Jon,
I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary R, as I have no desire to evoke that kind of feeling! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:31 Gary F., List: When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first constrains the mode of the second. [GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness?) The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law. [GF: ] Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term). The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object. [GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy … That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27. That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign. [GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination that accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine simpler, but not the reverse). GF: And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening. You seem to be saying that whether the Sign is an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object. By contrast, my understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign is classified as an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme. [GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way because it really is that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s definition of that Sign type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other words, I’m speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. All of Peirce’s definitions of the nine sign types in the three trichotomies are consistent with the order of determination as stated above, as far as I can see, but they are definitions, so they do determine what names are applied to the signs which fit them. The Sign in itself is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument in itself; it is only classified as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object. Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol in itself; it is only classified as such by virtue of its relation to its Object. [GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign types are classifications of Signs, i.e. of First Correlates in the various triadic relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse. Sometimes I think that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is sown by the habit of referring to the Sign as the “whole triad” rather than the First Correlate of a triadic relation, which is how Peirce defines the term “Sign” in the Syllabus. That’s why I consider it a bad habit, at least for any reader trying to understand Peircean semiotic. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
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