Mike, List: Thanks for the link. Unfortunately--and somewhat surprisingly--Ika does not say anything about the Universes. The closest is the statement on page 61, "The concern of the phenomenologist is entirely with phenomena as such, regardless of whether they correspond to any real object in the universe or not (CP 5.122; 1903)." This led me to review the referenced passage.
CSP: Philosophy has three grand divisions. The first is Phenomenology, which simply contemplates the Universal Phenomenon and discerns its ubiquitous elements, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, together perhaps with other series of categories. The second grand division is Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to *Ends*, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. The third grand division is Metaphysics, which endeavors to comprehend the Reality of Phenomena. (CP 5.121, 1903) What caught my eye here is that Peirce defined all three divisions of philosophy as branches of phenomenology, in the literal sense that they are all ways of *studying phenomena*. The difference between phenomenology proper and metaphysics is that the latter studies the *Reality *of phenomena, rather than merely contemplating the phenomena *in themselves*, irrespective of their Reality. It seems to me, then, that the Universes as modes of Being/Reality indeed belong to metaphysics, whereas the Categories as elements of phenomena belong to phenomenology proper. Nevertheless, there is an obvious correspondence between the two in terms of 1ns/2ns/3ns. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Dec 2, 2017 at 11:01 AM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: > Hi Jon, List: > > I go back and forth on whether the Universes are intended to be > phenomenological or metaphysical. Calling them "Universes of Experience" > certainly suggests phenomenology, but Peirce's descriptions of their > constituents (EP 2:435, 1908) clearly imply modes of Being, which sound > more like metaphysics. In fact, he explicitly called them "modalities of > Being" in his letter to Lady Welby later the same year (EP 2:478-479, > 1908). Two years earlier, he wrote that when we use hypostatic abstraction > to turn predicates into subjects and place them into Categories or > Predicaments, > > I have found Siosifa Ika's 2002 thesis, *A Critical Examination of the > Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce: A Defence of the* > *Claim that his Pragmatism is Founded on his Theory of Categories* > <https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1018&context=theses>, > to be most helpful on these types of questions about the universal > categories. > > Mike >
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