Gary F., List: When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first *constrains *the mode of the second. The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law. The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object. That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27. That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.
GF: And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening. You seem to be saying that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object. By contrast, my understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme. The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it is only *classified *as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object. Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *in itself*; it is only *classified *as such by virtue of its relation to its Object. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 3:06 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object > relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce > usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to > determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he > introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is > not mentioned in NDTR.) > > > > There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” > (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First > which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its > *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its > *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in > which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace > where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object > relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes > double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the > Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by > whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m > happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce > text. > > > > Gary f. >
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