A few points. Thermodynamics is a specialty of mine since I was an undergraduate, especially the statistical version. I don’t think I agree with Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some cases it can be. In other cases it is just something like form considered in isolation. I take it that the senses (qualia on some accounts) start with this, but there is typically a good deal more going on outside of this firstness that would lead me not to call it entropic. However I would also say that there are events that we perceive that are not coordinated with previous experience, and that these can lead to habits to accommodate future similar events. See my Dealing with the Unexpected<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/CASYS2000final.pdf> (CASYS 2000) for an account of how this can happen in a complex system like the mind, though I see no reason why this need be a mental process, and could apply to interacting complex processes in general, leading to habits in the broad sense. In my paper I use the idea to explain Piaget’s asdsimi9lation and accommodation, which is, of course, a generalization process, but a novel one, not preprogramed.
There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound. I think it is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce focuses on chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, such as when we have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in either of our determining that we will be in the store at that time is coordinated with our friend’s determinants except that these determinants become coordinated when we meet. Without both stories together, the meeting is chance, but not random in the technical sense, since the stories together can be compressed to mark our meeting. I call situations like this relative randomness: two histories are not sufficient individually to predict a common event – they don’t contain enough information to compute this event, but the stories together do, assuming determinism. In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of the concept of entropy. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: Wednesday, 05 April 2017 8:43 PM To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term) On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward more differentiation but towards more generality. What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce Hopefully you saw that subsequent post where I noted not everyone agreed with the article I was using. Although I think in terms of Peirce’s conception of why thermodynamics doesn’t apply it’s pretty on the ball. My sense (perhaps wrong) is that the differences tend to be tied to terminology. To the above, I agree habits are introducing more and more generality. However as they become more and more habitual they come more and more to take the character of substance. That is substance/matter is simply a reflection of a lack of variation from the habit. Peirce saw in the long run that these habits would crystalize in some sense. Now from the perspective of a habit, any variation is a swerve. Peirce in various places appears to have since qualia or feeling as firstness as the inner view of swerve that he picks up (in a somewhat distorted fashion) from the Epircureans. So to that degree that swerve or chance is a break from habit I fully agree with you. That’s entropy, formally considered. The problem is that Peirce’s conception of the in the long run means habits become more set which is anti-entropic. The question though is what happens when habits form. Peirce sees that formation as also occurring out of chance. That’s why I think we can’t only say that chance/feeling is entropy. What Peirce sees as entropy proper is purely in terms of deterministic mechanics and the Boltzmann statistical view of entropy. So here we’re distinguishing between the law of entropy and the measure of entropy. That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Chance as a break from habit increases the measure of entropy. But it does not affect the law of entropy which is purely a law of physical necessary motion. The reason this is difficult to wrap our mind around is because we’re all used to quantum mechanics with it’s notion of randomness of a sort. Even people who don’t accept ontological chance still talk of randomness. Yet we apply thermodynamics to quantum mechanics all the time. So to us thermodynamics isn’t only a law of determinative mechanics. So when I asked you to unpack what you mean by entropy, more or less what I’m getting at is whether you are talking about 1. the measure of entropy 2. the law of entropy in general 3. a tendency to increase entropy The problem is that I think most of us who don’t see thermodynamics in terms only of Newtonian mechanics just fundamentally see Peirce’s use as wrong. So please be aware what I’m getting at here is how Peirce saw it, not what the right way of seeing it is. At a bare minimum Peirce’s use is incompatible with contemporary use in most cases. (We’ll ignore the Bohmian mechanics proponents for the moment)
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