btw, I was also trying to call attention to the difficult problem of sizing the field, for different, complex physical/mechanical and chemical interactions operate across large domains. It's hard to imagine a complete theory of pattern formation involving a field size of a whole, entire vertebrate embryo. a better approach would be to treat individual, growing fields of proper size, ~ 500um.
Best, J On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 2:43 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > dear kirsti, list: > > I was responding to your remark: > ""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical > concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is > needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up." > > I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern > formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on > morphogenetic fields. It's rather large and still mysterious once you get > down to the molecular details. > > Best, > J > > > On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > >> Dear J. Rhee, >> >> You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any connection >> to my recent post to the list. >> >> Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your point to >> be a most important one. >> >> Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds. >> >> With most kind regards. >> >> Kirsti >> >> >> >> >> >> Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21: >> >>> Dear kirsti, all, >>> >>> "The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than 50 >>> cells in any direction." >>> >>> Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in >>> diameter. >>> >>> Best, >>> J >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: >>> >>> Helmut, >>>> >>>> "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a >>>> theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining >>>> anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence >>>> backing it up. >>>> >>>> Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been >>>> presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his >>>> theory? - If so, where? >>>> >>>> Or are his theories just surprising and odd? >>>> >>>> In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his >>>> experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were >>>> exceptionally well designed and carried out. >>>> >>>> I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of >>>> the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory >>>> should!) >>>> >>>> All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Kirsti >>>> >>>> Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52: >>>> >>>> Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in >>>> the >>>> below text. >>>> Lalala, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>> Dear list members, >>>> I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.: >>>> Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think >>>> that >>>> the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness >>>> blocks >>>> the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and >>>> leads >>>> to false conclusions. >>>> To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two >>>> ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. >>>> The >>>> experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other >>>> experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the >>>> same? >>>> >>>> If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to >>>> explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop >>>> looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not >>>> think, >>>> that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If >>>> they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or >>>> something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not >>>> remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim. >>>> I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only >>>> publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being >>>> done >>>> now to some extent? >>>> On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, >>>> Laplacism >>>> was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union >>>> Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead >>>> to >>>> famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery >>>> of >>>> epigenetic mechanisms. >>>> When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier >>>> convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England >>>> have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the >>>> carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do >>>> not >>>> know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl >>>> molecules. >>>> But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the >>>> "Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This >>>> Peircean >>>> "Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It >>>> is >>>> merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the >>>> ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), >>>> transmitted, >>>> and so on. >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>> 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr >>>> "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses >>>> that have served well. >>>> >>>> But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can >>>> be >>>> dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of >>>> the >>>> world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application >>>> noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither >>>> by >>>> genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore >>>> self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, >>>> but >>>> thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees >>>> (not >>>> Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough >>>> for a >>>> selectionist explanation. >>>> >>>> John Collier >>>> >>>> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate >>>> >>>> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal >>>> >>>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] [2] >>>> >>>> >>>> FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] >>>> SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM >>>> TO: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake >>>> TED >>>> Talk >>>> >>>> John S, list, >>>> >>>> John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists >>>> agree, >>>> nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that >>>> nothing _ought _to be a dogma. >>>> >>>> And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," >>>> materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in >>>> "Reply >>>> to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism >>>> of >>>> actions/reactions of 2ns, etc. >>>> >>>> Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an _ideal_ of scientific, >>>> but >>>> I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of >>>> scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, >>>> whether >>>> they would say they do, or think they do, or not. >>>> >>>> Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the >>>> Additaments) by writing that even "approximate acceptance of the >>>> Pragmaticist principle" has helped those who do accept it: >>>> >>>> ". . . to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths >>>> that other philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of >>>> them not at all. Among such truths -- all of them old, of course, >>>> yet acknowledged by few -- I reckon their denial of >>>> necessitarianism; their rejection of any "consciousness" different >>>> from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgment >>>> that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which >>>> Really >>>> would produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to >>>> get actualized, and are thus Real generals); and their insistence >>>> upon interpreting all hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they >>>> would or might (not actually will) come to in the concrete. . . . " >>>> >>>> (CP 6.485). >>>> >>>> It seems to me that Peirce is clear--and while here he seems to be >>>> addressing philosophers in particular, elsewhere and frequently he >>>> argues this for science more generally--that many thinkers >>>> (philosophers and scientists alike) do indeed hold such dogmas as >>>> "necessitarianism" and "mechanism" (==Sheldrake's slide for dogma >>>> #1 >>>> "EVERYTHING IS ESSENTIALLY MECHANICAL). That Peirce's views were >>>> far >>>> from dogmatic follows for me from his theory of inquiry including >>>> his >>>> pragmaticism. >>>> >>>> Again, I don't necessarily agree with Sheldrake's list of putatie >>>> dogmas, and I would certainly fully agree with you if by "nothing >>>> is a >>>> dogma of science" you mean that this should be an essential maxim >>>> of >>>> the ethics of science. But just as Peirce argued that every >>>> scientist >>>> has a metaphysics--even as certain scientists argue against >>>> metaphysics altogether, that everyone of them ought take pains at >>>> discovering what are her perhaps hidden metaphysical >>>> presuppositions--I think that even those who claim that "nothing is >>>> a >>>> dogma of science" (but, I must quickly add, certainly not you, >>>> John) >>>> still many yet hold certain dogmatic views, and that these can >>>> enter >>>> into even whole 'schools' in certain fields of scientific endeavor. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> GARY RICHMOND >>>> >>>> PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING >>>> >>>> COMMUNICATION STUDIES >>>> >>>> LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK >>>> >>>> C 745 >>>> >>>> 718 482-5690 [2] >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:34 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >>>> >>>> I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science. >>>> >>>> As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, >>>> nothing is a dogma of science. >>>> >>>> John >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [3] [1] . >>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L >>> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a >>> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >>> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [3] [1] . >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L >>> posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a >>> message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >>> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [3] [1] . >>> >>> Links: >>> ------ >>> [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [3] >>> [2] http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [3] . >>> >>> >>> >>> Links: >>> ------ >>> [1] http://web.ncf.ca/collier >>> [2] tel:718%20482-5690 >>> [3] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>> >> >> >
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