Edwina, Clark, List: ET: To the contrary, Mind ends up as generalities. "In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking.....a generalization of order" 6.490 Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit.
It might be helpful to review the entire context that quote. CSP: A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium* would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But *in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking*. Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied in any other way appears objectively as a character that is *a generalization of order*, and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The idea may be caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity are particular varieties. Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having a character related to *the habit-taking capacity*, just as super-order is related to uniformity. (CP 6.490; 1908) According to Peirce, "A disembodied spirit, or pure mind" is such that "in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking." What is "a generalization of order" is not Mind itself, but "Super-order"; i.e., how "thought embodied in any other way" than order itself "appears objectively." The "habit-taking capacity" is also not Mind itself; rather, "Pure mind, as creative of thought," appears in time to have "a character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to uniformity." Since uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the habit-taking capacity is evidently a particular variety of the thought-creating character of pure mind. I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint, uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in nature. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Clark, list - at the moment, I'm going to disagree - that is, I'm not > entirely convinced by your outline. > > The way I see it, is that Mind doesn't 'end up in the Final Interpretant > phase' as particular instantiations. To the contrary, Mind ends up as > generalities. > > "In endless time, it is destined to think all that it is capable of > thinking.....a generalization of order" 6.490 > > Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be > the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move > toward more differentiation but towards more generality. > > What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic > dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce > repeatedly refers to the 'breaking up of habit' [see Man's Glassy Essence, > 6.264] in which he writes of 'the manner in which habits generally get > broken up", because "matter never does obey its ideal laws with absolute > precision, but that there are almost insensible fortuitous departures from > regularity, these will produce, in general, minute effects. But protoplasm > is in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the characteristic of > unstable equilibrium that near that point excessively minute causes may > produce startlingly large effects"...."Now this breaking up of habit and > renewed fortuitous spontaneity will, according to the law of mind, be > accompanied by an intensification of feeling". > > My reading of the above is that Firstness, which is a basic foundational > law of the universe, could be defined as entropy, or the force that > continuously breaks up stability. Therefore - I don't get your conclusion > that Firstness is anti-entropy or that it violates entropy. If Firstness > were supreme then, we would in a sense, see the heat-death of the universe > since matter would dissipate to its lowest state or even non-existence. > What prevents this is Thirdness, the taking of habits - which enables > particular articulations of these habits to emerge and live their > short/long exisentialities. But Firstness, as a basic principle of the > universe, is quite ready to destabilize those habits and insert 'minute > differences - i.e, to act as entropy. > > That's where I see it at the moment. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 05/04/17 1:29 PM , Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com sent: > > On Apr 3, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, > feeling, chance - but - is entropy. > > Could you unpack that a little more? I *think* I understand what you’re > getting at — how chance undermines order — but I’m not quite sure. Or, put > an other way, if habit is the opposite of a rise in entropy then movement > away from habit (substance being the ultimate limit) would increase entropy. > > The place where of course Peirce has some difficulty here is with the > second law of thermodynamics. The heat death thesis is the clearest example > of this. Now one might say that Peirce’s conception of substance as the > limit of semiosis is heat death, but I don’t think that’s right. The heat > death is basically the interaction between things leading to a broad > distribution of energy so you lose differentiation. But for Peirce of > course habits are moving towards more differentiation. While we see that > locally we don’t see that globally. > > So far as I know not a lot has been written on Peirce and the second law > of thermodynamics. Which is surprising given how much has been written on > Peirce and chance - particularly related to classic epicureanism and > stoicism. Given Peirce’s background in physics and chemistry he knew > thermodynamics but from what I can tell didn’t really apply it to his > cosmology. > > One of the few articles on the subject in Andrew Reynolds “Peirce’s > Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics” in Transactions. There he notes > Peirce’s conception of the first law (conservation) was that it was just an > algebraic relationship and not an ontological condition (the way most > physicists take it). So for him it simply doesn’t prescribe that the total > amount of energy in the universe is constant. Merely that in any system you > have algebraic connections between energy flow. (See CP 6.602) > > He next distinguishes between forces for growth, that are irreversible, > from those tied to the conservation of energy which are reversible. Since > Perice thought growth had stronger evidence than conservation, growth was > the exception. (6.613) He adopts the position of Carus in which the brain > is primarily physical and thus subject to conservation laws except that > “there are present states of awareness….Neither states of awareness nor > their meanings can be weighed on any scales….” (CP 6.614) In explaining > that quote from Carus, Peirce says, “It escapes materialism. It supposes a > direct dynamical action between mind and matter, such as not been supposed > by any eminent philosopher that I know of for centuries.” > > Regarding entropy again, Peirce’s platonic cosmology is kind of the > inverse of what physicists would expect. The end is not heat death but a > system “in which mind is at last crystalized in the infinitely distant > future” (6.33) Reynolds argues that we ought distinguish between 20th > century views of entropy from Peirce’s 19th century views. (I don’t know > enough about the detailed history here to know how accurate he is - I’m > assuming he’s getting it right) > > Peirce praises the Maxwell/Boltzmann statistical interpretation of > entropy. (Reasoning, 220) The Boltzmann interpretation is that entropy > holds only statistically. But Peirce sees real chance as working in a > direction counter to the increase of entropy. “But although no force can > counteract this tendency, chance may and will have the opposite influence. > Force is in the long run dissipative; chance is in the long run > concentrative. The dissipation of energy by the regular laws of nature is > by those very laws accompanied by circumstances more and more favorable to > its reconcentration by chance.” (Writings 4.551) Reynolds argues Peirce is > thinking of what later was called the Poincare Recurrence Theorem. However > Peirce for mechanism favors Boltzmann and thus something like the heat > death but due to chance thinks this won’t happen. He recognizes the problem > with entropy but sees himself as an ontological evolutionist. Since “the > universe as a whole…should be conceived of as growing” (6.613) that growth > ontologically escapes both conservation and entropy. > > The way he does this is to see that there are temporary violations due to > chance but that there’s then a tendency towards entropy. So it’s that > combination that he thinks will let him achieve a final state, but which > because of growth won’t be a heat death state. > > Now of course none of this is terribly satisfying - especially to > scientists who tend to see the laws of entropy as ontological or absolute > laws. Indeed physicists seem quite willing to give up on most laws except > thermodynamics. It’s this reason that I personally find Peirce’s cosmology > so troubling, although I don’t think I’ve explained that before now. > > I know that was all long, but I want to return to Edwina’s initial comment > that firstness is both chance and entropy. For Peirce, I’ve hopefully > shown, those are actually opposed. Firstness is what violates entropy. It > is anti-entropy. > >
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