Gary f., Jon, list, I am still troubled by a few things in Jon's proposal while still thinking that it might prove highly useful. I'll employ Gary f's most recent comments to make a couple of points concerning what yet troubles me.
Gf: I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said in your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification of sciences. In my view, not only does "there tend to be a lot of overlap between the language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics," but that in the matter of categorial 'aspects' (I think Gary f's terminology is sound) that they are all (or almost all) 'given' in phenomenology, Then, as Gary notes, metaphysics takes categorial principles from logic which has taken categorial *principles* from phenomenology, and in return in Peirce's Classification of Sciences, logic and phenomenology may take *examples* from metaphysics; while phenomenology can also receive examples ---and undoubtedly other help--from logic. But the categorial elements (including 'possibility---and in the section of Lowell 3 I referred to in my earlier post, Peirce is discussing not metaphysics, but pointedly, phenomenology), these categorial aspects *first* appear in some phaneron. Gf continues: Gf: However in phaneroscopy, rather than “*divisions* of phenomena,” I would say *aspects *of phenomena, or even better, *aspects of the phaneron*. Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but *abstracts* from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is present in anything “before the mind” in any way. I agree that at least in phaneroscopy that one might better say 'aspects' rather than 'divisions' of phenomena. Andre De Tinne, Director and General Editor of PEP, in a paper, 'Iconoscopy: Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic', has argued that once one has 'experienced' such aspects in the phaneron that one can then single individual aspects out and give them names (and, perhaps, do further analysis: e.g. to retrospectively see that in the simplest theoretical mathematics that they appear as monod/dyad/triad and, further, that Peirce's *Reduction Thesis* makes this division necessary and sufficient for further -adities; and, moreover, in my view it is this retrospective mathematical analysis which gives warrant to our referring to them as 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns in phenomenology when the categorial aspects first *appear*). (Btw, in his paper De Tienne suggests, and I think he's correct, that 'Iconoscopy' is not quite the proper term in this context and suggests that it ought better be something closer to 'Imagoscopy' which, however, is probably too weird and ugly a term; still, Iconoscopy, in referencing a term in semeiotic, is at least misleading). I have also suggested that there may be a 3rd branch of phenomenology. Joe Ransdell suggested that i call that branch 'Category Theory' and I immediately took his advice. In this branch of phenomenology one goes beyond Iconoscopy/Imagoscopy and arranges trichotomies of aspects identified in that branch. The paper and ppt presentation I linked to in my last post from the Arisbe site offers suggestions as to the kinds of content that this 3rd branch of phenomenology might concern itself with. Gf concludes: Gf: In their Firstness, by the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of it, but there is in their Secondness (which may be more or less degenerate). I think that Gf is essentially correct in this if one remembers that it is phaneroscopy proper which treats phenomenon in their 1ns. Further analysis, especially that using the tools of logic as semeiotic (and even a *logica utens*), can analyze phenomena in consideration of the other categories as well allowing for the two other possible branches just mentioned. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Dec 7, 2017 at 11:05 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > > > I think your proposal looks pretty good, considering that (as you said in > your response to Gary R), there tends to be a lot of overlap between the > language of phenomenology and that of metaphysics — especially when the > metaphysics takes principles from logic and logic takes principles (or > “categories”) from phenomenology, as is the case in Peirce’s classification > of sciences. > > > > However in phaneroscopy, rather than “*divisions* of phenomena,” I would > say *aspects* of phenomena, or even better, *aspects of the phaneron*. > Phaneroscopy does not divide phenomena into Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, but > *abstracts* from them the Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness which is > present in anything “before the mind” in any way. In their Firstness, by > the way, there is no difference between a phenomenon and the experience of > it, but there is in their Secondness (which may be more or less degenerate). > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 5-Dec-17 22:16 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture > 2.14) > > > > List: > > > > For the sake of spurring further discussion, here is a proposal for > parsing out Peirce's philosophical terminology. > > - In phaneroscopy, we discover the three Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns as > divisions of Phenomena according to the elements of experience: > quality/reaction/mediation. > - In the normative sciences, we discover the three Ideals of > esthetic/ethical/logical goodness as divisions of Ends according to the > contents of consciousness: feeling/volition/thought. > - In metaphysics, we discover the three Universes of > Ideas/Facts/Habits as divisions of Reality according to the modes of > Being: possibility/actuality/regularity. > > Criticize away! > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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