Gary F, list
I guess we'll just continue to disagree.
I don't consider that I've given a 'very free translation' of
1.346-7 which sounds rather denigrating of my view. I wasn't
translating at all, but reading and understanding it. You read and
understand it differently. I'm certainly not going to say that YOU
provide a 'very free translation'. Instead - you offer a different
interpretation. OK?
Peirce himself says that 'genuine triadic relations can never be
built of dyadic relations'..and refers to a 'spot with one tail, a
spot with two tails'....[i.e., he does use the term 'spot'] and
writes: 'You may think that a node connecting three lines of identity
Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is so". 1.346.
And that 'Y' which is in that sentence - is definitely that three
-spoked image. Further in that same section, as you also write, he
refers to the syllogistic triad .."There is a recognition of triadic
identity but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two
premises, which is itself a triadic relation". [Major premise, minor
premise, conclusion]. BUT - I consider that a syllogism is ONE Sign, a
semiosic triad. It is an Argument - and is made up of three Relations
in a mode of Thirdness. You would disagree.
So- I consider that Peirce was quite clear about the spoked image of
the semiosic triad.
Therefore - all that can be said is that you and I have a clear
disagreement on this issue. We can each present our views - and
that's that.
Edwina
On Tue 12/12/17 7:56 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,
Getting back to Mary’s question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning
of Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of
Peirce’s work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I
don’t know where that diagram started its career, except that it
wasn’t with Peirce. But then the three-spoke diagram of the
“semiosic triad” (as Edwina calls it) didn’t start with Peirce
either. Edwina’s given us a very free translation of what Peirce
says in Lowell 3.4 (aka CP 1.347), and I’d like to direct attention
back to what Peirce actually said (included below, diagrams and all).
Peirce does give a little diagram of “a node connecting three
lines of identity”: . This is what he elsewhere calls a “point
of teridentity,” which is entirely different from a “spot with
three tails” (it’s not a spot at all). He uses both diagrams, in
different ways, to prove (or rather “sketch a proof” of) the
irreducibility of Thirdness, which he refers to here as
“Meaning,” which “is obviously a triadic relation.” (At
least, that should be obvious to any student of the logic of
relations.)
To establish the truth of his first premiss, “that every genuine
triadic relation involves meaning, ” he asks us to take “any fact
in physics of the triadic kind.” It’s clear enough that “Three
things, east, west, and up, are required to define the difference
between right and left”; but his reference to the chemistry of
“active substances” is not very clear, at least to me. Maybe some
of the chemists on the list can comment on that. The relation of
“giving,” which he also uses elsewhere as an exemplary triadic
relation, would be represented by a “spot with three tails,”
because “giving” is a triadic rheme, a predicate which requires
three subjects.
But it’s the “other premiss of the argument” — “that
genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
of Qualities” — that Peirce elects to illustrate with Existential
Graphs, and in two different ways. First, you can’t make a triadic
rheme by joining the tails of two (or more) dyadic spots; that would
just give you two dyadic rhemes (or a chain of them, which is still
dyadic.
Second, you do have a triadic relation if three lines of identity
are joined at a spot of teridentity. This is what would occur in the
transformations of a sequence of beta graphs that would diagram the
series of events Peirce narrates, leading to the conclusion: “On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, “That is the same man I saw on
Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday. There is a
recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation.”
The key word that makes this a triadic relation is “consequently”;
the whole sequence is an argument, or inference, which is
unquestionably triadic. And of course an argument is a sign — a
sign which cannot be fully represented by a single existential graph,
but only by a sequence of them. Semiosis takes time.
Then, as an “interesting” afterthought, Peirce adds that while
no “complexus of dyadic relations” (as he put it in the Syllabus)
can constitute a genuine triadic relation, a complexus of triadic
relations can give you any higher -adicity — the point being,
again, that Thirdness is an irreducible element but there is no
irreducible Fourthness.
This brings us back to Phenomenology, with perhaps a deeper
understanding of its mathematical aspect.
As for semiotics, there is no diagram here of the triad
object-sign-interpretant. If someone can point to such a diagram
anywhere in Peirce’s writings (either triangular or three-spoked),
I will thank them profusely, for refuting my claim that neither of
those diagramming habits started with Peirce.
Gary f.
From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: 12-Dec-17 07:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4
Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.3,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884
[1]
I will sketch a proof that the idea of Meaning is irreducible to
those of Quality and Reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The
first is that every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as
meaning is obviously a triadic relation. The second is that a triadic
relation is inexpressible by means of dyadic relations alone.
Considerable reflexion may be required to convince yourself of the
first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves
meaning. There will be two lines of inquiry. First, all physical
forces appear to subsist between pairs of particles. This was assumed
by Helmholtz in his original paper on the Conservation of Forces. Take
any fact in physics of the triadic kind, by which I mean a fact which
can only be defined by simultaneous reference to three things, and
you will find there is ample evidence that it never was produced by
the action of forces on mere dyadic conditions. Thus, your right hand
is that hand which is toward the east, when you face the north with
your head toward the zenith. Three things, east, west, and up, are
required to define the difference between right and left.
Consequently chemists find that those substances which rotate the
plane of polarization to the right or left can only be produced from
such active substances. They are all of such complex constitution
that they cannot have existed when the earth was very hot, and how
the first one was produced is a puzzle. It cannot have been by the
action of brute forces. For the second branch of the inquiry, you
must train yourself to the analysis of relations, beginning with such
as are very markedly triadic, gradually going on to others. In that
way, you will convince yourself thoroughly that every genuine triadic
relation involves thought or meaning. Take, for example, the relation
of giving. A gives B to C. This does not consist in A's throwing B
away and its accidentally hitting C, like the date-stone, which hit
the Jinnee in the eye. If that were all, it would not be a genuine
triadic relation, but merely one dyadic relation followed by another.
There need be no motion of the thing given. Giving is a transfer of
the right of property. Now right is a matter of law, and law is a
matter of thought and meaning. I there leave the matter to your own
reflection, merely adding that, though I have inserted the word
“genuine,” yet I do not really think that necessary. I think even
degenerate triadic relations involve something like thought.
The other premiss of the argument that genuine triadic relations can
never be built of dyadic relations and of Qualities is easily shown.
In Existential Graphs, a spot with one tail —X represents a
quality, a spot with two tails —R— a dyadic relation. Joining the
ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by such
joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node
connecting three lines of identity is not a triadic idea. But
analysis will show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I
see a man, and I exclaim, “Why, that is the very man I saw on
Monday.” We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly
experienced the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, “That
is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw
on Monday.” There is a recognition of triadic identity; but it is
only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is
itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any
such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw before.
I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same, but
as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of
manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A,
which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought,
C.
347. It is interesting to remark that while a graph with three tails
cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, yet
combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build
graphs with every higher number of tails.
And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic,
pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find
that beyond these three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, there is nothing else to be found in the phenomenon.
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm [2] }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures
of 1903
Links:
------
[1]
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13884
[2] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm
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