I fully agree. I think mostly in diagrams and feeling - certainly not in words. 
The words, if they can do it, come after and quite frankly, don't really fully 
express those diagrams/feelings.

Words are, I think, 'post-diagram/feeling'. They are symbols, and symbols have 
to be learned, while diagrams and feelings are more direct, non-learned 
indexical and iconic connections. Therefore, to me at least, words are more 
'removed' from my basic thoughts than are the diagrams/feelings.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: John Collier 
  To: Benjamin Udell ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2017 8:17 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -


  From talking with colleagues, some say they think only in words and others, 
like me, say they think mostly in diagrams or in physical feelings that I 
attach no words to (and probably couldn’t in many cases). Although I am 
surprised when I find someone who believes they think in words only, I have 
little reason to doubt them, as it seems these people also think quite 
differently from me. One of the hardest things for me in learning analytic 
philosophy (after original training and work in physics) was to think in words. 
Dick Cartwright helped me immensely with this.

   

  Surely it is a psychological issue, if people differ so much in this respect.

   

  John Collier

  Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

  Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

  http://web.ncf.ca/collier

   

  From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:baud...@gmail.com] 
  Sent: Wednesday, 15 February 2017 8:16 PM
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

   

  Eric, none of the statements that you quoted in your 2/14/2017 message 
originate with Peirce.

  Peirce held that logic generally involves icons (including diagrams and not 
only graphic-looking ones), indices, and symbols, and he saw all three kinds of 
signs as needed. Remember also that Peirce so defined 'symbol' that plenty of 
symbols are not words and some words are not symbols. 

  You wrote in your subsequent message:

    One can also find people with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) 
have lost their ability to coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot do 
language), and yet those people otherwise seem to think perfectly well. 

  I remember a course on Merleau-Ponty decades ago in which the professor 
discussed patients who could no longer think about absent things. He said that 
they had lost their "symbolic function" - taking "symbol" in an old traditional 
sense as sign of something not perceived, especially something not perceivable, 
picturable, etc. I can't say off-hand whether those patients had completely 
lost their ability to think in symbols in Peirce's sense.

  I don't know whether Peirce held that actual people usually think in words or 
in any particular kind of signs, and what basis he would have offered for the 
claim; anyway it wouldn't be a philosophical statement, but a psychological 
statement, and Peirce was as adverse to basing cenoscopic philosophy (including 
philosophical logic) on psychology as he was to to basing pure mathematics on 
psychology. When he discusses semiotics and logic, he is discussing how one 
ought to think, not how people actually do think.

  Peirce said of himself:

    I do not think that I ever _reflect_ in words. I employ visual diagrams, 
firstly because this way of thinking is my natural language of 
self-communication, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the best 
system for the purpose
    [MS 629, p. 8, quoted in _The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce_, p. 
126, by Don D. Roberts]

  Google preview: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=Q4K30wCAf-gC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22I+do+not+think+I+ever+reflect+in+words:+I+employ+visual+diagrams%22

  Peirce described corollarial deduction as verbal and philosophical, and 
theorematic deduction as diagrammatic and mathematical. He seemed to have a 
higher opinion of the latter, which is not unusual for a mathematician.

  Peirce left innumerable drawings among his papers. I somewhere read that a 
considerable percentage of his papers consisted in drawings, I seem to remember 
"60%" but I'm not sure. A project involving those drawings (and accumulating an 
archive of reproductions ofthem) resulted in the publication of a book:

  http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/newbooks.htm#engel_queisner_viola

    Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. Peirce.  [Visual Thinking: Charles S. 
Peirce].Actus et Imago Volume 5. Editors: Franz Engel, Moritz Queisner, Tullio 
Viola. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, March 21, 2012. Hardcover 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/224194 

    346 pages., 82 illustrations in black & white, 31 illustrations in color. 

  Peirce, as you say, often focuses on clear thought, but he sometimes 
discusses vague thought, and says that vagueness is often needed for thought. 
For example in his critical common-sensism.

  Peirce thought that there are logical conceptions of mind based not on 
empirical science of psychology nor even on metaphysics. See for example Memoir 
11 "On the Logical Conception of Mind" in the 1902 Carnegie Application: 

  http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm

  As to how linguistic people actually are or how linguistic one needs or ought 
to be, that will depend at least partly on the definition of language. In the 
quote of him above, Peirce uses the word "language" more loosely than some 
would.

  Best, Ben

  On 2/15/2017 11:16 AM, Eric Charles wrote:

    Jerry, Clark,

    Thank you for the thoughtful replies. 

    I have great love for Peirce and his work. But there are parts that I love 
less, particularly where Peirce ... seems to me to.... forget the parameters of 
his own argument. Peirce tells us what clear thinking is, while fully and 
responsibly acknowledging that most people do not think clearly most of the 
time. On that basis, if anyone thinks of anyone else's thoughts as entailing at 
all times the third degree of clarity, something is seriously amiss. Further, 
when Peirce elsewhere starts making broad pronouncements about "thought" it 
oftentimes seems that he is referring solely to those rare instances of clear 
thinking, but other times is referring to the typical thinking, or all 
thinking? 

    The later is particularly suspicious. Assertions regarding the nature of 
all thinking would presumably be subject to extreme empirical scrutiny. As we 
have rejected traditional metaphysics, and denied any special powers of 
introspection, one would expect "thought" to be examined in the same way 
Peirce's exemplars, the early bench chemists, examined their subject matter. 
All the same challenges and limitations, and the same potential for novel 
triumph. Thus when Peirce talks about clear thinking he seems on steady ground, 
and when he talks about how a scientist-qua-scientists thinks about the world 
he seems on steady ground, but when there are no caveats regarding what 
"thinking" he is referring to, I get nervous. 

    To Clark's question: While one could certainly find people who would find 
those assertions uncontroversial, there are problems. One can readily, for 
example, find individuals who (by all evidence) seem to think more readily and 
more commonly in words than in "images and diagrams". One can also find people 
with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) have lost their ability to 
coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot do language), and yet those people 
otherwise seem to think perfectly well. 

  On 2/14/2017 10:41 AM, Eric Charles wrote:

    Yikes! My inner William James just raised an eyebrow. This is probably a 
separate thread... but how did we suddenly start making claims about the nature 
of other people's thoughts? 

    People think, not so much in words, but in images and diagrams..." They do? 
How many people's thoughts have we interrogated to determine that?

    "Consciousness is inherently linguistic." It is? How much have we studied 
altered states of consciousness, or even typical consciousness? 

    Sorry, these parts of Peirce always make me a bit twitchy. I'm quite 
comfortable when he is talking about how scientists-qua-scientists think or 
act, but then he makes more general statements and I get worried. 

    Best,

    Eric

    -----------
    Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
    Supervisory Survey Statistician
    U.S. Marine Corps



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