. When he discusses semiotics and >> logic, he is discussing how one ought to think, not how people actually do >> think. >> >> Peirce said of himself: >> >> I do not think that I ever _*reflect*_ in words. I employ visual >> diagrams, firstly because this way of thinking is my natural language of >> self-communication, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the >> best system for the purpose >> [MS 629, p. 8, quoted in _The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce_, >> p. 126, by Don D. Roberts] >> >> Google preview: https://books.google.com/books >> ?id=Q4K30wCAf-gC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22I+do+not+think+I+ >> ever+reflect+in+words:+I+employ+visual+diagrams%22 >> >> Peirce described corollarial deduction as verbal and philosophical, and >> theorematic deduction as diagrammatic and mathematical. He seemed to have a >> higher opinion of the latter, which is not unusual for a mathematician. >> >> Peirce left innumerable drawings among his papers. I somewhere read that >> a considerable percentage of his papers consisted in drawings, I seem to >> remember "60%" but I'm not sure. A project involving those drawings (and >> accumulating an archive of reproductions ofthem) resulted in the >> publication of a book: >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/newbooks.htm#engel_queisner_viola >> >> Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. Peirce. [Visual Thinking: Charles >> S. Peirce].Actus et Imago Volume 5. Editors: Franz Engel, Moritz Queisner, >> Tullio Viola. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, March 21, 2012. Hardcover >> http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/224194 >> 346 pages., 82 illustrations in black & white, 31 illustrations in color. >> >> Peirce, as you say, often focuses on clear thought, but he sometimes >> discusses vague thought, and says that vagueness is often needed for >> thought. For example in his critical common-sensism. >> >> Peirce thought that there are logical conceptions of mind based not on >> empirical science of psychology nor even on metaphysics. See for example >> Memoir 11 "On the Logical Conception of Mind" in the 1902 Carnegie >> Application: >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm >> >> As to how linguistic people actually are or how linguistic one needs or >> ought to be, that will depend at least partly on the definition of >> language. In the quote of him above, Peirce uses the word "language" more >> loosely than some would. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 2/15/2017 11:16 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> >> Jerry, Clark, >> >> Thank you for the thoughtful replies. >> >> I have great love for Peirce and his work. But there are parts that I >> love less, particularly where Peirce ... seems to me to.... forget the >> parameters of his own argument. Peirce tells us what clear thinking is, >> while fully and responsibly acknowledging that most people do not think >> clearly most of the time. On that basis, if anyone thinks of anyone else's >> thoughts as entailing at all times the third degree of clarity, something >> is seriously amiss. Further, when Peirce elsewhere starts making broad >> pronouncements about "thought" it oftentimes seems that he is referring >> solely to those rare instances of clear thinking, but other times is >> referring to the typical thinking, or all thinking? >> >> The later is particularly suspicious. Assertions regarding the nature of >> *all* thinking would presumably be subject to extreme empirical >> scrutiny. As we have rejected traditional metaphysics, and denied any >> special powers of introspection, one would expect "thought" to be >> examined in the same way Peirce's exemplars, the early bench chemists, >> examined their subject matter. All the same challenges and limitations, and >> the same potential for novel triumph. Thus when Peirce talks about clear >> thinking he seems on steady ground, and when he talks about how a >> scientist-qua-scientists thinks about the world he seems on steady ground, >> but when there are no caveats regarding what "thinking" he is referring to, >> I get nervous. >> >> To Clark's question: While one could certainly find people who would find >> those assertions uncontroversial, there are problems. One can readily, for >> example, find individuals who (by all evidence) seem to think more readily >> and more commonly in words than in "images and diagrams". One can also find >> people with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) have lost their >> ability to coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot *do* language), and >> yet those people otherwise seem to think perfectly well. >> >> On 2/14/2017 10:41 AM, Eric Charles wrote: >> >> Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a >> separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the >> nature of other people's thoughts? >> >> People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They >> do? How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that? >> >> "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied >> altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness? >> >> Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite >> comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or >> act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried. >> >> Best, >> >> Eric >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Supervisory Survey Statistician >> U.S. Marine Corps >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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