Clark, List: CG: The question is, if I have you right, what the relationship between chance and reason is.
I would suggest that 1ns is better characterized as spontaneity, life, and freedom than as pure chance in the sense of randomness, especially as it relates to mind as 3ns. CSP: By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the really sui generis and new can be said to be accounted for. (CP 6.59; 1892) CSP: The truth is, the mind is not subject to "law" in the same rigid sense that matter is. It only experiences gentle forces which merely render it more likely to act in a given way than it otherwise would be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary spontaneity in its action, without which it would be dead. (CP 6.148; 1892) CSP: Thus, when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity. (CP 6.201; 1898) CSP: We start, then, with nothing, pure zero … It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility--boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. So of potential being there was in that initial state no lack. Now the question arises, what necessarily resulted from that state of things? But the only sane answer is that where freedom was boundless nothing in particular necessarily resulted. (CP 6.217-218; 1898) CSP: No doubt, all that chance is competent to destroy, it may, once in a long, long time, produce; but it is a question whether absolute chance--pure tychism--ought not to be regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not necessarily physiological. It could not be caused, apparently, by the inorganic action of dynamical law ... In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. (CP 6.322; 1909) As I have mentioned before, I interpret Peirce's cosmological blackboard diagram as requiring someone to *draw *the chalk marks, since presumably they cannot just *appear* on their own. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 10:19 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > On Apr 5, 2017, at 8:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > As I understand him, especially in his late writings, for Peirce chance *does > not* form habits, it *only* facilitates breaking them; e.g., small > deviations from the laws of nature. The habit-taking tendency (3ns) is > "original," rather than a spontaneous development brought about by chance > (1ns). According to my reading of CP 6.490 in particular, super-order is a > *prerequisite *for being. > > Could you expand upon this a little more? I see his discussion of the > pragmatic maxim there. The question is, if I have you right, what the > relationship between chance and reason is. Certainly pure mind is rational. > So as mind it’s not chance. The question though is what constitutes mind in > this sense. Which may reflect the difference in description between us. In > terms of a analysis with mind, then we speak of mind. In terms of the > ontology of mind though, then I think my comments on chance apply. > > Now when we speak of mind we have to be clear what we’re speaking of. Here > I’m speaking of mind as thirdness or in particular habit and law. > > We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within > a limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of > pure spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be > supposed to mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity with law is a > fact requiring to be explained; and since law in general cannot be > explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing > how law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy. > (CP 1.407) > > While not explicitly about mind, it does explain the mind-like > constitution of the universe. Mind is mind because of its self-organizing > capabilities. But that, for Peirce, depends upon chance. Getting back to my > earlier discussion on entropy, Peirce does distinguish between > discontinuous and continuous chance. This is pretty important to him. (He > goes through this in “The Law of Mind.” Thus tychism is chance that > averages out whereas synechism is the sorting of irregularities which is so > key for his cosmology. > > Now mind isn’t chance. > > Is not one of my papers entitled "The Law of Mind"? It is true that I > make the law of mind essentially different in its mode of action from the > law of mechanics, inasmuch as it requires its own violation; but *it is > law, not chance uncontrolled*. That it is not "an undetermined and > indeterminable sporting” should have been obvious from my expressly stating > that its ultimate result must be the entire elimination of chance from the > universe. That directly negatives the adjective "indeterminable," and hence > also the adjective "undetermined.” (CP 6.607) > > So it’s this interplay between chance and law that is key. He expands upon > this in his argument for real chance which at the time was unusual. (CP > 6.613) > > In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four > positive arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows: > 1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to > the conservation of energy. > 2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is > manifestly inexplicable. > 3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to > be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or > real chance. > 4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of > energy is maintained. > > > In particular (4) is important for the ontological consideration of > entropy that Edwina listed. (As I said I don’t think it necessarily applies > for the biological application she takes) >
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