John C,
You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in Peircean semiotic practice. But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying to understand what Peirce actually said about signs. I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct. Gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37 To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case. Cheers, John
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