List,
Peirces recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the slight glimpse into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of logical study. But before we plunge into that, Id like to point out a couple of questions raised by Peirces reference here to the term reference. Summarizing his previous remarks, he says that genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full Secondness. He did not use the term reference earlier in this lecture, but he did use it in the part of the 1903 Syllabus devoted to dyadic relations, CP 3.572: The broadest division of dyadic relations is into those which can only subsist between two subjects of different categories of being (as between an existing individual and a quality) and those which can subsist between two subjects of the same category. A relation of the former kind may advantageously be termed a reference; a relation of the latter kind, a dyadic relation proper. This seems consistent with the identification of Reference as Degenerate Secondness but what is advantageous about using the term reference in this way? And how is this specialized usage related to the ordinary usage of the common noun reference rooted in the verb refer? For instance, when I type the term cat to refer to the cat who is curled up on the sofa nearby, is there a dyadic relation between cat and word which is an instance of Degenerate Secondness? Spike the cat (to give him his proper name) is certainly an existing individual, and thus a Second, but does the common noun belong to a different category of being, a First which is a mere First? This may seem a trivial question, but it is definitely a semiotic question, because a word is definitely a sign. Now, semiosis is all about triadic relations; so what we are looking into here is the role of degenerate Secondness in triadic relations. I approached this topic several years ago in Chapter 7 of Turning Signs, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/xpt.htm#tention, and though I still have my doubts about it, I havent come up with any improvements. Regarding a sign, even a symbol like cat, as a First is not really a problem in the light of Peirces definition of the sign in the Syllabus (EP2:290-91) as First Correlate of a triadic relation. But Id like to know what other Peirceans think on this issue. Theres also a connection here with Peirces epiphany about existential graphs in 1906, when he said that: [[ in all my attempts to classify relations, I have invariably recognized, as one great class of relations, the class of references, as I have called them, where one correlate is an existent, and another is a mere possibility; yet whenever I have undertaken to develop the logic of relations, I have always left these references out of account, notwithstanding their manifest importance, simply because the algebras or other forms of diagrammatization which I employed did not seem to afford me any means of representing them. I need hardly say that the moment I discovered in the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs a representation of a universe of possibility, I perceived that a reference would be represented by a graph which should cross a cut, thus subduing a vast field of thought to the governance and control of exact logic. ] CP 4.579 ] But I think this message is long enough already, and Ill leave commenting on the rest of Lowell 3.11 for later. Gary f. From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 3-Jan-18 12:28 Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928 : [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, Qualitative Possibility, Existence, Mentality, resulting from applying Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: Primity, Secundity, Tertiality. [534] There are also three other kinds of firstness which arise in a somewhat similar way; namely, the idea of a simple original quality, the idea of a quality essentially relative, such as that of being an inch long; and the idea of a quality that consists in the way something is thought or represented, such as the quality of being manifest. [535] I shall not enter into any exact analysis of these ideas. I only wished to give you such slight glimpse as I could of the sort of questions that busy the student of phenomenology, merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of thirdness which is the sole object of logical study. I want first to show you what Genuine Thirdness is and what are its two degenerate forms. Now we found the genuine and degenerate forms of secondness by considering the full ideas of First and Second. Then the genuine Secondness was found to be Action, where First and Second are both true Seconds and the Secondness is something distinct from them, while in Degenerate Secondness, or mere Reference, the First is a mere First never attaining full Secondness. [536] Let us proceed in the same way with Thirdness. We have here a First, a Second, and a Third. The first is a Positive Qualitative Possibility, in itself nothing more. The Second is an Existent thing without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that First. A Third has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of being of a Law, or Concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being completely embodied. A Law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. [537] Now in Genuine Thirdness, the First, the Second, and the Third are all three of the nature of thirds, or Thought, while in respect to one another they are First, Second, and Third. The First is Thought in its capacity as mere Possibility; that is, mere Mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The Second is Thought playing the rôle of a Secondness, or Event. That is, it is of the general nature of Experience or Information. The Third is Thought in its rôle as governing Secondness. It brings the Information into the Mind, or determines the Idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or Cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a Sign. http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirces Lowell Lectures of 1903
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